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## WHAT IS PROPAGANDA, AND HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM PERSUASION?

Propaganda is a form of communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. Persuasion is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee. Our propaganda model depicts how elements of informative and persuasive communication are incorporated into propagandistic communication, thus distinguishing propaganda as a specific class of communication. Propaganda had few systematic theoretical treatments before the 20th century, which saw two world wars, wars of liberation, and ideological cold war conflicts between communism and capitalism. In war or peace, public opinion and behavioral change can be affected by propaganda. From its modern usage in the last century through the first quarter of the 21st century, propaganda retains a close association with war and conflict as an asymmetrical form of communication that favors the sponsor, in contrast to persuasion, which seeks a symmetrical exchange between parties.

Propaganda has been studied as history, journalism, political science, sociology, and psychology as well as from an interdisciplinary perspective. To study propaganda as history is to examine the practices of propagandists as events and the subsequent events as possible effects of propaganda. To consider propaganda as journalism is to understand how news management shapes information, emphasizing positive features and downplaying negative ones, casting media institutions in a favorable light. To examine propaganda in the light of political science is to analyze the ideologies of the practitioners and the dissemination and impact of public opinion. To approach propaganda as sociology is to look at social movements and the counterpropaganda that emerges in opposition. To investigate propaganda as psychology is to determine its effects on individuals. Propaganda is also viewed by some scholars as an inherent thought and practice in mass media culture and social media platforms. Another trend that draws on most of these allied fields is cultural or critical communication studies that include the study of propaganda as a purveyor of ideology. To this end, it is largely a study of how dominant ideological meanings are constructed and interpreted by people. Ethnographic research is one way to determine whether the people on the receiving end accept or resist dominant ideological meanings. Collective memory studies include how cultural memories of the past influence beliefs and actions in the present.

This book approaches the study of propaganda as a type of communication. Persuasion, another category of communication, is also examined. The terms *propaganda* and *persuasion* have been used interchangeably in the literature on propaganda as well as in everyday speech. Propaganda employs persuasive strategies, but it differs

from persuasion in purpose. A communication approach to the study of propaganda enables us to isolate its communicative variables, to determine the relationship of message to context, to examine intentionality, to examine the responses and responsibilities of the audience, and to trace the development of propagandistic communication as a process.

We believe there is a need to evaluate propaganda in a contemporary context free from value-laden definitions. Our objectives are (a) to provide a concise examination of propaganda and persuasion, (b) to examine the role of propaganda as an aspect of communication studies, and (c) to analyze propaganda as part of cultural, social, religious, and political systems throughout history and contemporary times.

## PROPAGANDA DEFINED

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*Propaganda*, in the most neutral sense, means to disseminate or promote particular ideas. In Latin, it means “to propagate” or “to sow.” In 1622, the Vatican established the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, meaning the sacred congregation for propagating the faith of the Roman Catholic Church. Because the propaganda of the Roman Catholic Church had as its intent spreading the faith to the New World, in competition with and opposition to Protestantism, the word *propaganda* lost its neutrality, and subsequent usage has rendered the term largely pejorative. To identify a message, especially that of the enemy or opponent, as propaganda today is to assign something negative and dishonest to its meaning. Words frequently used as synonyms for *propaganda* are *lies*, *distortion*, *deceit*, *manipulation*, *mind control*, *psychological warfare*, *brainwashing*, *dirty tricks*, or *fake news*. To update the old expression, one person’s fake news is another person’s truth. The ongoing resistance to the word or label *propaganda* is illustrated by the following examples. When the legendary film director John Ford assumed active duty as a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy and chief of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, he was asked by his editor, Robert Parrish, if his film *The Battle of Midway* was going to be a propaganda film. After a long pause, Ford replied, “Don’t you ever let me hear you use that word again in my presence as long as you’re under my command” (Doherty, 1993, pp. 25–26). Ford had filmed the actual battle of Midway, but he also included flashbacks of an American family at home that implied that an attack on them was an attack on every American. Ford designed the film to appeal to the American people to strengthen their resolve and belief in the war effort, but he resisted the idea of making films for political indoctrination. According to our definition, *The Battle of Midway* was a white propaganda film; it was neither deceitful nor false, the source was known, but it shaped viewer perceptions and furthered the desired intent of the filmmaker to vilify the enemy and encourage American patriotism. Similarly, in 1982, during Ronald Reagan’s presidency, a 26-minute documentary film, *If You Love This*

*Planet*, was released by the National Film Board of Canada. The film was directed by Terre Nash, who had heard the medical doctor and anti-nuclear activist Dr. Helen Caldicott speak about the horrors of nuclear war. She decided to film a subsequent talk by Caldicott, who was then president of Physicians for Social Responsibility in the United States, while intercutting dramatic images that included the aftermath of the nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with excerpts from a 1943 training film by the U.S. War Department called *Recognition of the Japanese Zero Fighter* (nicknamed *Jap Zero*).<sup>1</sup> The training film featured a young pilot played by the Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan. The Reagan administration attempted to prevent the anti-nuclear Canadian documentary film from being shown in the United States by labeling it “foreign political propaganda,” which helped draw more publicity. When Nash later won the Academy Award for Best Short Documentary in 1983, she personally thanked President Reagan’s administration for bringing attention to her film through its failed attempts to ban it. In our definition, *If You Love This Planet* is also a white propaganda film. It reflects the anti-nuclear views of the filmmaker Nash and featured speaker, Caldicott, and makes no attempt to disguise its intentions to generate more opposition to nuclear power and the use of nuclear weapons in geopolitics. Although the film is remembered for the overreach by the Reagan administration, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) elected not to air the film initially due to what it judged was its lack of balanced journalism. However, once the film received the critical acclaim of an Oscar, it was shown during a CBC late-night news program called *The Journal*. The CBC hesitation to air the anti-nuclear film shows how propaganda is often defined as what it is not. A century ago in April 1923, the American Society of News Editors issued a canon of journalism following public alarm at press complicity in generating propaganda stories during World War I. The statement, published by *The New York Times* under the headline, “A Newspaper Code,” made clear that the role of the press is a process to inform and differentiate deception and misinformation from the facts. “By every consideration of good faith a newspaper is constrained to be truthful” (“A Newspaper Code,” 1923, p. 2). Its purpose is to hold power accountable through impartiality, free of bias. This was the first time in American history to establish a mass media code of ethics. Nearly a quarter of a century ago, journalists Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel published *The Elements of Journalism* (2001) identifying nine core principles of journalism to present a new theory of the press for a new century. Subsequent to the book’s publication, they took their theory on the road to meet with more than 3,000 people in 21 public forums. Kovach explained the rationale: “We’ve got to make sure that as the public dissatisfaction grows, it doesn’t grow the wrong way, towards censorship that says, ‘Stop this. Stop that.’ We want a public that is more aware about what quality journalism means to them and their lives and what they’ve got a right to expect and how to recognize it” (Giles, 2001, p. 4).

In an era of digital information wars, it may be harder than ever to define what is quality journalism compared to propaganda. Traditional newsrooms have shrunk to historic lows. As much as we all would like to believe that the best press creates a

firewall of protection from propaganda effects, the reality is that manipulation and censorship will continue to seep into press coverage. Propagandists target the press to serve as an ignitor and distributor of their intentions. A reliable press system, like a good government, needs to acknowledge its susceptibility to this manipulative aspects of propaganda and make corrections to maintain its credibility with the public.

In 2013, the British Library installed an exhibition of historic and contemporary propaganda. Nick Higham, reporting on the exhibit for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), said,

Propaganda has a bad name. It is what repressive regimes use to glorify their leaders, motivate their citizens and demonise their enemies. It is about lies and distortion, manipulation and misrepresentation. But it is also, according to the British Library, about alerting people to the risks of disease, about making sure children learn how to cross the road safely and about building a perfectly legitimate sense of common purpose among the citizens of a democracy. . . . It [the exhibit] includes banknotes, postage stamps, a display of model Eiffel Towers and Nelson's Columns and a huge photographic blow-up of Mount Rushmore, illustrating the ways states use iconography and subliminal propaganda to brand themselves and promote a sense of belonging and common purpose among the citizenry. (Higham, 2013)

Terms implying propaganda that have gained popularity in the modern era are *spin*, *alternative facts*, and *fake news*. *Spin* is often used in reference to the manipulation of political information; therefore, press secretaries and public relations officers are referred to as "spin doctors" when they attempt to launder the news (Kurtz, 1998). *Alternative facts* became a buzz phrase when Kellyanne Conway, counselor to President Donald Trump, asserted on NBC's *Meet the Press* that the White House's assessment of the scope and size of the 2017 inauguration crowd was an alternative fact compared to what was reported by the news media (Fandos, 2017). Of course, there is no such thing as an alternative fact. A fact is a true and verifiable statement that has no alternative. *Fake news* is the deliberative spread of misleading and false information that contradicts the facts. It ranges from exaggerations of the truth designed for opinionated perspectives to made-up articles on social media. Common Sense Media found that less than 45% of Americans ages 10 to 18 could accurately detect fake news in their social media feeds, and nearly one-third of respondents said they had shared inaccurate news before realizing it ("Data: This Just In," 2017). Truth has become so distorted that the *Oxford English Dictionary* named the word *post-truth* the 2016 word of the year, citing both the British Brexit and U.S. presidential elections (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016).

Besides being associated with unethical, harmful, and unfair tactics, propaganda is also commonly defined as "organized persuasion" (DeVito, 1986, p. 239). Persuasion differs from propaganda, as we will see later in this chapter, but the term is often used as a catch-all for suspicious rhetoric.

When the use of *propaganda* emphasizes purpose, the term is associated with control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. Deliberate attempt is usually linked with a clear institutional ideology and objective. The purpose of propaganda is to convey an ideology to an audience with a related objective. Whether it is a government agency attempting to instill a massive wave of patriotism in a national audience to support a war effort, a terrorist network enlisting followers in armed struggle,<sup>2</sup> a military leader trying to frighten the enemy by exaggerating the strength of its army, a corporation pursuing a credible brand to maintain its legitimacy among its clientele, or a company seeking to malign a rival to deter competition for its product, a careful and predetermined plan of prefabricated symbol manipulation is used to communicate an objective to an audience. That objective endeavors to reinforce or modify the attitudes, the behavior, or both of an audience.

Many scholars have grappled with a definition of the word *propaganda*. Jacques Ellul (1965, p. xv) focused on propaganda as technique itself (notably, psychological manipulation) that, in technological societies, “has certain identical results,” whether it is used by communists or Nazis or Western democratic organizations. He singled out the United States, China, and the USSR as the three main propaganda blocs in the world and regarded propaganda as sociological phenomena. Ellul contended that nearly all biased messages in society were propagandistic even when the biases were unconscious. He also emphasized the potency and pervasiveness of propaganda. Because propaganda is instantaneous, he contended, it destroys one’s sense of history and disallows critical reflection. Yet Ellul believed that people have a need for propaganda because we live in mass society. Propaganda, he said, enables us to participate in important ritualized events such as elections, celebrations, and memorials. With regard to wartime, he said, “Before the war, propaganda is a substitute for physical violence; during the war, it is a supplement to it” (p. x). Ellul believed that truth does not separate propaganda from “moral forms” because propaganda uses truth, half-truth, and limited truth. A similar statement from British Labour politician Richard Crossman is that “the art of propaganda is not telling lies but rather seeing the truth you require and giving it mixed up with some truths the audience wants to hear” (Higham, 2013, p. 2). Edward R. Murrow, the famous CBS newscaster and host of the 1950s television news magazine series *See It Now* testified before the U.S. Congress in 1963 as new director of the United States Information Agency under JFK. One of the most known Murrowisms in the field of public diplomacy is the following quote about the American way of truth telling its official story to the world:

American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that. (Snow, 2013)

Leonard W. Doob, who defined propaganda in 1948 as “the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time” (p. 390), said in a 1989 essay that “a clear-cut definition of propaganda is neither possible nor desirable” (p. 375). Doob rejected a contemporary definition of propaganda because of the complexity of the issues related to behavior in society and differences in times and cultures.

Both Ellul and Doob have contributed seminal ideas to the study of propaganda, but we find Ellul’s magnitude and Doob’s resistance to definitions troublesome because we believe that to analyze propaganda, one needs to be able to identify it. A definition sets forth propaganda’s characteristics and aids our recognition of it.

Psychologists Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson (2001) wrote a book to inform about propaganda devices and psychological dynamics so that people will know “how to counteract their effectiveness” (p. xv). They regarded propaganda as the abuse of persuasion and recognized that propaganda is more than clever deception. In a series of case studies, they illustrated propaganda tactics such as withholding vital information, invoking heuristic devices, using meaningless association, and other strategies of questionable ethics. They defined propaganda as “mass ‘suggestion’ or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual” (p. 11), thus emphasizing verbal and nonverbal communication and audience appeals.

Other scholars have emphasized the communicative qualities of propaganda. Leo Bogart (1995), in his study of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), focused on the propagandist as a sender of messages:

Propaganda is an art requiring special talent. It is not mechanical, scientific work. Influencing attitudes requires experience, area knowledge, and instinctive “judgment of what is the best argument for the audience.” No manual can guide the propagandist. He must have “a good mind, genius, sensitivity, and knowledge of how that audience thinks and reacts.” (pp. 195–196)

In this context, Bogart regarded a government propagandist working for the USIA as a trained specialist similar in talent to what is necessary to serve as a foreign diplomat of the State Department. He valued the proselytizing Cold War origins of the agency and bemoaned the loss of America’s credibility abroad: “America is no longer universally perceived as the principal and most vigilant guardian of human dignity; what is perhaps even more significant, declining numbers of its own citizens see their country in this role.” (p. xviii)

Snow (2010), who worked at the U.S. Information Agency in the Clinton administration, said this about her former employer:

USIA prefers the term public diplomacy to propaganda because it doesn’t want the American public to think that its own government engages in psychological warfare and because ‘propaganda’ in the United States is a pejorative term for negative or offensive manipulation, particularly in the political arena.

. . . Many Americans today view their own government and other professed democracies as tellers of the truth except, of course, in wartime or when trying to win over converts during the cold war. It would surprise many Americans to learn that our own government has a decades-long history of propagandizing its own population and other countries.

Scholars have studied propaganda in specific institutional settings (corporate, government, nonprofit) and nation–states that range from democratic to totalitarian. In his book *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, the late Australian scholar Alex Carey viewed propaganda as a form of social control. In his chapter “The Origins of American Propaganda,” he wrote, “The successful use of propaganda as a means of social control requires a number of conditions: the will to use it, the skills to produce propaganda; the means of dissemination; and the use of ‘significant symbols,’ symbols with real power over emotional reactions—ideally symbols of the Sacred and the Satanic. The United States has, for a long time, provided all of these conditions in greater abundance than any other Western country” (1997, p. 11). Carey noted a pattern about the growth industry of propaganda over the last century: “The twentieth century has been characterized by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy” (p. 18). Carey said that “commercial advertising and public relations are the forms of propaganda activity common to a democracy. . . . It is arguable that the success of business propaganda in persuading us, for so long, that we are free from propaganda is one of the most significant propaganda achievements of the twentieth century” (pp. 14, 21). Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (2008), who analyzed the intervention of state-corporate propaganda power into the news media, were so influenced by Carey’s work on the “ideal of a propaganda-managed democracy” fueled by business and the intellectual sector that they dedicated the opening of *Manufacturing Consent* to his memory. The 21st century has advanced business marketing to the nth degree. Technologically advanced societies convey propaganda via marketing and fake grassroots techniques, according to Eliane Glaser. She said, “They emphasise the role of direct engagement with consumers taking part in the marketing process, and they talk of two-way communications with consumers, which sounds very egalitarian. But what it really means is that consumers are now circulating entertaining viral adverts on Facebook and companies are using ‘Astroturf’ or fake grassroots techniques to create the appearance of a broad base of support for their product or message” (Higham, 2013, p. 2). Think of how often we use social media to connect with friends and family. We may be inured to the sponsored messages and accept them as a part of our online engagement life, but Glaser’s point reminds us of how complicit we are in corporate messaging.

Shawn J. Parry-Giles (2002), who studied the propaganda production of the Truman and Eisenhower Cold War operations, defined propaganda as “conceived of as strategically devised messages that are disseminated to masses of people by an

institution for the purpose of generating action benefiting its source” (p. xxvi). She indicated that

Truman and Eisenhower were the first two presidents to introduce and mobilize propaganda as an official peacetime institution. In a “war of words,” propaganda acted as an integral component of the government’s foreign policy operation. To understand propaganda’s influence is to grasp the means by which America’s Cold War messages were produced and the overall impact that such strategizing had on the ideological constructions of the Cold War. (p. xvii)

Bertrand Taithe and Tim Thornton (2000) saw propaganda as part of a historical tradition of pleading and convincing and therefore

as a form of political language, however, propaganda is always articulated around a system of truths and expresses a logic of exclusive representation. It is the purpose of propaganda to convince, to win over and to convert; it has therefore to be convincing, viable and truthful within its own remit. . . . The shaping of the term propaganda is also an indication of the way the political nation judges the manner in which political messages are communicated. . . . Propaganda promotes the ways of the community as well as defining them. (pp. 2–4)

Recognizing how difficult it is to define propaganda, O’Shaughnessy (2004) devoted several pages to the term’s complexity. He recognized that propaganda is a “co-production in which we are willing participants, it articulates the things that are half whispered internally” (p. 4). Further, he wrote, “Propaganda generally involves the unambiguous transmission of message. . . . [I]t is a complex conveyer of simple solutions” (p. 16). Aldous Huxley (1936) noted its exploitative nature: “Propaganda gives force and direction to the successive movements of popular feeling and desire; but it does not do much to create these movements. The propagandist is a man who canalizes an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water, he digs in vain.” Terence H. Qualter (1962) emphasized the necessity of audience adaptation: “Propaganda, to be effective, must be seen, remembered, understood, and acted upon . . . [and] adapted to particular needs of the situation and the audience to which it is aimed” (p. xii). Influencing attitudes, anticipating audience reaction, adapting to the situation and audience, and being seen, remembered, understood, and acted on are important elements of the communicative process.

Pratkanis and Turner (1996) defined the function of propaganda as “attempts to move a recipient to a predetermined point of view by using simple images and slogans that truncate thought by playing on prejudices and emotions” (p. 190). They separated propaganda from persuasion according to the type of deliberation used to design messages. Persuasion, they said, is based on “debate, discussion, and careful consideration of options” to discover “better solutions for complex problems,” whereas “propaganda



results in the manipulation of the mob by the elite” (p. 191). These definitions vary from the general to the specific, sometimes including value judgments, sometimes folding propaganda into persuasion, but nearly always recognizing propaganda as a form of communication.

## JOWETT AND O'DONNELL'S DEFINITION OF PROPAGANDA

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The Internet era, particularly the social media age of the last two decades, has significantly increased the dissemination of propaganda; thus it is especially important to understand what propaganda is and what its capabilities are. We seek to understand and analyze propaganda by identifying its characteristics and to place it within communication studies to examine the qualities of context, sender, intent, message, channel, audience, and response. Furthermore, we want to clarify, as much as possible, the distinction between propaganda and persuasion by examining propaganda as a subcategory of persuasion as well as information. Our definition of propaganda focuses on the communication process—most specifically, on the purpose of the process: *Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.* Let's examine the words of the definition to see what is precisely meant.

### Deliberate

We define *deliberate* as a strong word meaning willful, intentional, and premeditated. It implies a sense of careful consideration of all possibilities. We use it because propaganda is planned and thought out ahead of time to select what will be the most effective strategy to promote an ideology and maintain an advantageous position.

### Systematic

*Systematic* complements *deliberate* because we define it as precise and methodical, carrying out something with organized regularity. Governments and corporations establish departments or agencies specifically to create systematic propaganda. Although the general public is more aware of propaganda agencies during wartime, such agencies exist all the time, for they are seen as essential communication elements to enhance policy and profit. For example, large pharmaceutical companies, known commonly as Big Pharma, wage massive advertising campaigns to affect the public and dominate lobbying efforts to try to influence politicians and elected officials in areas such as price regulation. Their size wields enormous influence over individual physicians and public health agencies. The COVID-19 pandemic became a boon for companies like Pfizer, which made a record \$100 billion in profit in 2022, largely off of its vaccine and antiviral treatments. Pfizer is also one of the top lobbying spenders and campaign contributors in the pharmaceutical and health product industry in the United States. Advertising campaigns are forms of systematic propaganda. Political advertising

campaigns, often negative, are systematic before elections. They are expensive to produce for television; consequently, digital technologies have been used creatively and systematically.

### Attempt

The goal of propaganda is to attempt to create a certain state in a certain audience; thus, propaganda is an attempt at directive communication with an objective that has been established *a priori*. The desired state may be perceptual, cognitive, behavioral, or all three. Each one of these is described with examples as follows.

### Shaping Perceptions

*Shaping perceptions* generally uses powerful language and images, which is why slogans, posters, symbols, and even architectural structures are developed during resistance movements and wartime. How we perceive is based on “complex psychological, philosophical, and practical habitual thought patterns that we carry over from past experiences” (Hayward, 1997, p. 73). *Perception* is the process of extracting information from the world outside us as well as from within ourselves. Each individual has a perceptual field that is unique to that person and formed by the influences of values, roles, group norms, and self-image. Each of these factors colors the ways a person perceives (O’Donnell & Kable, 1982, p. 171). George Johnson, in his book *In the Palaces of Memory* (1991), offered a colorful description of perception and recognition according to the activity of neural networks in the brain:

Looking out the window at the ocean, we might notice a bright light in the night sky hovering on the horizon. Deep inside the brain one neural network responds to this vector, dismissing it as just another star. But its intense brightness causes another network to guess that it is Venus. Then the light starts getting bigger, brighter, creating a different vector, a different set of firing patterns. Another network associates this configuration with approaching headlights on a freeway. Then two more lights appear, green and red. Networks that interpret these colors feed into other networks; the pattern for stop light weakly responds. All over the brain, networks are talking to networks, entertaining competing hypotheses. Then comes the roar, and suddenly we know what it is. The noise vector, the growing-white-light vector, the red-and-green vector all converge on the network—or network of networks—that says airplane. (p. 165)

Johnson (1991) continued, “How a perception was ultimately categorized would depend on the architecture of the system, that which a person was born with and that which was developed through experience. Some people’s brains would tell them they had seen a UFO or an angel instead of a plane” (p. 165). Because members of a culture share similar values and norms as well as the same laws and general practices, it is quite possible to have group perceptions or, at least, similar perceptions within a cultural group.

Our language is based on a vast web of associations that enables us to interpret, judge, and conceptualize our perceptions. Propagandists understand that our constructed meanings are related to both our past understanding of language and images and the culture and context in which they appear. Perception is dependent on our attitudes toward issues and our feelings about them. For example, the phrase “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” has been used for decades as a rallying cry at pro-Palestinian rallies to support a one-state solution. In 2023, it reemerged as a highly contested slogan in the Israel– Hamas war. UK Home Secretary Suella Braverman released a public declaration about the phrase:

It is not just explicit pro-Hamas symbols and chants that are cause for concern. I would encourage police to consider whether chants such as ‘from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free’ should be understood as an expression of a violent desire to see Israel erased from the world and whether its use in certain contexts may amount to a racially aggravated section 5 public order offence. (Dawn, 2023)

Braverman’s remarks reflect the position of many Jews that such words are an anti-semitic code or dog whistle for the elimination of the state of Israel. Days following the Hamas attack on Israel, Austrian officials banned a pro-Palestinian gathering after the phrase “from the river to the sea” was used in publicity materials, explaining that the words were an incitement to violence and hatred. The police later rescinded the policy: “According to current jurisprudence, the sentence ‘from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free’ does not constitute incitement to hatred” (Dawn, 2023). Clearly, the web of associations in language has far-reaching consequences, and contested terms will persist as long as contested perceptions exist.

An Associated Press (2006) article titled “Doublespeak: Lingo in Nation’s Capital as Important as Issues” offered several examples of language that evade “responsibility and accountability,” including a government report that referred to “food insecurity” instead of hunger in America; descriptions of suicide by war captives were labeled as “self-injurious behavior incidents,” and interrogations as “debriefings” (p. A1). When the sky became dark and dirty with smog during the first few days of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, Chinese officials referred to it as “haze” (Plaschke, 2008, p. S4).

President George W. Bush began to use the phrase “war on terror” 9 days after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and continued using it throughout his reelection campaign in 2004. Gilles Kepel, in *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (2004), said, “The phrase was engineered to heighten fear while simultaneously tapping the righteous indignation of citizens in ‘civilized nations’ against barbaric murderers who would perpetrate despicable atrocities on innocent victims” (p. 112). Officially it was called the Global War on Terrorism and, briefly, the Long War. After the election of Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama in 2008, the phrase came under criticism. The Obama administration

dropped references altogether to “global war on terror” and “Islamic extremism” in its May 2010 National Security Strategy report (Harnden, 2010), which also stated, “This is not a global war against a tactic—terrorism, or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qaeda, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners.”

The U.S. military has created perception-shaping phrases that sanitize the reality of war, for example, “collateral damage” standing for civilians killed or injured, “friendly fire” for soldiers killed or injured by troops from their side, “turkey run” for randomly killing a massive number of people, and “sorties” for bombing missions. Military acronyms such as WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and IED (improvised explosive device) have become so common in news reporting that they have become public jargon.

President Bush made a serious gaffe when, in impromptu remarks, he described America’s goal to annihilate Al Qaeda’s Taliban hosts in Afghanistan as a “crusade.” In the Muslim world, “crusade” represents medieval European Christianity’s Crusades against Islam. There was an uproar over the religious connotations of the word, which suggested that Bush wanted to conquer Islam. Bush retracted the term immediately and promptly visited The Islamic Center of Washington, an historical mosque along Embassy Row, in an attempt to nullify the impression that American mobilization against Al Qaeda was aimed at Muslims or at Islam in general (Kepel, 2004, p. 117). Osama bin Laden, however, quickly picked up the term and used it in his Al Qaeda propaganda messages denouncing American crusaders. President Bush would go on to rededicate the Islamic Center on June 27, 2007 as part of his effort to make amends for the original gaffe and promote American ideals of religious freedom in the war on terror:

For those who seek a true understanding of our country, they need to look no farther than here. This Muslim center sits quietly down the road from a synagogue, a Lutheran church, a Catholic parish, a Greek Orthodox chapel, a Buddhist temple—each with faithful followers who practice their deeply held beliefs and live side by side in peace.

Perceptions are also shaped by visual symbols. During the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, symbolic yellow ribbons were put on trees, fences, buildings, automobiles, and jewelry to indicate support of the U.S. military. The ritual of tying yellow ribbons can be traced back to the American Civil War, when women wore yellow ribbons for their loved ones who were away at war. The 1949 John Wayne film *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* reflects the theme of remembering someone who is away. To signify identification and status as commander in chief of the armed forces, President Bush wore combat clothes when he visited troops in a surprise visit to Baghdad, Iraq, on Thanksgiving Day, 2003, and President Obama wore a bomber jacket when he spoke to the troops at Bagram Air Base in Kabul on March 28, 2010. Posters have become common in the Middle East and Latin American protest meetings. In Syria, both the Assad government and the opposition supporters have used multiple posters, which can be seen on websites.

As we have seen, digital technology enables images to be sent to television, newspapers, and the Internet instantly. Photographs are easily doctored or faked, making it difficult to tell what is real and what is not. A video of a man and his 12-year-old son, Mohammed al-Dura, cowered behind a concrete structure in the Gaza strip, while Israeli soldiers and Palestinian fighters engaged in gun battle, appeared in September 2000. The boy appeared to be killed and the father wounded in the cross fire. A clip of the boy's death was widely circulated on television worldwide, and stills appeared on the front pages of newspapers. This visual became a symbol of continuing atrocities for the Palestinian intifada, causing riots to break out in the West Bank and violent outbreaks against Jews not only in Israel but also elsewhere around the world. According to an article in *Reader's Digest* ("Seeing Isn't Believing," 2004), there were many indications that the video was staged.

There have been numerous accounts of incorrect images in Western media of the 2012–2017 Syrian conflict. The BBC used a 9-year-old photograph of hundreds of dead Iraqi children who were said to have been killed in a 2012 government massacre in Houla, Syria (Watson, 2012). In another instance, *The New York Times*, relying on a video released from Tremseh, Syria, reported that hundreds of people had been killed by the Assad government troops. After United Nations investigators went to Tremseh, they found that the death toll was much smaller, perhaps 40–100, and that most of the dead were opposition rebels who had fought against the Syrian Army. It turned out that it was a propaganda video from the rebel fighters (Gopal, 2012). The Syrian sectarian conflict has witnessed gruesome atrocities on both sides, and graphic images have been shown on YouTube and other Internet sites for propaganda purposes (Baker, 2013).

As the dangerous eating disorder anorexia nervosa reaches epidemic proportions among young girls and women, hundreds of pro-anorexia websites keep appearing on the Internet. These websites, which appear to be put up by young anorexic females and friends, offer advice on dieting tips for drastic weight loss, strategies to trick parents into believing that their daughters are eating, and praise on behalf of extreme thinness. Visual propaganda on these *Pro-Ana* (anorexia is personified as "My friend Ana") websites features photographs of famous models and movie stars that have been altered to make them appear even thinner than they actually are. Photographs of extremely obese women are also shown to trigger extreme fasting.

There is nothing new about propagandists exploiting the media to get their visual messages across; historical propagandists did so as well to shape perceptions. In 1914, Mary Richardson went into the National Gallery in London and slashed a painting, *The Rokeby Venus*, a 1650 masterpiece by Diego Velasquez. At her trial, she said her motive had been to draw attention to the treatment of the suffragette leader Emmeline Pankhurst, who was on a hunger strike in prison. Toby Clark (1997) said,

The attack on the painting would have been partly understood as an extension of the suffragettes' tactic of smashing department store windows, which assaulted feminized spaces of consumerism like a parodic inversion of shopping.

By moving the battle to the nation's foremost art museum, Richardson brought the values of the state's guardians of culture into the line of fire, and by choosing a famous picture of a nude woman, she targeted the point of intersection between institutional power and the representation of femininity. . . . Richardson had not destroyed the picture, but altered it, making a new image—the slashed Venus—which was widely reproduced in photographs in the national press, as Richardson had surely anticipated. Though the newspapers' response was hostile, demonizing “Slasher Mary” as a monstrous hysteric, Richardson had succeeded in using the mass media to disseminate “her” picture of a wounded heroine, in effect a metaphorical portrait of the martyred Pankhurst and of the suffering of women in general. (pp. 28–29)

As perceptions are shaped, *cognitions may be manipulated*. One way that cognitions or beliefs are formed is through a person's trust in their own senses (Bem, 1970). Certainly, an attitude is a cognitive or affective reaction to an idea or object based on one's perceptions. Of course, once a belief or an attitude is formed, a person's perceptions are influenced by it. This does not happen in a vacuum. The formation of cognitions and attitudes is a complex process related to cultural and personal values and emotions.

Manipulation means to manage, control, and handle to one's own advantage. Although the word suggests something negative, manipulation can have positive results. For example, a parent may manipulate a teenager by cutting off an allowance or use of the family car if the child does not get good grades in school. The Voice of America (VOA) during World War II had a stated directive to manipulate the cognitions of both the enemy and America's allies. It was to “spread the contagion of fear among our enemies but also to spread the contagion of hope, confidence and determination among our friends” (Shulman, 1997, p. 97).

There were many heroes among the troops fighting in the second Iraq war, but the story of Private Jessica Lynch received nonstop coverage in the media. One story in the *Washington Post* (Baker, 2003), whose headlines claimed, “She Was Fighting to the Death,” manipulated a public cognition that the 19-year-old supply clerk had fought fiercely against her Iraqi attackers but was riddled with bullet and knife wounds. As a prisoner of war, the papers said she was abused and finally rescued in a daring night raid. A revised story (Priest et al., 2003), with the headline “A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together,” disclosed that Lynch had not been shot or stabbed but that a Humvee accident shattered her bones. Her rifle jammed, thus she never fired, and her captors were gone before she was rescued. As Ellen Goodman wrote in her column titled “Jessica Lynch a Human, Not Symbolic, Hero” (2003), “By making Jessica into a cartoon hero, we may have missed the bravery of the young soldier. . . . Jessica Lynch has now become a redefining story of the war, with skeptics asking whether the Pentagon spun the media or the media hyped the story” (p. B4). Whether it was the Pentagon or media hype, the public's cognitions were manipulated.

After a devastating cyclone that killed 60,000 people in Myanmar (formerly Burma) on May 3, 2008, 1.5 million people faced disease and starvation. When the United Nations World Food Program delivered airplanes full of aid, relief workers were barred entry into the country. Instead, members of the military, including Senior General Than Shwe, handed out the donated food and medicine from boxes that had the names of the generals written on them. A referendum to solidify the ruling junta's power was held as scheduled. Because the people believed that the aid had come from the generals, they were inclined to have positive attitudes toward them (Associated Press, 2008). Beliefs and attitudes are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Often, the *direction of a specific behavior* is the intent of a propaganda effort. During war, one desired behavior is defection of enemy troops. In the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. Fourth Psychological Operations Group dropped 29 million leaflets on Iraqi forces to attract defectors. A U.S. radio program, *Voice of the Gulf*, featured testimonials from happy Iraqi prisoners of war, along with prayers from the Koran and the location of the bomb targets for the next day. Seventy-five percent of Iraqi defectors said they were influenced by the leaflets and the radio broadcasts ("A Psy-Ops Bonanza," 1991). The same tactic was used in the 2003 Iraq war when leaflets that said, "Do Not Risk Your Life and the Lives of Your Comrades. Leave Now and Go Home. Watch Your Children Learn, Grow and Prosper" were dropped on Iraqi military forces. At the beginning of the 2001 war on the Taliban, U.S. military radio broadcasts into Afghanistan by Air Force EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft warned the Taliban in two of the local Afghan languages that they would be destroyed not only by U.S. bombs and missiles but also by American helicopters and ground troops:

Our helicopters will rain fire down upon your camps before you detect them on radar. . . . Our bombs are so accurate we can drop them right through your windows. Our infantry is trained for any climate and terrain on earth. United States soldiers fire with superior marksmanship and are armed with superior weapons.

This tactic to frighten the enemy was successful in directing a specific behavior; Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem, deputy director of operations for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "I have not seen any reports that they are returning fire on our aircraft" (Associated Press, 2001).

Al Qaeda websites not only attempt to recruit people to the jihad, but they also provide behavioral instructions for making bombs and how to use them. A month before the Boston Marathon attack in 2013, "the Al Qaeda branch in Yemen posted on the Web the 'Lone Mujahid Pocketbook,' a compilation of all the do-it-yourself articles with jaunty English text, high-quality graphics and teen-friendly shorthand, . . . [stating], 'There's no need to travel abroad, because the frontline has come to you.'" The Boston attack seems to have followed the tips. "The pressurized cooker should be placed in crowded areas and left to blow up," the manual says. "More than one of these could be planted to explode at the same time" (Shane, 2013, p. 2). Dzhokhar Tsarnaev told FBI investigators that he and

his brother Tamerlan followed the script to make the bombs that killed three people and injured scores of others at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Tamerlan downloaded the summer 2010 issue of *Inspire*, an online magazine published by Al Qaeda, that gave detailed instructions on how to make bombs from pressure cookers, explosive powder, and shrapnel. He also downloaded extremist Muslim literature that advocates “violence designed to terrorize the perceived enemies of Islam” (Associated Press, 2013b, p. A3). It appeared that the Tsarnaev brothers were “radicalized and instructed in explosives not at a training camp but at home on the Internet” (Shane, 2013, p. 2). Thus a specific behavior was the result of a propaganda effort. The desired response furthered the intent of Al Qaeda because of the spectacular media impact that followed.

Beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are desirable end states for propagandistic purposes and determine the formation of a propaganda message, campaign, or both. Because so many factors determine the formation of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, the propagandist has to gather a great deal of information about the intended audience.

### Achieve a Response

To continue with the definition, propaganda seeks to *achieve a response*, a specific reaction or action from an audience *that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist*. These last words are the key to the definition of propaganda, for the one who benefits from the audience’s response, if the response is the desired one, is the propagandist and not necessarily the members of the audience. People in the audience may think the propagandist has their interests at heart, but in fact, the propagandist’s motives are selfish ones. Selfish motives are not necessarily negative, and judgment depends on which ideology one supports. For example, people who listened to the VOA broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War found satisfaction for their hunger for information, and thus it appeared that VOA had altruistic motives. The information they received from VOA, however, was ideologically injected to shape positive perceptions about the United States and its allies and to manipulate attitudes toward democracy, capitalism, and freedom. Most Americans would not regard these practices as negative, but Communist government officials did. An estimated 410 million people each week access U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) programming (USAGM, 2023a), the federal agency that oversees VOA and other international broadcasting entities. These include the Office of Cuba Broadcasting and four nonprofits: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Open Technology Fund. Government-sponsored international broadcasting is explored in a later chapter. Later in this chapter, in the section on subpropaganda, we give examples of seemingly altruistic communication that was deliberately designed to facilitate acceptance of an ideology.

### Propaganda and the Containment of Information

When conflict exists and security is required, it is not unusual for propagandists to try to contain information and responses to it in a specific area. Recipients of propaganda



messages are discouraged from asking about anything outside the contained area. During wartime, members of the press complain about restrictions placed on them in reporting the events of the war. Newspaper reporters covering the Civil War complained in the 1860s, as journalists did during more than a century later in the Gulf War in 1991. In the latter war, press pool writer Tom Wicker of *The New York Times* wrote, “The Bush administration and the military were so successful in controlling information about the war that they were able to tell the public just about what they wanted the public to know. Perhaps worse, press and public largely acquiesced in this disclosure of only selected information” (1991, p. 96).

## The First Casualty

Complaints regarding information control during wartime are not unusual. Consider the saying, “The first casualty when war comes is the truth,” credited to U.S. Senator from California, Hiram Johnson. Former *Washington Post* editor Ben Bagdikian, author of *The Media Monopoly*, began the foreword to the book, *War, Media and Propaganda* (Kamalipour & Snow, 2004) with these words: “It was Senator Hiram Johnson who, in 1917, arguing before the Senate against the United States’ entry into World War I, said, “The first casualty when war comes is the truth.” Bagdikian added: “It was I.F. Stone who told a group of aspiring journalists, “The first thing you need to understand in covering politics is that all governments lie.” Hiram Johnson’s remarks were later reported by *The Baltimore Sun* (1929) in reference to the Kellogg Anti-War Pact, or the “General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy.” Johnson, who viewed support for the agreement as mostly symbolic, still supported it in an almost unanimous vote of 85–1. He said in full: “The first casualty when war comes is truth, and whenever there is a war, and whenever an individual nation seeks to coerce by force of arms another, it always acts and always insists that it acts under self-defense.” The 2003 Academy Award-winning documentary film by Errol Morris, *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons From the Life of Robert S. McNamara*, uses a military term in its title to refer to the lack of clarity in decision-making in the mist and fog of conflict. The U.S. Marine Corps (2018) reference manual, *Warfighting*, first published in 1989, notes the uncertainty of war and how it affects the information and misinformation spectrum.

All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty, or the “fog of war.”

Uncertainty pervades battle in the form of unknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even about the friendly situation. While we try to reduce these unknowns by gathering information, we must realize that we cannot eliminate them—or even come close. The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

The first casualty of war may be the truth, but is it based on the uncertainty that the fog of war brings or through deliberate intention to deceive? How the media elect to frame a conflict makes a difference in the public's mind about who is winning or losing, identifies who wears the white hats and who wears the black hats, and implies which actors are at most fault for the loss of life. For example, on November 9, 2023, a month after October 7, 2023, *Washington Post* reporters Wagner and Sommer (2023) published an article, "Hundreds of Journalists Sign Letter Protesting Coverage of Israel." The article added a link to a website (<https://www.protect-journalists.com/>) with an open letter from 750 journalists affiliated with dozens of news organizations, including *The New York Times*, Reuters, the *Los Angeles Times*, and *The Washington Post*, who condemned Israel's killing of reporters in Gaza and criticized Western media's coverage of the war that followed the attack by Hamas on October 7. Elite media frames serve a propagandistic function when they highlight or downplay the roles of warring parties, as well as victims, to a conflict. In December 2023, *The Washington Post* maintained a special section of its newspaper coverage using the headline "Israel-Gaza War," although the URL kept the original headline, "Israel-Hamas War": <https://www.washingtonpost.com/israel-hamas-war/>. CNN chose to identify the conflict as "Israel-Hamas War" (Chen et al., 2023) in alignment with other newspapers of record, like *The New York Times*, that published a timeline, "Key Moments in 2 Months of War Between Israel and Hamas." (Bigg, 2023).

Although contemporary technology is capable of instantaneous transmission of messages around the world via the Internet and because of the tremendous expansion of exposure to all the mass media throughout the world, it is difficult for a country to isolate its citizens from ideas and information that are commonly known in the rest of the world. Despite the wide availability of the Internet, smartphones, computers, tablets, and other digital devices, countries like North Korea, China, and Iran are at the top of many lists for Internet censorship along with Iraq, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Chinese censorship came to be known as "The Great Firewall," referring to a "vast digital barricade that prevented Chinese users from seeing newspaper stories critical of China's leaders or reports from human rights groups" (Osnos, 2014, p. 30). In China, users must use messaging apps that are made and likely controlled within the country, for example WeChat, which has no end-to-end encryption to prevent data from being read or secretly modified other than by the actual sender and recipient. The Communist government in Beijing under President Xi Jinping has intensified its efforts to control what its citizens can read and discuss online. Before the widespread adoption of mobile phones, Internet cafés were popular in China. In 2008 café owners were forced to use only officially sanctioned software, Red Flag Linux, which eliminated access to the English-language websites. Furthermore, computer users at Internet cafés were required by the China State Council Information Office, which supervises the Internet in China, to register with their actual names and numbers as they appeared on their identification cards. Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet Project at the University of California-Berkeley, explained the actions: "It mainly means [a]

less secure and private communication environment for netizens in those Internet cafes. The authorities are gaining more control” (Radio Free Asia, 2008). In regions where there is antigovernment unrest, censors cut off Internet service to places like the Xinjiang region after there were deadly clashes between ethnic Uighurs and Han in 2009 (Ansfield, 2009). The 19th Party Congress enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” into the party’s constitution in 2017, placing him in the same esteemed company as the founder of modern China, Mao Zedong (Ruwitch, 2018). President Xi declared that China’s media “must work for the party’s will . . . and protect the party’s authority and unity” (Wong, 2016, p. 2). Xi also ruled that foreign media companies must be prevented from publishing and distributing content online inside China. Prohibited content included depictions of homosexual relationships, underage romance, extramarital affairs, smoking, witchcraft, and reincarnation (Qin, 2016, p. 1).

Google, the ubiquitous search engine that is considered one of the most powerful multinational companies in the world, is one of the five Big Tech companies alongside Amazon, Apple Inc., Meta, and Microsoft. Google’s China search engine, www.google.cn, launched in 2006, 2 years after the company went public. At that time, Hu Jintao was party general secretary and president, the politician who would make global headlines when, looking frail and confused, he was unceremoniously escorted out of the Great Hall of the People at the closing ceremony of China’s Congress in October 2022. Xi Jinping in 2006 was party chief of neighboring Zhejiang province, not yet the nation brand face of China. This was a period when China needed Google, and Google wanted China’s large and undeveloped market. As Matt Sheehan (2018) explained,

The Chinese Internet was seen as a backwater of knockoff products that were devoid of innovation. Google’s Chinese search engine represented the most controversial experiment to date in Internet diplomacy. To get into China, the young company that had defined itself by the motto “Don’t be evil” agreed to censor the search results shown to Chinese users.

By 2009, Google controlled about one-third of the search engine traffic but less than the 58% controlled by China’s own search engine, Baidu. Google abided by government censorship policies before an abrupt departure on March 22, 2010, thus revealing to the world that Chinese officials had demanded that Google censor web content such as the pro-democracy movement, persecution, the 1989 crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square, the banned spiritual sect Falun Gong, and Tibetan independence. In negotiations, Google executives asked to operate as an uncensored search engine in China, and they were rejected. Google moved its operations to Hong Kong, where its mainland users were blocked by the government when searches involved forbidden subjects. Hong Kong users could still see uncensored results (Nakashima et al., 2010; Pomfret, 2010). In 2014, access to Gmail was blocked (Associated Press, 2014). A report by Ryan Gallagher of *The Intercept* (2018a) revealed that Google was secretly working on a censored version of Google for China, code-named Dragonfly, that

would blacklist websites and search terms about human rights, democracy, religion, and peaceful protest. The public notoriety and political pushback from politicians like U.S. Vice President Mike Pence that Dragonfly would “strengthen Communist Party censorship and compromise the privacy of Chinese customers” led to Google suspending the project.

Shocking forms of suppression of individuals have occurred in China, including the high-profile case of Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese advocate for democracy who was imprisoned for subversion in 2008 and awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. Nothing about it appeared in Chinese-language state media or on the country’s Internet portals. CNN broadcasts, which reach only luxury compounds and hotels in China, were blacked out. Mobile phone users could not transmit text messages containing his name (Jacobs & Ansfield, 2010). In June 2017, it was revealed that Liu, then 61 years old, had cancer. He was transferred under custody to a state hospital, where he died a month later, still captive under guard. In February 2020, a 34-year-old Chinese ophthalmologist named Li Wenliang who was living in Wuhan, China, died from coronavirus. He had reported in a group chat in December 2019 about a mysterious cluster outbreak of flu-like cases and urged his colleagues to protect themselves. Within days he was summoned to the public security bureau where he was accused of spreading rumors and making false comments that upset the social order. He agreed not to go public again. But when he returned to work and got sick from an infected patient who had the coronavirus, he went public again, this time from his hospital deathbed. Dr. Li’s haunting words were enshrined by reporters Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers in the last paragraph of their article “As New Coronavirus Spread, China’s Old Habits Delayed Fight,” *The New York Times*, February 7, 2020: “If the officials had disclosed information about the epidemic earlier, I think it would have been a lot better. There should be more openness and transparency.” Years after his death, his profile on the Chinese social media site Weibo regularly receives comments as a symbol of a heroic truth teller in an atmosphere of suppression and self-censorship.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a vast system of propaganda in place to support its political ideology. The agenda for the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD) includes the following: “theoretical work; the news media; political thought work; managing literary and art circles; establishing moral standards; and the construction of a ‘spiritual civilization’—a euphemism for the new era’s soft propaganda and soft social control” (Brady & Wang, 2009, p. 773). The CPD controls 2,000 newspapers, 8,000 magazines, every film and television program, and every textbook. Publishing companies must have licenses under control of the General Administration of Press and Publishing, which has the power to determine how many books each publisher can sell every year. Permission must be granted by the CPD for cultural activities to be organized, causing entertainment, such as the Chinese New Year celebrations, to be a key vehicle for propaganda. The CPD oversees museums, amusement parks, libraries, theaters, exhibits, video games, hobby societies, art groups, and of course, the Internet. The CPD has veto power over scholarly research and can silence professors (Osnos, 2014, pp. 117–119). In 2018, the Central Propaganda Department took full

control over media regulation. Radio Free Asia (2018) reported that the CPD oversees Voice of China, formed from the merger of China Central Television (CCTV), China National Radio, and China Radio International. The mega-broadcaster is tasked with “propagating the party’s theories, directions, principles and policies” as well as “telling good China stories.” The move was put on display with the state broadcaster CCTV documentary, *Amazing China*, which all party members were required to view and that also received screenings overseas (Zheng, 2018). In his 2023 book, *Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World* Joshua Kurlantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations says that the propaganda mission is extensive and intensive, likely unparalleled anywhere else:

Over the past fifteen years, top Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated their conviction that Beijing needs to use information to more effectively tell China’s story to the world, to bolster what they call China’s “discourse power.” They further have declared that they view information, including information on the Internet, as a “battleground.” Indeed, they have explicitly demanded that Beijing improve its global information efforts. “The competition for news and public opinion is . . . a contest over ‘discourse power,’” according to documents from the Communist Party’s Propaganda Department. Xi has publicly declared, “Wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles.” (2023, p. 16)

The U.S. federal government under two administrations that have little in common agree on China’s hegemonic rise and need to counter it. Republican President Donald Trump and Democratic President Joe Biden have been openly critical of China’s media and propaganda system and have been dedicated to tracking its powerful reach. In September 2023, the Biden administration’s U.S. State Department released a special report produced by the Global Engagement Center: “How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment.” The report contained 200 citations and was made freely available online with executive summaries in 18 languages, including Chinese simplified and Chinese traditional. The Beijing government was called out for using “false or biased information to promote positive views of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the same time, the PRC suppresses critical information that contradicts its desired narratives on issues such as Taiwan, its human rights practices, the South China Sea, its domestic economy, and international economic engagement.” The report identified China as a digital authoritarian country that places constraints domestically and globally on free expression: “On WeChat, an application used by many Chinese-speaking communities outside the PRC, Beijing has exercised technical censorship and harassed individual content producers.” In November 2023, CNN released its own investigation that featured interviews with journalists such as Jiayang Fan of *The New Yorker*, who covered the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in 2019. She received tens of thousands of online threats with the hashtag #TraitorJiayangFan that originated from fake and

anonymous accounts called “spamouflage.” CNN said that the “Chinese government has built up the world’s largest known online disinformation operation and is using it to harass US residents, politicians, and businesses—at times threatening its targets with violence” (O’Sullivan et al., 2023).

In contrast to the Age of Internet and Social Media in this century, in the 20th century, it was primarily television transmission that crossed political boundaries to halt containment of information. As communist governments toppled in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and Romania in 1989, the world saw dramatic evidence that propaganda cannot be contained for long where television exists. People living under the austere regime of East Germany received television from West Germany and saw consumer goods that were easily had and a lifestyle that was abundant rather than austere. Also, the technology of the portable video camera enabled amateurs to capture and display footage of the Czech police on the rampage, the massacre of Georgian demonstrators in Tbilisi, and the bloodbath in Tiananmen Square. When Communists controlled Czechoslovakia, rebellious protesters produced video journals using home video cameras and broadcast the content into Czech homes via rented satellite dishes. In Poland, Lech Walesa said that the underground Solidarity movement could not have succeeded without video. In Romania, while the crowds protested against Nicolae Ceausescu, the television showed fear and doubt in his eyes and encouraged people to continue to fight against his regime despite his army’s violence. Ironically, the center of the intense fighting between the army and Ceausescu’s loyalists was the Bucharest television station. For a time, the new government was in residence there, making the television station the epicenter of the revolution and the seat of the provisional government.

Propaganda itself, as a form of communication, is influenced by the technological devices available at a given time to send messages. As technology advances, propagandists have more sophisticated tools at their service, but so too do counter propagandists. A Hong Kong crowd-sourced fax campaign led by student activists at the University of Hong Kong alerted mainland Chinese to what was happening inside the country, especially at Tiananmen Square, on June 4, 1989 (Fu, 2019). In the United States, Chinese students numbered more than 40,000 in 1989, one of the largest foreign student populations. As reported by *Time* magazine in an article titled “Fax Against Fictions” (1989), Chinese students at the University of Michigan bought a fax machine to counter the state press censorship about martial law and army killings in response to weeks of student protests at Tiananmen Square. Fax brigades comprised of Chinese exchange students spread across the United States to other campuses. Sheng-Yu Huang, a chemistry student at the University of California, Berkeley, was quoted in *Time*: “We want everyone to see that there’s blood in the streets.” The BBC reported in 2017 that the death count at Tiananmen was 10,000, a number revealed in a secret cable from then British ambassador to China, Sir Alan Donald. To this day, the Chinese government bans activist commemorations and regulates any online discussion of the Tiananmen Square protests and killings, which the government said killed 200 civilians and several dozen security personnel following the suppression of “counter-revolutionary riots” on

June 4, 1989. In January 2011, when the Mubarek regime blocked Internet service and social media as tens of thousands gathered in protest at Cairo's Tahrir square, faxes were once again employed to connect people across Egypt; many of the faxes reproduced WikiLeaks cables critical of Egypt's government (Weeks, 2011).

The ABC News late-night television program *Nightline* reported in December 1991 about the first recorded use of a fax machine for propaganda purposes: leaflets that described how to prepare for a chemical warfare assault, presumably sent by Saddam Hussein propagandists, came through thousands of Kuwaiti fax machines. The Global Jihadist Movement has given propaganda communication through the Internet a central role in its attempts to realize its goals. Manuel Torres, Javier Jordan, and Nicola Horsburgh (2006) analyzed the thematic content, both narrative and visual, on jihadist websites where material targeted both Muslims and non-Muslims, mixing objectives to intimidate some and mobilize others: "threat of new attacks; blackmail on the taking of hostages; commentary on current affairs; religious-political discourse; assassination of hostages; mobilization of new mujahedin; denial of responsibility for attacks; and re-vindication of an attack" (p. 404). In addition to recruiting new members and raising funds, the websites also offer sympathizers of the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) a form of "surrogate activism," enabling them to defend terrorism and engage in cyberterrorism (Soriano, 2012, p. 782).

*Cyberterrorism* generally means "unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives" (Ogun, 2012, p. 209). Cyberterrorism is a form of propaganda because it operates within a specific ideological agenda supported by organized funding. Individual hackers may be paid to carry out attacks on behalf of the terrorist organization. Cyberterrorists use the term *hacktivism* to describe defacing the site of an enemy for a political cause (Warren, 2008, p. 43). Cyberterrorism, according to Warren (2008), "offers the opportunity of making an ideological point to a wider population while ensuring that no immediate long-term damage is caused which would cloud the issue" (p. 48). For example, a return to services that existed prior to the cyberattack would happen if demands were met.

Unlawful attacks on the Internet have become known as cyberwarfare. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence has created the *Tallinn Manual*, which applies the practice of international law to the world of electronic warfare to show how hospitals, civilians, and neutral nations can be protected from cyberterrorism. The manual takes existing rules of battlefield behavior, such as the 1949 Geneva Convention, to the Internet and includes humanitarian rules (Associated Press, 2013a). This, however, has not prevented extensive hacking of medical records.

Another use of the Internet for propaganda purposes is steganography ("covered writing"), which is "the process of hiding information that can be used to embed propaganda messages in digital files" (Warkentin et al., 2008, p. 50). This is a way to disguise communications between or among others, resulting in facilitated communications among terrorists. It is theorized that ISIS "uses porn sites to hide their messages because porn sites are so prevalent and because they are among the last places Muslims would be expected to visit" (Warkentin et al., 2008, p. 52). Encryption technology is used by surveillance

agencies in governments to uncover hidden messages, but it is resource intensive, if not impossible, because of the nature of the Internet. By some estimates, there are trillions of files transmitted each year over the Internet (Warkentin et al., 2008, p. 52).

New technologies have also been a boon to protesters, resulting in cyber duels between autocratic governments and dissidents. According to Navtej Dhillon, an analyst with the Brookings Institution, “The Internet has certainly broken 30 years of state control over what is seen and is unseen, what is visible versus invisible” (Stelter & Stone, 2009, p. 1).

Young people have increasingly used the Internet to mobilize politically. Text messaging was used to rally supporters in a popular political uprising in Ukraine in 2004 and again in 2014 and since Russia’s invasion in 2022; protesters in Moldova used text messaging, Facebook, and Twitter to rally supporters to protest against communist leadership in 2009; protesters in the Arab Spring countries in 2010–2013 used smartphone messages to rally and recruit supporters. Text messages threatened activists in Belarus in 2006. When Myanmar sought to silence demonstrators in 2007, it switched off the country’s Internet for 6 weeks. China’s government has tried hard to obliterate the national memory of the huge student-led protests in Tiananmen Square that captivated the world on June 4, 1989. China blocked sites like YouTube to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Chen Guang, who was 17 in 1989, had been a soldier who was told to fire on the students. Twenty years later, he made a painting of the event. When Chinese galleries refused to exhibit his painting, he posted it on the Internet, but it was removed within hours (Barry, 2009; Stelter & Stone, 2009). As in pre-Internet conflicts, communication media serve both supporters and the enemy. Although the technology has changed, propaganda strategies tend to be similar in many ways. The study of contemporary propaganda in both oppressed and free societies is a complex endeavor. We acknowledge that one’s perception of a form of communication determines what is self-evident and what is controversial. One person’s propaganda may be another person’s education. In our definition, the elements of deliberate intent and manipulation, along with a systematic plan to achieve a purpose that is advantageous to the propagandist, however, distinguish propaganda from a free and open exchange of ideas.

## FORMS OF PROPAGANDA

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Although propaganda takes many forms, it is almost always in some form of activated ideology. Sometimes propaganda is *agitative*, attempting to rouse an audience to certain ends and usually resulting in significant change; sometimes it is *integrative*, attempting to render an audience passive, accepting, and nonchallenging (Szanto, 1978, p. 10). Propaganda is also described as white, gray, or black in relationship to an acknowledgment of its source and its accuracy of information. This distinction comes from the Psychological Warfare Division of the Allied Forces in 1944 (Sproule, 1997, p. 192).

*White* propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate. This is what one hears on Radio Moscow and VOA during peacetime. Although what listeners hear is reasonably close to the truth, it is



presented in a manner that attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the “good guy” with the best ideas and political ideology. White propaganda attempts to build credibility with the audience because this could be useful at some point in the future.

National celebrations, with their overt patriotism and regional chauvinism, can usually be classified as white propaganda. International sports competitions also inspire white propaganda from journalists. The 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, China, had more than 200 nations represented, but in addition to the events themselves, American television networks primarily focused on biographical profiles of American athletes, especially champion swimmer Michael Phelps. The same thing happened during the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia, but this time the cameras focused on skiers Lindsey Vonn and Bode Miller and speed skater Apollo Ohno. In its pro-American coverage, with its prepackaged biographies, NBC’s anchors kept referring to “Team USA.” Even though they were instructed not to use pronouns like “we” and “our,” with reference to American athletes, in their enthusiasm, they did so. In Russia, after figure skater Yevgeny Plushenko lost the gold medal to American Evan Lysacek, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said, with disdain, that Plushenko was still the champion. One has to ask whether television viewers watch the Olympics out of national pride or interest in international athletics. Sports anchors continued with “Team USA” in the 2012 Olympics in London and dubbed Michael Phelps the “King of the Games” when he won four more gold medals and two silver medals. Much was made of the United States having the most medals (104) with China second (87). China had been first in medals in 2008. Overt nationalism continued in 2016 at the Rio de Janeiro Olympics. When Michael Phelps lost the 100-meter butterfly swim to Joseph Schooling of Singapore, NBC interviewed Phelps afterward but not Schooling. Simone Manuel of the United States and Penny Oleksiak of Canada tied for the gold medal in the 100-meter freestyle swim, and the follow-up interview was with Manuel, who was the first African American woman to win an individual swimming event. NBC did not interview Oleksiak. Greg Hughes, spokesperson for NBC Sports said, “The American audience wants to hear from U.S. athletes” (Sandomir, 2016, p. 2). This was all white propaganda because it was correct, but it emphasized American Olympic superiority.

Andrew Billings (2008) examined six Olympic telecasts from 1996 to 2006 and found that “sportscasters treat US athletes in a particular way that is significantly different from the treatment of non-US athletes” (p. 102). Overall, he found that 41–44% of NBC’s coverage was on American athletes. He drew the conclusion that excessive nationalism is driven by television ratings and advertising rates. This kind of white propaganda is also common in Olympic telecasts in other nations as well.

The NBC broadcast of the 2018 Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea, emphasized American athletes not only with many biographical sketches but also with advertisements featuring athletes such as Lindsey Vonn and Shaun White. However, the commentators emphasized the dazzling performances of Russian figure skater Alina Zagitova and Japanese figure skater Yuzuru Hanyu. They also marveled at Alpine skier and snowboarder Ester Ledecká from the Czech Republic. This was not only good television journalism, but it was also a shared recognition of their performances.

*Black* propaganda is when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions. Black propaganda is the “big lie,” including all types of creative deceit. Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Hitler’s propaganda minister, claimed that outrageous charges evoke more belief than milder statements that merely twist the truth slightly (Bogart, 1995, p. xii). Written by Czar Nicholas II’s secret police in 1903, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* portrayed Jews as demonic schemers. The 24 chapters or protocols claimed to be the real minutes of a secret council of Jews discussing its plot for world domination. First serialized in part in a Russian newspaper, the *Protocols* were released publicly in 1905 at a time when, as part of a propaganda campaign, Russia sought to incite anti-Semitism. They were also used in Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to encourage widespread slaughter of Jews and were circulated widely by conspiracy theorists even after they were exposed as a forgery in 1921. Henry Ford republished the *Protocols* in Ford’s hometown newspaper, *The Dearborn Independent*, that he had purchased in 1918. The newspaper was distributed at Ford dealerships across America, including in some cases, placed on the seat of the newly purchased Model T. Hitler cited the *Protocols* in *Mein Kampf*, and they permeated Nazi propaganda. In recent times, they were printed in Pakistan, put on the web in Palestine, shown on Arab TV as a miniseries in Egypt in 2002 and Lebanon in 2003, and cited by neo-Nazis in the United States and Europe. In 2020, the FBI tweeted a link to the *Protocols* as part of its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) release of materials. It later followed up with another tweet (FBI, 2020): “Earlier today FOIA materials were posted to the FBI’s Vault and FOIA Twitter account via an automated process without further outlining the context of the documents. We regret that this release may have inadvertently caused distress among the communities we serve.” Marianne Williamson (2020), a Jewish former presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, tweeted her own response: “This isn’t about needing more ‘context!’ And it’s not about ‘causing distress.’ It’s about the most vicious anti-Semitic propaganda ever created, which has caused persecution and murder on a vast scale at times and in places throughout the world. TAKE IT DOWN!!!!” (Williamson, 2020).

During World War II, prior to Hitler’s planned invasion of Britain, a radio station known as The New English Broadcasting Station, supposedly run by discontented British subjects, ran half-hour programs throughout the day, opening with “Loch Lomond” and closing with “God Save the King.” The station’s programming consisted of “war news.” This was actually a German undercover operation determined to reduce the morale of the British people throughout the Battle of Britain. The same technique was used on French soldiers serving on the Maginot Line from the autumn of 1939 until the spring of 1940. Radio broadcasts originating from Stuttgart and hosted by Paul Ferdonnet, a turncoat Frenchman who pretended to be a patriot, warned the French soldiers to save France before the Nazis took it over. The French soldiers heard Ferdonnet sympathize with their discomfort in crowded and damp conditions in barrack tunnels, and they enjoyed the latest gossip about Paris. He then went on to tell them that French officers had dined at a famous restaurant in Paris, where they ate delicious six-course lunches (Roetter, 1974, p. 3). He also described British soldiers in French towns. Because they earned higher

pay than their French counterparts, he said they spent a lot of money and made love to French women. He also said the French soldiers were dupes to fight England's war and urged them to support a "new" government for France. The French soldiers were already miserable because of the conditions on the Maginot Line, and they resented the differences in pay between themselves and the British soldiers. Ferdonnet's broadcasts, although designed to weaken the French soldiers' morale, provided entertainment but not thoughts of defection. Perhaps the French soldiers were not deceived because they also received overt Nazi propaganda in the form of pornographic cartoons showing British soldiers fondling naked French women. Huge billboards were set up within their view that said, "SOLDIERS OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, LICENTIOUS BRITISH SOLDIERY ARE SLEEPING WITH YOUR WIVES AND RAPING YOUR DAUGHTERS." The French soldiers put up their own sign that said, "WE DON'T GIVE A BUGGER, WE'RE FROM THE SOUTH" (Costello, 1985, pp. 242–243). The French soldiers listened to Ferdonnet because they knew he would be more entertaining than their own official radio broadcasts (O'Donnell & Jowett, 1989, p. 51).

One of the most dramatic examples of black propaganda was known as The Ghost Army, a field deception unit devised in 1944 to deceive the Germans in World War II into believing that the Allied Forces were in places in Europe from Normandy to the Rhine. Eleven hundred American men, many of them artists, craftsmen, and designers, landed in France with truckloads of inflatable rubber tanks, rubber airplanes and artillery guns, sound effect records, and radio interception devices. They made phony tank tracks and placed rubber artillery shells on the ground for German reconnaissance planes to see. They used sound trucks to make it sound like much equipment and a tank battalion were coming into certain areas. Germans opened fire on rubber tanks and were fooled into planning attacks where there were no armed forces. The Ghost Army staged more than 20 deception operations in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany, each one requiring that they impersonate a different U.S. unit, often using different multimedia and fake equipment. This elaborate deception saved many Allied lives because they tricked the Germans into going to false battle sites. General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that deception is a potent weapon because of surprise and duplicity. The Ghost Army was kept a secret for nearly 50 years because during the Cold War the U.S. government thought there might be a war with the Soviet Union and did not want the Soviets to know about successful American deception ("The Ghost Army," 2013).

Even allies target friendly nations with black propaganda. British intelligence operations attempted to manipulate the United States to go to war in the 2 years before Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese. British Security Coordination (BSC) established itself in New York City's Rockefeller Center for covert action techniques. They wrote stories fed to the *New York Herald Tribune* about Nazi spies in America and infiltrated WRUL, a radio station in New York. BSC subsidized the radio station and furnished it with material for news bulletins and specially prepared scripts for talks and commentaries. One example was a propaganda campaign by the British to deter Spain from entering the war on Germany's side. Because the radio station had an ethics standard and a

rule against broadcasting material that had not appeared in the American press, the BSC inserted its own material into friendly newspapers and then quoted it for radio broadcasts. BSC also conducted a campaign against German-controlled corporations in the United States by placing articles in newspapers and magazines, organizing protest meetings, and bringing picket lines to certain properties belonging to I.G. Farben Corporation. The British activities were discovered after the bombing of Pearl Harbor when the U.S. State Department pronounced that “British intelligence operations in America were out of control and demanded that offensive covert operations end” (Ignatius, 1989, pp. 9–11).

Black propaganda includes all types of creative deceit, and this type of propaganda gets the most attention when it is revealed. The exhibit “Fake? The Art of Deception” was featured in the British Museum in 1990 and included among the art forgeries several examples of propaganda. One type of forgery was the postage stamp (see Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3). Both British and German versions were displayed, and the exhibition catalogue reported that 160 different stamps were produced by both sides during the two world wars (Jones, 1990, p. 75).

**FIGURE 1.1** ■ A German Black Propaganda of a British Stamp, C. 1944.  
 Note How The Traditional Crown has been Replaced with a Star of David at the Top of the Stamp.



**FIGURE 1.2** ■ In This Black Propaganda, C. 1944, the Germans Used the Image of the Russian Leader Stalin in Place of the Traditional Image of Queen Elizabeth. Other Political Symbols Visible on this Stamp Include the Star of David and the Hammer and Sickle. The Function of Such Black Propaganda Stamps was More to Create a Symbolic Association Between the USSR and Britain than to Undermine the Economy of the Postal System.



Source: Produced by German Government as Propaganda Counterfeit, 1944 (photograph of originals).

**FIGURE 1.3** ■ The “Battle of the Stamps” Continued with this British Black Propaganda of a German Stamp. The Meaning of the Iconography is Obvious. Here Again, this Stamp was Probably more Effective as Anti-Nazi Propaganda in Britain than in Germany Itself.



Source: Produced by the U.S. government as a propaganda counterfeit in Second World War, c. 1942.

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The success or failure of black propaganda depends on the receiver's willingness to accept the credibility of the source and the content of the message. Care has to be taken to place the sources and messages within a social, cultural, and political framework of the target audience. If the sender misunderstands the audience and therefore designs a message that does not fit, black propaganda may appear suspicious and tends to fail.

*Gray* propaganda is somewhere between white and black propaganda. The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain. In 1961, when the Bay of Pigs invasion took place in Cuba, the VOA moved over into the gray area when it denied any U.S. involvement in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed activities. In 1966–1967, Radio Free Europe was organized, financed, and controlled by the CIA, which publicly denied any connection. A fund appeal on American television, radio, and mail indicated that Radio Free Europe was dependent on voluntary contributions, known as “truth dollars.” The actual purpose of the appeal was to fortify the deception and dispel rumors about a CIA relationship (Barnouw, 1978, p. 143). Gray propaganda is also used to embarrass an enemy or competitor. Radio Moscow took advantage of the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and John F. Kennedy to derogate the United States. VOA did not miss the opportunity to offer similar commentaries about Russia's arrests of Jewish dissidents. In June 2013, after Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor, leaked details of a U.S. government secret surveillance program, China's state-run media reveled in the opportunity to embarrass the United States by hailing Snowden as a hero (Greene, 2013).

It has long been a practice to plant favorable stories about the United States in foreign newspapers. The practice has been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Defense. This was confirmed by an unclassified summary of the policy released by the Associated Press: “Psychological operations are a central part of information operations and contribute to achieving . . . the commander's objectives. They are aimed at conveying selected, truthful information to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of governments and other entities” (“Pentagon Propaganda Program Within the Law,” 2006). Following the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Pentagon contracted with The Lincoln Group, a Washington-based PR firm, for \$100 million to secretly “produce favorable articles, translate the articles into Arabic, get them placed in Iraqi newspapers and not reveal the Pentagon's role” (NBC News, 2005). The NBC report noted, “There is nothing illegal about using propaganda during war time.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to this action as a “nontraditional means” to get its message across to the Iraqi people in the face of a disinformation campaign by the insurgents. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, he said,

Yet this has been portrayed as inappropriate, for example, the allegations of someone in the military hiring a contractor, and the contractor allegedly paying someone to print a story, a true story, but paying to print a story. The resulting explosion of critical press stories then causes everything, all activity, all initiative, to stop, just frozen. (CBS News, 2006)

Planting stories is not practiced only by governments. Private organizations do it as well. Video news releases (VNRs) inserted in television news programs is a practice that began in the 1980s, when promotional videos were sent to selected television stations for possible inclusion in the evening news. This is gray propaganda because the true source is hidden and legitimized by the news station as the source. Today, VNRs have become a slick public relations tool as sophisticated, high-quality video content formatted to the needs of local newsrooms. VNRs can be downloaded online, and studies reveal that they are widely used in selected segments or in their entirety. Major networks tend to identify them as “This Is a Video News Release.” Federal Communications Commission regulations require news stations to reveal the source of a VNR only when it is about a political or controversial issue or when a station is paid to use it. VNRs also appear as a form of marketing communication for viewing on cell phones and other devices (Pavlik, 2006). Not only do corporate sponsors, whose identity is usually concealed, insert news releases, but they also can censor news reports that may discredit them or their products (Collison, 2004). Vice News reported that the behemoth Amazon delivered VNRs to at least 11 local news stations with a running script by Amazon spokesperson Todd Walker: “Millions of Americans staying at home are relying on Amazon to deliver essentials like groceries and cleaning products during the COVID-19 outbreak. For the first time we’re getting a glimpse inside Amazon’s fulfillment centers to see just how the company is keeping its employees safe and healthy, while delivering packages to your doorstep” (Gurley, 2020). The VNR followed actual news coverage of Amazon’s difficulty in getting packages delivered or protecting its workforce. “Todd Walker takes us inside.” Walker, a former journalist turned member of Amazon’s PR team, was introduced as if he were one of the local reporters and his real identity was never revealed.

A review by Parry-Giles (1996) of internal documents of the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies revealed how the U.S. government used the domestic news media to propagandize the American public during the Cold War by supplying text to be published in the newspapers in the 1940s and 1950s. By controlling the content and favoring journalists who cooperated, the government covertly disseminated propaganda to a domestic audience. This example of gray propaganda expands the definition to include, according to Parry-Giles, the attribution of the source to a nonhostile source (p. 53). An example of gray propaganda coming from a nonhostile source is as follows: Letters describing the successes of rebuilding Iraq, presumably written by American soldiers in Iraq in 2003, appeared in newspapers across the United States. A Gannett News Service (GNS) search found identical letters in 11 newspapers, and thus they appeared to be form letters. Six soldiers, whose names appeared on the letters, were questioned by GNS, and they denied having written them. A seventh soldier did not know about the letter bearing his name until his father congratulated him for getting it published in his hometown newspaper. All of the interviewed soldiers said they agreed with the information in the letters even though they did not write them.

The actual source has not been uncovered. This is clearly gray propaganda with acceptable information attributed to a nonhostile source that was not the actual source (Parry-Giles, 1996).

Gray propaganda is widespread. Companies that distort statistics on annual reports, advertising that suggests a product will achieve results that it cannot, films that are made solely for product placement, and prominent charities that raise money for research but use it for administrative costs all tend to fall in the gray propaganda category.

Another term used to describe propaganda is *disinformation*. Disinformation is usually considered black propaganda because it is covert and uses false information. In fact, the word *disinformation* is a cognate for the Russian *dezinformatsia*, taken from the name of a division of the KGB devoted to black propaganda.

Disinformation means “false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country” (Shultz & Godson, 1984, p. 41). It is not misinformation that is merely misguided or erroneous information. Disinformation is made up of news stories deliberately designed to weaken adversaries and planted in newspapers by journalists who are actually secret agents of a foreign country. The stories are passed off as real and from credible sources.

Ladislav Bittmann, former deputy chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, in testimony before the House Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Congress in February 1980, said,

If somebody had at this moment the magic key that would open the Soviet bloc intelligence safes and looked into the files of secret agents operating in Western countries, he would be surprised. A relatively high percentage of secret agents are journalists. . . . There are newspapers around the world penetrated by the Communist Intelligence services. (Brownfield, 1984, p. 6)

John Stockton, a CIA officer, wrote of disinformation used by his agency,

Propaganda experts in the CIA station in Kinshasa busily planted articles in the Kinshasa newspapers, *Elimo* and *Salongo*. These were recopied into agency cables and sent on to European, Asian, and South American stations, where they were secretly passed to recruited journalists representing news services who saw to it that many were replayed in the world press. Similarly, the Lisaka station placed a steady flow of stories in Zambian newspapers and then relayed them to major European newspapers. (West, 2016)

Among the more sensational Soviet disinformation campaigns was one that charged the United States with developing the virus responsible for AIDS for biological warfare. The story first appeared in the October 1985 issue of the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and it quoted the *Patriot*, a pro-Soviet newspaper in India. Although it was a Soviet tactic to place a story in a foreign newspaper to give it credibility, this time no such story had appeared in India. Despite denials by the U.S.




Department of State, the story appeared in the news media of more than 60 countries, including Zimbabwe, while the nonaligned countries were having a conference there and in the October 26, 1986, issue of London's *Sunday Express* after *Express* reporters interviewed two people from East Berlin who repeated the story. Subtle variations continued to appear in the world press, including an East German broadcast of the story into Turkey that suggested it might be wise to get rid of U.S. bases because of servicemen infected with AIDS. On March 30, 1987, Dan Rather read the following news item on *CBS Evening News*:

A Soviet military publication claims the virus that causes AIDS leaked from a U.S. Army laboratory conducting experiments in biological warfare. The article offers no hard evidence but claims to be reporting the conclusions of unnamed scientists in the United States, Britain, and East Germany. Last October, a Soviet newspaper alleged that the AIDS virus may have been the result of Pentagon or CIA experiments. ("CBS Spreads Disinformation," 1987, p. 7)


Increasing evidence indicates that disinformation is widely practiced by most major world powers, and this reflects the reality of international politics. For a long time, the United States denied using disinformation, yet disinformation stories planted by the United States during the Cold War were about carcinogenic Soviet spy dust, Soviet sponsorship of international terrorism, and attempts by Bulgarians to assassinate the pope (Alexandre, 1988, pp. 114–115). According to Ahmed Rashid (2004), the Pakistan, Afghanistan, and central Asia correspondent for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the *Daily Telegraph*, "The CIA has a long record of manipulating the press and television and putting out its own interpretation of events" (p. 19).

Websites used for identity theft and software Trojan horses that conceal malicious functions within are Internet examples of disinformation (Rowe & Custy, 2008). Fake news stories such as one that appeared on the Internet shortly before Election Day in 2016 indicating that Hillary Clinton and her aides ran a pedophile ring in the basement of a pizza parlor are also disinformation.

As a communication process, disinformation is described according to two models we have developed (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5). In Figure 1.4, the propagandist (P) creates a *deflective source* ( $P_1$ ), which becomes the apparent source of the message (M). The receiver (R) perceives the information as coming directly from  $P_1$  and does not associate it with the original propagandist (P). In Figure 1.5, the propagandist secretly places the original message ( $M_1$ ) in a *legitimizing source* ( $P_2$ ). This message (now  $M_2$ ), as interpreted by  $P_2$ , is then picked up by the propagandist (P) and communicated to the receiver (R) in the form  $M_3$ , as having come from  $P_2$ . This legitimates the message and at the same time dissociates the propagandist (P) from its origination. One can see in both models that the propagandist's intent is to obscure the identity of the message originator, thus creating a high degree of credibility for both message and apparent source.

**FIGURE 1.4 ■ Deflective Source Model.**

Source: Reprinted by permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT, from Victoria O'Donnell and Garth Jowett, "Propaganda as a Form of Communication," in *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective* by T. J. Smith III. Copyright by T. J. Smith III and published in 1989 by Praeger Publishers.

**FIGURE 1.5 ■ Legitimizing Source Model.**

Source: Reprinted by permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT, from Victoria O'Donnell and Garth Jowett, "Propaganda as a Form of Communication," in *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective* by T. J. Smith III. Copyright by T. J. Smith III and published in 1989 by Praeger Publishers.

In October 2020, 3 weeks before former Vice President Joe Biden defeated the incumbent Republican president, Donald Trump, *New York Post*, a conservative tabloid newspaper owned by Rupert Murdoch, ran a story that it had access to the contents of a laptop once owned by Joe Biden's son, Hunter. The *Post* claimed the emails could ruin the father's Democratic presidential bid by showing a trail of corruptive business dealings benefiting father and son. Twitter and Facebook blocked users from sharing the story, although Twitter quickly flip-flopped after cries of censorship by Republican leaders. Facebook maintained its position to minimize access to the story through the election. Facebook spokesperson Andy Stone said, "We remain committed to free expression while also recognizing the current environment requires clearer guardrails to minimize harm" (Conger & Isaac, 2020).

Although the emails ultimately did not prove corruption, Hunter Biden's laptop took on a viral meme mystique of its own in the weeks that preceded the national election. A group of 51 former senior intelligence officials signed an open letter on October 19, 2020, stating that the release of the alleged emails "has all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation." They added:

We want to emphasize that we do not know if the emails, provided to the New York Post by President Trump’s personal attorney Rudy Giuliani, are genuine or not and that we do not have evidence of Russian involvement—just that our experience makes us deeply suspicious that the Russian government played a significant role in this case. (Bertrand, 2020)

Politico’s Natasha Bertrand (2020) ran a story that night with the headline, “Hunter Biden Story Is Russian Disinfo, Dozens of Former Intel Officials Say.” Casting suspicion and doubt had been replaced by a definitive headline. During the final presidential debate on October 22, 2020 at Belmont University, the Biden laptop story became part of a heated exchange:

**DONALD TRUMP:** *“It’s the laptop from hell . . .”*

**JOE BIDEN:** *“Look, there are 50 former national intelligence folks who said that what he’s accusing me of is a Russian plan. They have said that this has all the characteristics—four, five former heads of the CIA, both parties, say what he’s saying is a bunch of garbage. Nobody believes it except him and his good friend Rudy Giuliani.”*

**TRUMP:** *“You mean, the laptop is now another Russia, Russia, Russia hoax? You gotta be—”*

**BIDEN:** *“That’s exactly what . . . we’re told.”*

**TRUMP:** *“Is this where you’re going? This is where he’s going? The laptop is Russia, Russia, Russia?”*

Three days later, on October 25, 2020, Biden was asked by CBS’s *60 Minutes*’ Norah O’Donnell, *Do you believe the recent leak of material allegedly from Hunter’s computer is part of a Russian disinformation campaign?”*

**BIDEN:** *“From what I’ve read and know, the intelligence community warned the president that Giuliani was being fed disinformation from the Russians. And we also know that Putin is trying very hard to spread disinformation about Joe Biden. And so when you put the combination of Russia, Giuliani and the president together, you assess what it is. It’s a smear campaign because he has nothing he wants to talk about in his—what is he running on? What is he running on?”*

Years later, former Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr., one of the signatories to the pre-election open letter, told Glenn Kessler of *The Washington Post* (Wagner & Sommer, 2023): “There was message distortion. All we were doing was raising a yellow flag that this could be Russian disinformation. Politico deliberately distorted what we said.”

Covering misinformation—especially what it is or isn’t—has now become a cottage industry with a messianic zeal that would impress Oppenheimer. *The New York Times* has a correspondent in place, Steven Lee Myers, a veteran foreign and national security correspondent, who covers misinformation at home and abroad.

As noted by Joseph Bernstein (2021) in a *Harper's* feature, "Bad News: Selling the Story of Disinformation," according to a 2019 Pew Center survey, half of Americans think that "made-up news/info" is "a very big problem in the country today," about on par with the "U.S. political system," the "gap between rich and poor," and "violent crime." The Aspen Institute convened a Commission on Information Disorder in 2021 co-chaired by Katie Couric, who in 1994 had wondered aloud on air with her NBC colleagues, "What's the Internet?" The commission included Kathryn Murdoch, Rupert Murdoch's estranged daughter, and Prince Harry, King Charles's estranged son. One of the commission's goals was "how government, private industry, and civil society can work together . . . to engage disaffected populations who have lost faith in evidence-based reality." Bernstein commented,

The Commission on Information Disorder is the latest (and most creepily named) addition to a new field of knowledge production that emerged during the Trump years at the juncture of media, academia, and policy research: Big Disinfo. A kind of EPA for content, it seeks to expose the spread of various sorts of "toxicity" on social-media platforms, the downstream effects of this spread, and the platforms' clumsy, dishonest, and half-hearted attempts to halt it. As an environmental cleanup project, it presumes a harm model of content consumption. Just as, say, smoking causes cancer, consuming bad information must cause changes in belief or behavior that are bad, by some standard. Otherwise, why care what people read and watch?

Facebook convened a private Global Information Operations Working Group that culminated in a 2-day forum at its Palo Alto, California, headquarters campus in March 2019. The small gathering included propaganda studies scholar Nancy Snow, think tank representatives, as well as Maria Ressa, CEO and co-founder of the Filipino website Rappler. Ressa was later awarded the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with Dmitry Muratov for "their efforts to safeguard freedom of expression, which is a precondition for democracy and lasting peace" (Snow, 2021). Snow (2021) recounted in *Nikkei Asia* that Facebook's head of cybersecurity policy, Nathaniel Gleicher, was the group convener. "He made it clear that this would not be a Facebook-directed forum. In his carefully crafted verbiage, Facebook could only do so much as a social media platform to counter harmful influence operations. In code speak, that meant Facebook had limited accountability to civil society and certainly not the same level of public obligation or oversight as a media company. It all seemed Orwellian at the time because it was an open secret that Facebook was a both/and entity: technology platform convener and media content provider." As Foremski (2016), noted, media companies, after all, "are legally responsible for the nature of the content that they publish." Facebook, as long as it repeats the mantra that it is strictly a tech platform, "has

no legal responsibility for the content it publishes,” it isn’t the creator of the content.” Gleicher had been President Obama’s director for cybersecurity policy at the National Security Council. Our meeting led to a Facebook-funded special project, Partnership for Countering Influence Operations, at the Carnegie Institute for International Peace. Ressa, a former Southeast Asia CNN correspondent, came out strongly against Facebook after the workgroup meeting, especially after receiving the Nobel. She explained the company’s inner workings in a podcast interview with *The New Yorker* in November 2021 (Wickenden):

Now Facebook, these companies didn’t set out to be news organizations. So, they actually don’t have standards and ethics or the mission to protect the public sphere. But that’s also where regulation must come in, because that is exactly what they’re doing. These platforms are the connective tissue of society. These platforms determine our reality. They exploit the weaknesses of our biology to actually shift behavior, to shift the way you think. If the way you think shifts, then the way you behave shifts, right? January 6th is a perfect example of that, right? So I don’t even know where to begin.

Ressa indicted Facebook’s algorithms that “prioritize the spread of lies laced with anger and hate over facts.” Whistleblower Frances Haugen, who worked as a product manager on the civic misinformation team at Facebook, testified before the U.S. Congress. “There were conflicts of interest between what was good for the public and what was good for Facebook. And Facebook over and over again chose to optimize for its own interests like making more money” (Wickenden, 2021). Does this make Facebook propagandistic in form or mission?

Philip M. Taylor (2006) has acknowledged that there are many definitions of propaganda.

We need to remember that while propaganda does indeed involve the manipulation of information by omission as well as by commission, so do other forms of communication—including journalism. It would be thus disingenuous to suggest that propaganda is something quite different from other forms of persuasion that are equally designed to benefit the source, such as advertising (“commercial propaganda” designed to increase profits), public relations (sometimes called “spin” in order to make the source appear in a positive light)—or even journalism (also “commercial propaganda” designed to increase profits of proprietors).

Propaganda runs the gamut from their and our version of the truth to deception. It is, simultaneously, always value and ideology laden. The means may vary from a mild slanting of information to outright deception, but the ends are *always* predetermined to favor the propagandist.

## SUBPROPAGANDA/FACILITATIVE COMMUNICATION

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Another dimension of propaganda is what Doob (1948) called “subpropaganda.” Here, the propagandist’s task is to spread an unfamiliar doctrine, for which a considerable period of time is needed to build a frame of mind in the audience toward acceptance of the doctrine. To gain the target audience’s favor, stimuli are used to arouse the attention of the audience and the related encoders and agents who mediate communication. L. John Martin (1971), a research administrator in the USIA for 9 years, called subpropaganda “facilitative communication” (p. 62)—that is, an activity designed to keep lines open and maintain contacts against the day when they will be needed for propaganda purposes.

Facilitative communication most frequently takes the form of financial aid, newscasts, television and Internet programs, press releases, books, pamphlets, periodicals, cultural programs, exhibits, films, seminars, language classes, reference services, and personal social contacts. These are all arranged in an effort to create a friendly atmosphere toward those who may be needed later. W. Phillips Davison (1971) gave examples of influencing journalists to give favorable press to the United States by offering rides and other services such as office space provided by the U.S. Committee on Public Information, parties, tours of foreign cities, and news scoops. In efforts to counter Arab anger over the war in Iraq, the U.S. State Department took Muslim students to the World Cup games in Germany, hosted Arab journalists at training seminars in Washington, D.C., and sent a female undersecretary of state to talk to Muslim women around the world (Cooper, 2007). Prior to the 2002 Summer Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, children were given assignments to learn about countries represented by their athletes. When the teams arrived in Salt Lake City, the children greeted them and told them what they had learned about their countries. The VOA broadcast the stories of the children’s efforts to learn about the country to the countries that were represented for goodwill purposes (Cowan, 2004, pp. 233–234). The U.S. Department of State has long sponsored international programs for women in rural Afghanistan over the two-decade U.S. presence in the country (2001–2021). While attending the General Assembly’s annual meeting at the United Nations in September 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a public-private collaboration with Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies. The Alliance for Afghan Women’s Economic Resilience initiative to support access to education and training, expand job opportunity, support women entrepreneurs in Afghanistan as well as in other countries followed the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan and came about after Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban failed to reopen closed women’s high schools. These initiatives, which are common to many countries, help promote a positive country image in the target nation.

Facilitative communication itself may not be propaganda, but it is communication designed to render a positive attitude toward a potential propagandist. In 1969, 450 active registrations of agencies distributing propaganda were on file with the U.S.

government on behalf of foreign agencies. Davison (1971) pointed out that most were concerned with tourism, investment, or trade. This did not include activities by embassies or consulates, nor did it include mail and shortwave radio from abroad. Bogart (1995) said that within the USIA, both in 1953 and today,

It is widely believed that a sense of affinity is developed by showing the people of other nations American documentary films and giving them free access to American books and publications. Such exposure fosters friendship that has great, intangible value, quite apart from any immediate political benefits. An even more powerful impression is made by bringing foreign nationals to the United States, where they can meet Americans and get a first-hand look at the society. (p. xxxiii)

The USIA, known overseas as United States Information Service (USIS), ended its independent foreign affairs agency status after five decades (1953–1999) and became reabsorbed into the United States Department of State (n.d.b; State Department). The State Department’s mission is “to protect and promote U.S. security, prosperity, and democratic values and shape an international environment in which all Americans can thrive.” At its height, USIS maintained more than 200 posts in 143 countries with a singular purpose to clarify (inform), support (engage), and promote (influence) American foreign policy while supporting U.S. national interests. Over the years, it acted as a publishing clearinghouse for magazines and commercial bulletins in 20 languages, had a wireless file information service in five languages, produced films, operated a radio-teletype network, and by the 1990s maintained a World Wide Web site (USIA.gov) designed for foreign audiences. News, educational, and cultural programs were broadcast 24 hours a day to millions of viewers through American embassies, USIS posts, and foreign television and cable networks. After the restructuring, the Clinton administration created the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), one of three bureaus along with the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs. President Clinton called the propaganda from the bureau one of “the most effective foreign policy tools we have” (Parry-Giles, 2002, p. 191). Under the George W. Bush administration, the IIP at the U.S. Department of State was “the principal international strategic communications entity for the foreign affairs community” (U.S. Department of State Archive, n.d.a). IIP merged with the Bureau of Public Affairs into the Bureau of Global Public Affairs in May 2019, and the duties of the IIP coordinator merged into the duties of the assistant secretary of state for Global Public Affairs.

The position of under secretary of state for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was created in 1999 with Evelyn S. Lieberman as inaugural holder. In a *Washington Post* article about Hillary Clinton supporters (Romano, 2007), Lieberman was described as having “cult status among the disciples for firing Monica Lewinsky before her affair with the president was known, and she remains a trusted adviser. A favorite joke in Hillaryland: If Lieberman invites you for a walk, don’t go. It means you’re fired.” The position was

held by many senior executive women, like the “Queen of Madison Avenue” Charlotte Beers, longtime George W. Bush senior counselor Karen Hughes, and Ronald Reagan’s executive assistant, Margaret Tutwiler. Beers served from 2001 until days before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Using her Madison Avenue skills—her accounts included Jaguar and Uncle Ben’s Rice—Beers initiated a government advertising campaign called the Shared Values Initiative, which spotlighted “real Muslim Americans” in varied service professions such as doctor, teacher, baker, journalist, and firefighter. “Religious freedom here is something that is very important, and no one ever bothered us,” said Abdul Hammuda, owner since 1971 of Tiger Bakery in Toledo, Ohio. “Since 9/11, we’ve had an overwhelming sense of support from our customers and clients.” (Plaisance, 2005). Each mini-documentary ended with a reference to the sponsor: “Presented by the Council of American Muslims for Understanding and the American people.” The Council of American Muslims for Understanding was a creation of the State Department to give the documentaries more grassroots authenticity. The American people had paid for the public advertisements with their taxes. “The advertising campaign Shared Values Initiative from 2002 is without doubt the most debated public diplomacy effort in the war on terrorism era,” wrote Anja Sletteland (2008).

With an official mandate of “telling America’s story to the world” (Snow, 2010), USIA’s programs continue today at the State Department. These include an outbound U.S. Speaker and Specialist Program and inbound International Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP). The IVLP is the premier professional exchange program of the State Department with nearly 5,000 visitors nominated by U.S. embassies overseas. The E Bureau or Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, sponsors the Fulbright educational exchange student and scholar program through coordination with the Institute of International Education, Council for International Exchange of Scholars, and nearly 50 binational Fulbright commissions. In 2018, the former Broadcasting Board of Governors that oversaw all U.S. government broadcast news and information was restructured as the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM). On its website (<https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/history>) USAGM has described its structure as “civilian broadcasting” entities, a euphemism for tax-supported federal government-sponsored broadcasting: They include the VOA, created in 1942 during World War II, with these immortalized words in German: “We bring you voices from America. Today, and daily from now on, we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good for us. The news may be bad. But we shall tell you the truth (<https://www.insidevoa.com/p/5829.html>).” The additional four U.S. civilian broadcast networks are Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which went on the air on July 4, 1950, with a broadcast to communist Czechoslovakia from a studio in New York City; the Office of Cuba Broadcasting with its Radio and TV Martí, which started broadcasting in 1985 and 1990, respectively; Radio Free Asia, which was founded on March 12, 1996; and the Arabic-language stations Alhurra Television and Radio Sawa of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, which were launched in 2004. The Open Technology Fund, which launched in 2019, is the USAGM entity tasked with developing and distributing



cutting-edge technologies and techniques to counter efforts by repressive regimes and closed societies.

VOA's YouTube channel that "Voice of America (VOA) is the largest U.S. international broadcaster, providing news and information in more than 40 languages to an estimated weekly audience of 236.8 million people." Radio Free Europe (RFE)/RL, with headquarters in Prague and Washington, D.C., reports in 27 languages to 23 countries, including Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, with a staff of about 700 full-time journalists and 1,300 freelancers. In FY2021, RFE/RL had a weekly radio, television, and Internet audience of 37 million. Worldnet Television and Film Service (Worldnet) was a satellite television network that was established in 1983 integrated into VOA in 2004. The Smith–Mundt Act of 1948 prohibited Worldnet from broadcasting directly to American citizens, as it prohibited agency staff from sharing the URL address USIA.gov with the American people. In 1998, plaintiffs argued in *Essential Information et al. v. United States Information Agency* for American public access to USIA archival material and its Internet addresses. They included the VOA, Worldnet, and the daily text-based press service Wireless File that was produced in five languages and reached all overseas USIA posts. The U.S. government position opposed the access request, stating that the original intent of the Smith–Mundt legislation was to protect the American public from propaganda by its own government.

Another form of facilitative propaganda is helping societies restore their institutions after war or conflict. American soldiers in Afghanistan built schools in Paktia with the objective of winning enough gratitude and loyalty from the local Afghans to undercut any support for the defeated Taliban movement (Constable, 2002, p. 15). Under the Obama administration, the Department of Commerce had an Afghanistan Investment and Reconstructive Task Force to encourage business opportunities to develop the economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan ("What's New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," 2010).

The use of propaganda is prevalent in the world today, obvious in war-torn countries, divisions between and among ethnic groups, and struggles for power. Dissemination of digital propaganda is easier than it has ever been. Communication networks have expanded and changed, and information, whether reliable or tainted, is more accessible. The institutions of modern society, government, business, and religion will retain the need to manipulate responses deliberately.

## A MODEL OF PROPAGANDA

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The literature of propaganda often refers to "mass persuasion," suggesting that propaganda is persuasion on a one-to-many basis. Propaganda tends to be linked with a general societal process, whereas persuasion is regarded as an individual psychological process. Propaganda has not been altogether successfully differentiated from


persuasion by other writers. The model in Figure 1.6 is our attempt to differentiate between them and demonstrate a separation according to purpose and process. The model also reveals the similarity between persuasion and propaganda with subtle differences of technique used according to purpose.

### Communication Defined

*Communication* is a process in which a sender transmits a message to a receiver through a channel. This process has been represented by both linear and transactional models. One of the earliest models of communication was developed by Aristotle (333 B.C.E.), who described a speaker, a speech, and an audience as the major components of the communication act. A linear model that influenced communication research was developed by Shannon and Weaver in 1949 for the study of electronic engineering. Its components were source, message, transmitter, signal, and receiver. Other linear communication models that followed were similar to Shannon and Weaver’s because they emphasized source, message, channel, and response.

Communication involves attempts to share meaning through a process of symbolic interaction between and among human beings. Communication has been defined as “an essential life process of exchange through which humans create, acquire, transmit, and utilize information” (O’Donnell, 1993, p. 8). Communication is built around an exchange of information that has both intended and perceived meaning. Information exchange can reduce uncertainty after several cycles of exchange. The tendency is for the sender and the receiver to move toward one point, for one to move toward the other, or for both to unite in a common interest or focus.

A straightforward definition of the communication process is that which happens when *A* (sender) communicates to *B* (receiver) about *X* (Westley & MacLean, 1977).



*A* may be a person, a group, or a social system. *B* may be a person, a group, or a social system as well. Communication may be a human face-to-face transaction, but it is also often a mediated interaction whereby *A* communicates to *B* through *C* about *X*. Here, *C* is a gatekeeper, an encoder of a message, or quite possibly an agent for *B* (Westley & MacLean, 1977). Today *C* is likely to be a computer, smartphone, or other technological device.

It is important to examine both the message and the response to it in the study of communication. Responses may be in the realm of feedback, or they may be examined as effects on the audience. The elements of face-to-face or mediated communication or both must be examined in the light of the context in which they occur both in a specific and an immediate sense and in the social-cultural framework of the times. Information, persuasion, and propaganda are all types of communication.

## Propaganda and Information

Communication has been defined as a process of exchange in which sender and receiver, either through mediated or nonmediated means, create, acquire, transmit, and use information. When the information is used to accomplish a purpose of sharing, explaining, or instructing, this is considered to be informative communication. People seek information when they need to understand their world. Once gained, information tends to reduce uncertainty. Uncertainty reduction is usually acquired through the communication of messages; thus, messages can be analyzed in terms of the amount of uncertainty they remove. Informative messages affect receivers by allowing them to acquire information, understand their world, and learn.

Generally, *informative communication* is thought to be neutral because it is characterized by a special and limited use of language. Informative discourse is communication about subject matter that has attained the privileged status of being beyond dispute. Whenever information is regarded as disputable by either the sender or the receiver, the communication has difficulty proceeding as information. An informative communicator differs from other kinds of communicators by having the purpose of creating mutual understanding of data that are considered to be accurate, concepts that are considered to be indisputable, and ideas that are based on facts.

Propaganda uses informative communication in a similar fashion. The difference is that the purpose exceeds the notion of mutual understanding. The purpose of propaganda is to promote a partisan or competitive cause in the best interest of the propagandist but not necessarily in the best interest of the recipient. The recipient, however, may believe that the communication is merely informative. As we pointed out in the example of VOA, white propaganda is similar to informative communication. Information is imparted from an identifiable source, and the information is accurate. The distinction between white propaganda and informative communication is that white propaganda informs solely to promote a specific ideology. Techniques of informative communication are also used in gray and black propaganda, but the

information is not likely to be accurate or even based in reality. An excellent example of propaganda parading as information is when Adolph Hitler, along with Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, formed the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda that worked along with the Reich Chamber of Culture to completely control all content of the German press, literature, visual arts, film, theater, music, and radio. Propaganda was a value-neutral term in Nazi Germany, and such a ministry name would be associated with advocating for Nazi Party “public enlightenment” in culture, media, and public relations.

Many writers grapple with the distinction between propaganda and informative communication in educational practices that include the communicative purpose of instructing for mutual understanding. Elliot Aronson (1980, p. 60) questioned whether educators are merely imparting knowledge or skill. One subject area that Aronson questioned is arithmetic. He pointed out that most examples in elementary school arithmetic texts deal with buying, selling, renting, working for wages, and computing interest. He also cited Zimbardo et al. (1977), who thought these examples did more than simply reflect the capitalist system in which education occurs. The point is that arithmetic problems with a capitalist ideological base endorse the system, legitimate it, and suggest that it is the natural and normal way. Aronson said that interpretation of an instructional practice depends largely on the values of the person interpreting it. Four authors were asked by university researchers if their management textbooks are propaganda. Although their responses varied, “all four authors [said that they] write their textbooks to support a managerial ideology.” The researchers concluded that the managerial ideology “would seem to serve the interest of other groups who are also currently most powerful in management education” (Cameron et al., 2003, pp. 726–728). William E. Griffith, in his essay on communist propaganda, referred to *propaganda* and *education* interchangeably. He said that educating the masses has been the same as propaganda (cited in Lasswell et al., 1979, pp. 239–258).

By evaluating educational practices according to their ends rather than their means, however, one can observe the use of informative communication as a means of achieving a propagandistic end in practices such as the ones described earlier.

Further complicating the meaning of information is the use of the term *information dominance*, which has come to mean the integrated conception of media and communication. This has become so important to the military that it is called *information operations*, defined as “the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making” (quoted from a military manual by Miller, 2004, p. 8). Information dominance is also used by the military to mean maintaining and applying a superior understanding of a battlefield situation (Johnson, 2013, p. 3). Information dominance, according to Miller (2004), integrates “propaganda and psychological operations into a much wider conception of information war” as a military strategy (p. 8). Another form of

information dominance is to deny, degrade, and destroy enemy capabilities to destroy unfriendly information that interferes with or challenges the dominance of a government (Miller, 2004, p. 13). The U.S. Navy has a Center for Information Warfare Training (CIWT) that is responsible for the development of education and training policies for members of the Information Warfare Corps in the fields of cryptology and intelligence, cyber realms of information operations and technology, and computer systems and networks. CIWT also oversees Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (<https://www.netc.navy.mil/CIWT/>).

## PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION

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### Persuasion Defined

*Persuasion* as a subset of communication is usually defined as a communicative process to influence others. A persuasive message has a point of view or desired behavior for the recipient to adopt in a voluntary fashion. Victoria O'Donnell and June Kable (1982) defined persuasion as

a complex, continuing, interactive process in which a sender and a receiver are linked by symbols, verbal and nonverbal, through which the persuader attempts to influence the persuadee to adopt a change in a given attitude or behavior because the persuadee has had perceptions enlarged or changed. (p. 9)

Persuasion has the effect, when it is successful, of resulting in a reaction such as "I never saw it that way before." What happens is that the recipient of the persuasive interaction relates to or contrasts the message with an existing repertoire of information, beliefs, attitudes, and experiences. The process of persuasion is an interactive one in which the recipient foresees the fulfillment of a personal or societal need or desire if the persuasive purpose is adopted. The persuader also has a need fulfilled *if* the persuadee accepts the persuasive purpose. Because both persuader and persuadee stand to have their needs fulfilled, persuasion is regarded as more mutually satisfying than propaganda.

### Persuasion Is Transactional

People respond to persuasion that promises to help them in some way by satisfying their wants or needs. That is why the persuader must think in terms of the persuadee's needs as well as their own. Persuasion is a reciprocal process in which both parties are dependent on one another. It is a situation of interactive or transactive dependency. *Interactive* suggests turn taking, whereas *transactive* suggests a more continuous and dynamic process of cocreating meaning. The persuader who understands that persuasion is interactive or a transaction in which both parties approach a message-event and use it to attempt to fulfill needs will never assume a passive audience. An active

audience seeks to have its needs fulfilled by the persuader. An active persuader knows how to appeal to audience needs by asking the audience to fill the persuader's needs by adopting the message-purpose. A politician seeking votes must address the needs of the voters. If voters are convinced that the politician will fulfill their needs, then they will fulfill the needs of the politician by casting positive votes at election time.

## Responses to Persuasion


Persuasion attempts to evoke a specific change in the attitudes or behaviors of an audience. The change sought is a specific response from the audience. Three different forms of response are possible (Roloff & Miller, 1980, p. 16).

First is *response shaping*. This is similar to learning, wherein the persuader is a teacher and the audience is a student. A persuader may attempt to shape the response of an audience by teaching it how to behave and offer positive reinforcement for learning. If audience responses favorable to the persuader's purpose are reinforced by rewards to the audience, positive attitudes are developed toward what is learned. The audience has a need for positive reinforcement filled, and the persuader has a need for a desired response from the audience filled.

Second is *response reinforcing*. If the people in the audience already have positive attitudes toward a subject, the persuader reminds them about the positive attitudes and stimulates them to feel even more strongly by demonstrating their attitudes through specified forms of behavior. Much persuasion in today's society is response reinforcing (e.g., blood drives, fundraising, pep rallies, helping others), but people have to be motivated to go out and do these things year after year. Little controversy surrounds these situations, but people's emotional needs have to be aroused to get them to get out and give blood or money, provide team support, and engage in other activities requiring effort, time, and money.

Third is *response changing*. This is the most difficult kind of persuasion because it involves asking people to switch from one attitude to another (e.g., support universal health care), to go from a neutral position to a positive or negative one (e.g., support the community's recycling program), to change behavior (e.g., practice safe sex), or to adopt a new behavior (e.g., host an international student for the summer). People are reluctant to change. Thus, to convince them to do so, the persuader has to relate the change to something in which the persuadee already believes. This is called an *anchor* because it is already accepted by the persuadee and will be used to tie down new attitudes or behaviors. An anchor is a starting point for change because it represents something already widely accepted by potential persuadees. Anchors can be beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, and group norms. In 1943, during World War II, the illustrator Norman Rockwell used the anchors of the four freedoms declared by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom to worship, and freedom of speech) in posters to get people to buy savings bonds. The freedom of speech poster proclaimed, "Save freedom of speech, buy war bonds" (see Figure 1.7).

**FIGURE 1.7** ■ Norman Rockwell Poster. The Setting is a New England Town Meeting. The Speaker's Hands are Those of a Laborer Conveyed by Color and Texture. The Detail Conveys the Idea that in a Democracy, Everyone has an Equal Voice Regardless of Social and Economic Status.



Source: © Swim ink 2 llc/Getty Images.

### Beliefs

A *belief* is a perceived link between any two aspects of a person's world (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 131). A belief expresses a relationship between two things ("I believe

that a laptop computer will help me get better grades”) or a thing and a characteristic of that thing (“I believe that life once existed on Mars”). We have thousands of beliefs. To change old beliefs or to create new ones, a persuader has to build on beliefs that already exist in the minds of the audience. A persuader has to use anchors of belief to create new belief. The stronger the belief of a receiver, the more likely it is to influence the formation of a new belief.

## Values

A *value* is a special kind of belief that endures and is not likely to change. A value is a belief that is prescriptive and a guideline for a person’s behavior. A value can be a standard for behavior (honesty, sensitivity) or a desired end (success, power). Values are concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, or desirable and undesirable. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, p. 551), after a review of the literature on values, designated five features that are common to most definitions of values: (a) concepts or beliefs (b) about desirable end states or behaviors (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior or events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance.

Personal values are derived from cultural values that tend to be utopian, mythic, and pragmatic. For example, many people share a national vision that embraces the belief in popular participation of people in government, in the right to say what you think without restriction, and in good conquering evil. A Western European research organization, Futuribles, through a grant from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, conducted a study of 1,125 experts throughout the world to predict their countries’ core values for the year 2000. The experts from North America, primarily the United States, predicted that the top-ranked values would include possession of material wealth, health, jobs and work, individual liberty, and social equality. In contrast, the experts from Latin American countries predicted survival as the top priority, whereas African experts feared the loss of liberty. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) surveyed subjects from Israel and Germany and found seven dominant motivational values: enjoyment, achievement, restrictive conformity, security, prosocial (active concern for the welfare of others), maturity, and self-direction.

When situations arise that pose a conflict between national and personal values, people often find it difficult to adapt. A nation’s decision to go to war to protect economic assets creates conflict for the people whose children may die in battle. People regard their values as personal and get upset when these are attacked; thus, values make strong anchors for both persuasion and propaganda.

## Attitudes

An *attitude* is a readiness to respond to an idea, an object, or a course of action. It is an internal state of feeling toward, or an evaluative response to, an idea, person, or object. It is expressed in a statement that clarifies a position (“I like milk in my coffee” or “I disagree with mining in pristine wilderness areas”). An attitude is a relatively enduring



predisposition to respond; therefore, it already resides in the minds of audience members and can be used as an anchor. As people form beliefs about an object, idea, or person, they automatically and simultaneously acquire attitudes toward it. Whereas each belief is an association of an attribute with an object, an attitude is essentially an attribute evaluation.

Attitude change is often the desired response in persuasion; thus, attitudes may be used as anchors (“If you prefer to be physically fit, then you should exercise regularly”) or as persuasive end states (“Patients should be allowed to sue health maintenance organizations”). People have thousands of attitudes—some important, others inconsequential. A persuader and a propagandist can use strongly held attitudes as anchors to promote related attitude change.

## Behavior

*Behavior* can be used as an anchor not only because it is an overt expression of a way of being but also because behavioral patterns are fair predictors of future behaviors. When a behavior is recurrent, a script for behavior develops to the point that a great deal of consciousness is not necessary to continue the same behavior. References to successful behavior can be motivational. By reminding persuadees that their behavior has meant need fulfillment in the past, a persuader can urge them to use the same or similar behavior in the future (“You contributed to the Humane Society in the past and helped save the lives of dogs and cats, so give to the present campaign to continue saving them”). Conversely, if a certain behavior has negative consequences, the persuader can urge persuadees to avoid the consequences by discontinuing the behavior (“Secondhand smoke can cause lung cancer, so prohibit smoking on campus”).

Another successful motivational strategy is to show persuadees models of behavior. Modeling influences new behavior in persuadees because it offers new information about how to behave (Bandura, 1986, 2001). Albert Bandura’s model of observational learning includes the necessity of symbolic representation in words and images for retention of a behavior and identification of the subject with the model. Powerful modeling can simultaneously change observers’ behaviors, thought patterns, emotional reactions, and evaluations. Observational learning includes knowledge of the rules of thought as well as behavior itself. Recognizing that modeling influences are no longer confined to live interaction, he said that the range of models to which people are exposed on a daily basis has expanded because of social media. “New ideas, values, behavior patterns, and social practices are now being rapidly diffused worldwide by symbolic modeling in ways that foster a globally distributed consciousness” (Bandura, 2001, p. 271).

## Group Norms

*Group norms* are beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors derived from membership in groups. Group norms can be used as anchors because people tend to conform to the

norms of the groups to which they belong. Psychologist Daryl Bem (1970, p. 75) said that the major influence on people is people. Peer pressure influences how people dress, talk, and behave. When they are uncertain about what position to take or what to do, people often adopt the attitudes and behaviors of their peers. They also succumb to peer pressure because it is easier to conform than to depart from the norms of their groups.

Another form of group norm is derived from the norms of a reference group. *Reference groups* are groups admired or disliked by nonmembers who may be influenced in a positive or negative direction by those groups. People may admire the norms of a group such as Amnesty International or be repulsed by the norms of neo-Nazis.

## Resonance

A persuader who is well prepared knows the audience. Anchors can be discovered from knowledge of the audience members' affiliation with groups as well as from insight into their beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors. Because these categories constitute important attributes of the audience, they can be used to motivate the audience to accept the purpose of the persuader. Both persuasion and propaganda tend to produce messages of *resonance*; that is, the recipients do not perceive the themes of messages to be imposed on them from an outside authority to which they are required or committed to defer. Rather, the recipients perceive the anchors on which the message is based as coming from within themselves. Paul Kecskemeti (1973) defined the propagandist's ideal role in relation to the recipient of the message as that of an alter ego: "someone giving expression to the recipient's own concerns, tensions, aspirations, and hopes . . . Thus, propaganda . . . denies all distance between the source and the audience: the propaganda voices the propagandee's own feelings" (p. 864). Nazi propaganda relied on resonance by representing legends of the past, familiar music, and street theater in its propaganda. There was a bizarre play performed for German railroad workers in 1933. Hitler was compared with Jesus Christ in a Christmas nativity play. The performers, dressed as crusaders, acted out the struggle of light and darkness, while storm troopers marched to the nativity scene carrying swastika flags. An announcer spoke over a loudspeaker: "God sent us a savior at the moment of our deepest despair; our Führer and our wonderful Stormtroopers" (Clark, 1997, p. 52).

Identification must take place between the persuader and the persuadee in persuasive communication. Common sensations, concepts, images, and ideas that make them feel as one are shared. A persuader analyzes an audience to be able to express its members' needs, desires, personal and social beliefs, attitudes, and values as well as their attitudes and concerns about the social outcome of the persuasive situation. The persuader is a voice from without, speaking the language of the audience members' voices within. Yet persuasive communication may be dialectic in nature and preclude homogeneity. Conversely, the propaganda message is more often homogeneous because it is more likely to be sent to a mass audience than to one person in an interpersonal setting. Exceptions to this exist, of course, when the propagandist works one-on-one with subjects.

## Persuasion Seeks Voluntary Change

In general, practitioners of persuasion assume that the audience has access to information about the other side of a controversial issue as well as exposure to counter persuasion. In other words, there is a recognition that any change that occurs within audience perceptions, cognitions, or behaviors will be voluntary change. Both parties, persuader and persuadee, will perceive the change due to persuasion as mutually beneficial.

## Misleading and Manipulating an Audience

Of course, a persuader can mislead an audience regarding the true intention. Sometimes an audience is aware of this, which gives an aura of voluntary compliance; that is, the audience can decide to make a choice to change while knowing quite well that the persuader has a hidden agenda. Sometimes an audience will believe a persuader's spoken intent, and consequently, it will be manipulated and used without knowing what is happening. This we regard as propaganda. More commonly, however, the propagandist exploits an audience's beliefs or values or group norms in such a way as to fan the fires of prejudice or self-interest. When the audience goes along with such practices, a certain kind of mutual reciprocity occurs because both parties have needs fulfilled. The audience's needs—the reinforcement of prejudicial or self-serving attitudes—get fulfilled and spoken, but the propagandist's needs—the attainment of a selfish end through the audience's compliance—get fulfilled but not spoken. In contrast, no audience members, no matter how perverse their own needs, will put up with knowing that they are being manipulated and used to fulfill another's selfish needs. Thus, the propagandist cannot reveal the true intent of the message.

A 1993 Roper poll revealed that 22% of U.S. adults and 20% of U.S. high school students believed it was possible that the Holocaust did not happen. Deborah Lipstadt (1993) attributed this to partial ignorance on the part of those surveyed but also recognized that Holocaust denial stems from “a mélange of extremist, racist, and nativist sentiments” (p. 4). A YouGov/Economist poll conducted December 2–5, 2023, found that 20% of young U.S. adults age 18–29 agreed that the Holocaust is a myth, whereas 51% in that age range disagreed. No Americans age 65 and above agreed with the denial of the Holocaust. *The Economist* (2023) set the context for the results:

On December 5th, for over five hours, lawmakers grilled the presidents of elite universities in a congressional hearing about antisemitism on college campuses. In one of the testiest exchanges a Republican congresswoman, Elise Stefanik, asked whether “calling for the genocide of Jews” violates university rules. It is “context-dependent”, replied Liz Magill, the president of the University of Pennsylvania.

Four days later, President Magill resigned.

## RHETORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION

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Since the beginning of the study of rhetoric, which was synonymous with persuasion until the early 20th century, theorists and practitioners have been concerned with ethics. The form of government in ancient Greece encouraged public speaking. Citizens voiced their opinions openly and were encouraged to share in making political and judicial decisions. Because civic responsibility was presumed, encouragement to be honorable citizens and to acquire skill in public statement was strong. The Athenian system disqualified any speaker who was “suspected of certain dishonorable acts. . . . [H]e could be prosecuted, not for the offense, but for continuing to speak in the assembly after committing the offense” (Bonner, 1933, p. 80). People studied the art of rhetoric almost as an entire system of higher education, if not a way of life (Hunt, 1925, p. 3).

Plato opposed the place of rhetoric in Athenian life as well as whatever part rhetoric had in influencing public opinion. As Hunt (1925) said, “He despised mere opinion almost as much as he did the public” (p. 3). He believed in a government ruled by philosopher-kings and not a government in which rhetoric was employed by those who did not possess true wisdom or knowledge. As a result, two of his writings, the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*, attacked rhetoric as a system capable of making the worse appear the better reason. In the *Gorgias*, Plato criticized the study of rhetoric for misleading people into believing that, by attempting through words to achieve what is good, they could do good. Without insight and wisdom, a person who studied rhetoric was likely to become what we would call a propagandist. Plato, through his spokesman Socrates, posed the following questions:

Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens may be made as good as possible by their discourses? Or do they, too, endeavor to gratify the citizens, and neglecting the public interest for the sake of their own private advantage, do they treat the people as children, trying only to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether they shall become better or worse by these means? (cited in Cary, 1854, pp. 125–126)

Plato became more accepting of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*, for Plato admonished the rhetorician to have high moral purpose and knowledge of truth or else not attempt rhetoric at all. Through the exhibition of three speeches about love, which represent three different kinds of speakers, Plato contrasted the neutral, the evil, and the noble lovers/speakers. The second lover/speaker is evil and insincere and attempts to exploit, deceive, and manipulate his audience, whereas the third lover/speaker is noble and has a genuine desire to help the audience and to actualize its ideals. Plato summed up the best of the speakers by having Socrates say,

A man must know the truth about each particular of which he speaks or writes. . . . Not till then can discourses be artistic as far as it lies in the nature of their genus to be made so, to be controlled by art for the purpose of instruction or persuasion. (Bailey, 1965, p. 51)

Aristotle, the great philosopher and social interpreter of fourth-century B.C.E. Greece, produced many classical works about the nature of ideas and people. The work that is seminal in the field of persuasion is *Rhetoric* (Cooper, 1932). Although Aristotle studied with Plato at the academy and embraced many ideas that Plato expressed in the *Phaedrus*, *Rhetoric* tends to be detached from issues of morality. Rather, it is an amoral and scientific analysis of *rhetoric*, defined as “the faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion” (Cooper, 1932, p. 7). Yet, in *Rhetoric*, Aristotle established the concept of *credibility* (*ethos*) as a form of proof and mode of persuasion. *Ethos*, an artistic proof established within the discourse itself, provided the audience with insight into the persuader’s character, integrity, and goodwill. Other forms of proof are emotional appeal (*pathos*) and the speech itself, its reasoning and arguments (*logos*), defined by Aristotle as “when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth from such means of persuasion as are appropriate to a particular subject” (Cooper, 1932, p. 9).

Central to the study of rhetoric is the audience, which Aristotle classified and analyzed. Logic is established through audience participation in an interactive reasoning process. Known as the *enthymeme*, this practical device is regarded by many as a syllogism with some part or parts missing. The enthymeme enables the persuader and persuadees to co-create reasoning by dialectically coming to a conclusion. It requires the mental effort of the audience to fill in parts of the reasoning process, thus stimulating involvement. Aristotle regarded the enthymeme as a way of guarding truth and justice against falsehood and wrong. He believed that audiences could not follow close and careful logical reasoning related to universal truths but could participate in reasoning related to probability in the sphere of human affairs. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle dealt with his expectations for high moral principles and analyzed virtue and vice to provide strategies for *ethos*, or character of the speaker. With regard to persuasion, he indicated that a crafty person could artfully manipulate the instruments of rhetoric for either honest or dishonest ends. Depending on which end is desired, the use of rhetorical devices is judged accordingly: “If . . . the aim be good, the cleverness is praiseworthy; but if it be bad, it becomes craft” (Browne, 1850, VI, pp. xii, 8). MacCunn (1906) interpreted this to mean that the Aristotelian thesis postulates that “cleverness and character must strike alliance” (p. 298). MacCunn also saw Aristotle’s general point of view as judging the means according to the ends sought: “He who would win the harper’s skill must win by harping; he who would write, by writing; he who would heal the sick by healing them. In these, as indeed in all the arts, faculty is begotten of function, and definite proclivity comes of determinate acts” (p. 301). Aristotle believed that the ethics of rhetoric could be judged by the speaker’s intent, the

means used in the speech to further the argument, and accompanying circumstances. He also thought the integration of reason and emotional appeals was acceptable as long as the speaker advocated for the general public good.

Quintilian, the premier teacher of imperial rhetoric in Rome during the first century C.E., wrote the *Institutes of Oratory*, in which he advocated the necessity of credibility, arguing on behalf of Cato's definition: "An orator is a good man, skilled in speaking" (cited in Benson & Prosser, 1969, p. 118). This concept was reiterated by St. Augustine in his fifth-century work on Christian preaching and rhetoric, *On Christian Doctrine*. Insistence on truth as the overall objective of public speaking is the cardinal tenet of this treatise. St. Augustine was concerned about using rhetorical techniques for false persuasion, but he thought the way it was used did not reflect on rhetoric itself:

There are also rules for a more copious kind of argument, which is called eloquence, and these rules are not the less true that they can be used for persuading men of what is false, but as they can be used to enforce the truth as well, it is not the faculty itself that is to be blamed, but the perversity of those who put it to a bad use. (Shaw, 1873, IX, p. 5)

Classical concepts of rhetoric, especially that of the good man speaking well, were revitalized throughout the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. Neoclassicism held forth in theoretical works on persuasion despite the appearance of despotic princes and authoritarian rulers in the same countries in which the rhetorical works were published. In 1513, Machiavelli wrote *The Prince*, advocating that deception to gain and maintain control be used, that the ends justified the means, and that the public was easily corrupted. He said, however, that force was needed to coerce the public as well:

The populace is by nature fickle; it is easy to persuade them of something, but difficult to confirm them in that persuasion. Therefore one must urgently arrange matters so that when they no longer believe they can be made to believe by force. (Machiavelli, 1513/1961, p. 19)

Machiavelli (1513/1961) accurately described the demagogue/propagandist—"everyone sees who you appear to be, few sense who you really are"—and elaborated thusly:

A prince, therefore, need not necessarily have all the good qualities I mentioned above, but he should certainly appear to have them. . . . He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and devout. . . . But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how. (pp. 55–56)

In the same century, rhetorical theorists such as Philipp Melanchthon, the humanist educator, contemporary of Martin Luther, and major religious reformer of Germany; Leonard Cox, the first to write a treatise on rhetoric in the English language;

and Thomas Wilson, Elizabeth I's secretary of state, whose *Arte of Rhetorique* was published eight times in 30 years from 1553 to 1583, were turning out works that echoed the ethical principles of Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian.

Even after the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* became an official organ of the Roman Catholic Church in 1622, no rhetorical theorist addressed its implications with regard to persuasion. The major rhetorical works of the 17th century were Francis Bacon's four treatises—adapting classical rhetoric to the needs of the scientist and affirming the value of ornamentation and imaginative coloring in rhetoric—and the works of the early elocutionists Robert Robinson and John Bulwer, whose delivery foreshadowed the rhetorical movement that placed major emphasis on delivery and pronunciation.

## Rhetoric and Propaganda

The study of persuasion in the theories of rhetoric laid down throughout the centuries emphasized adherence to the truth and sound reason in revealing the real intent of the persuader, demonstration of a conclusion based on evidence and reasoning, and a sincere concern for the welfare of the audience. These are the humanistic concerns of the classicists. It can be argued that the humanists were concerned with eloquence and consequently preferred rhetoric to logic. No major rhetorical theories have come from nations whose governments have been totalitarian; thus, the history of rhetoric hardly includes the study of propaganda except for allusions to misuse of rhetorical techniques for dishonest ends. The Bolsheviks had Eisenstein to describe and demonstrate the use of propaganda in film, and the Nazis had Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Goebbels's diaries as guidelines for propaganda, but these have not been part of the history of rhetorical theory. The reason for this comes from the rhetorician's insistence on a consideration of ethics in rhetoric. Not until Kenneth Burke, the American literary critic, wrote *The Rhetoric of Hitler's "Battle"* in 1939 (in Burke, 1973) did a serious rhetorical critic tackle and analyze propaganda while simultaneously contributing new ideas to rhetorical theory.

Drawing on what he called the Dramatistic Pentad—five interrelated motivational or causal points of view—Burke (1973) analyzed the *act* (what took place in thought or deed), the *scene* (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred), the *agent* (the actor or person or institution that performed the act), the *agency* or *agencies* (the means or instruments used by the agent), and the *purpose* (the motive or cause behind the act). Burke determined that, in *Mein Kampf*, (a) the *act* was the bastardization of religious thought; (b) the *scene* was discordant elements in a culture progressively weakened by capitalist materialism; (c) the *agent* was Hitler; (d) the *agencies* were unity identification such as “one voice” (the Reich, Munich, the army, German democracy, race, nation, Aryan, heroism, etc.) versus disunity identification such as images, ideas, and so on of the parliamentary wrangle of the Hapsburgs, Babel of opinion, and Jewish cunning, together with spiritualization and materialization techniques; and (e) the *purpose* was the

unification of the German people. Burke's description of Hitler's strategies to control the German people is a masterful criticism of propaganda, yet it also is heavily flavored with moralistic judgment. It warns the reader about "what to guard against if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine in America" (p. 191).

Donald C. Bryant's (1953) seminal essay, *Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope*, devotes a few pages to propaganda, which includes advertising and certain political discourse as "partial, incomplete, and perhaps misused, rhetorics" (p. 413). He characterized propaganda by technique—excluding competing ideas, short-circuiting informed judgment, ignoring alternative ideas or courses of action, and in general subverting rational processes. Although Bryant did not engage in propaganda analysis or add new insight into understanding propaganda, he acknowledged that the understanding of propaganda is grounded in the understanding of rhetoric. His stance is a classical one, for he said, "The major techniques of this propaganda are long known rhetorical techniques gone wrong" (p. 415).

Whereas scholars such as Gurak and Antonijevic (2009) have explored digital rhetoric, recognizing its wide reach, speed, combinations of verbal and visual material, possible anonymity, and an interactive audience through the Internet, urging the study of different contexts and distribution methods, they have not addressed how prolific propaganda rhetoric is on the Internet. No doubt such analyses will be forthcoming.

Contemporary rhetorical theorists have focused on intention in rhetoric. They note that intention means that a person "plans to obtain a specifiable outcome" (Arnold & Bowers, 1984, pp. 875–876). It is not always possible to know the exact intent of a propagandist; that is why historical analysis may be more exacting than analysis of current propaganda. Although few rhetorical theorists discussed propaganda, the study of persuasion blossomed in the 20th century as an inquiry into behaviorism. This happened almost concurrently with the serious study of propaganda by social scientists. Now let's return to the model that depicts propaganda as a special form of communication.

## PROPAGANDA AS A FORM OF COMMUNICATION

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Propaganda may appear to be informative communication when ideas are shared, something is explained, or instruction takes place. Information communicated by the propagandist may appear to be indisputable and totally factual. The propagandist knows, however, that the purpose is not to promote mutual understanding but rather to promote their own objectives. Thus, the propagandist will attempt to control information flow and manage a certain public's opinion by shaping perceptions through strategies of informative communication.

A persuader, likewise, shares ideas, explains, or instructs within the purpose of promoting the mutual satisfaction of needs. In fact, a persuader skillfully uses evidence to teach potential persuadees with the intent of response shaping. Evidence itself does not persuade, but it can enhance a persuader's credibility (McCroskey,



1969). Persuaders, however, do not try to appear as informers. An effective persuader makes the purpose as clear as possible to bring about attitude or behavior change. The explicitly stated conclusion is twice as likely to get the desired audience response compared with the suggested one (Biddle, 1966; Hovland & Mandell, 1952). The propagandist may appear to have a clear purpose and certainly an explicitly stated conclusion, but the true purpose is likely to be concealed.

### **Concealed Purpose**

The propagandist is likely to appear as a persuader with a stated purpose that seems to satisfy mutual needs. In reality, however, the propagandist wants to promote their own interests or those of an organization—sometimes at the expense of the recipients, sometimes not. The point is that the propagandist does not regard the well-being of the audience as a primary concern. The propagandist is likely to be detached from the recipients. Not only does the propagandist not care about the audience, but they may also not believe in the message that is being sent. In fact, concealment of purpose may not be the only deviousness. Often, propagandists do not want their identity known.

### **Concealed Identity**

Identity concealment is often necessary for the propagandist to achieve desired objectives and goals. The propagandist seeks to control the flow of information, manage public opinion, and manipulate behavioral patterns. These are the kinds of objectives that might not be achieved if the true intent were known or if the real source were revealed. As previously noted, it is possible to conceal identity on the Internet.

### **Control of Information Flow**

Control of information flow takes the form of withholding information, releasing information at predetermined times, releasing information in juxtaposition with other information that may influence public perception, manufacturing information, communicating information to selective audiences, and distorting information. The propagandist tries to control information flow in two major ways: (a) controlling the media as a source of information distribution and (b) presenting distorted information from what appears to be a credible source. Using journalists to infiltrate the media and spread disinformation is one way to present distorted information. A public relations expert, Victoria Clarke, developed the Pentagon's media operation, including the program to embed American journalists with American troops in Iraq in 2003–2005. This may have been intended as a form of controlling information flow because the journalists get emotionally attached to their units, thus causing their reporting to be emotional. It should also be noted that embedded journalists must sign a contract to check each story with the military media liaison officer in both the United States and the United Kingdom (Miller, 2004, p. 9).

Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia seized control of most of the media and used newspaper, radio, and television reports of atrocities to fan the fires of hatred on both sides during the Serbian-Croatian war in the former Yugoslavia. The reporting on Belgrade television was so biased that thousands of people staged a huge demonstration to protest. In Croatia, Tudjman removed personnel at Croatian television and the newspaper *Vjesnik* and replaced them with his own people. In Russia, opponents of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are digitally erased when they appear on Kremlin-controlled television networks. Even comedians are barred from making political jokes. Talk show hosts are told which guests they can invite (Levy, 2008).

Altheide and Johnson (1980) made a case for what they called “bureaucratic propaganda,” in which organizations as diverse as the military, television networks, and evangelical crusades release official reports containing what appears to be scientifically gathered and objective information to influential groups with the purpose of maintaining the legitimacy of the organizations and their activities. The information in the official reports is often contrived, distorted, or falsely interpreted. This information, according to Altheide and Johnson, may never be seen by the public but rather by a congressional committee or some citizens group and may be used for some action or program.

Other reasons for corporate information control are secrecy in new product development or suppression of data about products that are hazardous to human health and the environment.

Minority opinion may be suppressed to maintain an appearance of a strong base of support. Colluding sources of information that support the propagandist’s intent will be disseminated, whereas opposing sources are likely to be suppressed. When Chinese students demonstrated in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989, the government blacked out news reports of the protest to smaller cities and the countryside. Chinese citizens in these areas never knew about the Beijing unrest and the demands for reforms. The world saw the demonstrations because the media were in Beijing to cover Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit. When the government brutally massacred student protesters fleeing from tanks and grenades, it distorted the truth by claiming that thugs and counterrevolutionaries had murdered soldiers of the People’s Republic of China, who fired back in self-defense. Here, the Chinese government successfully controlled information flow to its own people, but other people of the world knew about it.

Expansion of access to information around the world through new mass communication technologies has made control of information flow difficult. CNN and the BBC World Service brought television news to almost everyone except where they had banned in North Korea and China (Bogart, 1995, p. xxxiii). Censorship is stringent in North Korea, where cell phones are illegal; newspapers, radio, and television are tightly controlled by the government; and ordinary citizens cannot access the Internet. Enforcement is carried out by security troops who enter and check homes. Yet human rights activists have recruited North Koreans who are permitted to travel, arming them with cell phones and then posting their phoned and texted reports on websites seen in South Korea and America. The North Korean government, however, monitors cell

phone calls, and police drive around the countryside with tracking devices. If caught, the callers are publicly executed (Choe, 2010). To foster economic benefits, North Korea has begun to open the Internet to selected users while ensuring regime security. A “Mosquito Net” method of Internet control was set up to block threatening online information. It should be noted that Internet service did not begin until the government finished the technological development of mobile phone wiretapping (Chen et al., 2010, pp. 665–666).

## The Management of Public Opinion

Propaganda is most often associated with the management of public opinion. Public opinion has been defined by Land and Sears (1964) as “an implicit verbal response or ‘answer’ that an individual gives in response to a particular stimulus situation in which some general ‘question’ is raised” (quoted in Mitchell, 1970, p. 62). Walter Lippmann (1922/1960) regarded public opinion as that which emanated from persons interested in public affairs rather than as a fixed body of individuals. He believed that public opinion was effective only if those interested persons supported or opposed the “actors” in public affairs. Speier (1950) thought public opinion existed when a unique “right” is granted to a significant portion of extra governmental persons:

In its most attenuated form this right asserts itself as the expectation that the government will reveal and explain its decisions in order to enable people outside the government to think and talk about these decisions, or to put it in terms of democratic amenities, in order to assure “the success” of the government’s policy. (quoted in Altheide & Johnson, 1980, p. 7)

Mitchell (1970) gave four forms that public opinion usually takes: (a) popular opinion as generalized support for an institution, regime, or political system (as opposed to apathy, withdrawal, or alienation); (b) patterns of group loyalties and identifications; (c) public preferences for select leaders; and (d) intensely held opinions prevalent among a large public regarding public issues and current affairs (pp. 60–61). Mitchell likened the propagandist’s management of public opinion to “a burning glass which collects and focuses the diffused warmth of popular emotions, concentrating them upon a specific issue on which the warmth becomes heat and may reach the firing-point of revivals, risings, revolts, revolutions” (p. 111).

## The Manipulation of Behavior

Ultimately, the goal of propaganda is to manipulate behavior and behavioral patterns; external rather than internal public opinion is sought. Voting, buying products, selecting entertainment, joining organizations, displaying symbols, fighting for a cause, donating to an organization, and other forms of action responses are sought from the audiences who are addressed by the persuader and the propagandist. These are *overt* behaviors that can be observed as both verbal and nonverbal responses.

According to Triandis (1977), other categories of behavior are *attributive* behavior, derived from the conclusions drawn about the internal states of others from observations of their behavior, and *affective* behavior, emotional reactions to people and events. An example of an attributive behavior is a manufacturer concluding, “Consumers buy our product regularly; therefore, they must like it.” Examples of affective behaviors are cheering and yelling for a political candidate and experiencing a burst of pride when the national anthem is sung. Triandis pointed out that behaviors become habits or behavioral patterns when they are performed repeatedly over a long period of time. Patterns in past behaviors or habits are fair predictors of future behaviors. In other words, they become “scripts” for behavior in similar situations. When a similar situation is encountered, carrying out the same behavior does not require a great deal of consciousness (Roloff & Miller, 1980, p. 50). Robert Coles’s book *The Political Life of Children* (1986), which is about how children learn about political loyalties from language, religion, and family, tells, for example, about the children of war-torn Northern Ireland. The Protestant children believe that God is on their side, and Coles related how their parents sang “God Save the Queen” to them while rocking them to sleep in the nursery.

A propagandist or persuader will have difficulty changing behavior if the audience already has habits to the contrary. This is especially true when a habitual behavior is triggered by emotion (Triandis, 1977, p. 25). The point is that behavioral change is not easy to bring about. Both persuaders and propagandists are well aware of this and actively seek information regarding variables related to behavioral change and predictors of behavior.

Thus, we have seen how propaganda is a form of communication and how it uses both informative and persuasive communication concepts to promote its own objectives by controlling the flow of information, managing public opinion, and manipulating behavioral patterns. Propaganda is a subset of both information and persuasion. Sharing techniques with information and persuasion but going beyond its aims, propaganda does not seek mutual understanding or mutual fulfillment of needs. Propaganda deliberately and systematically seeks to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.

## THE DEMAGOGUE/PROPAGANDIST

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The term *demagogue* has roots in the Greek word *demos*, meaning “the people” but in the sense of “the population” or “the mob.” A demagogue was considered in classical times as the leader of the mob or the state (McLean & McMillan, 2009). The term is pejorative for it refers to an unprincipled orator, a political agitator, or a rabble-rouser who appeals to the basest instincts and prejudices of a mob. We saw that Machiavelli equated the demagogue with a propagandist who appears to have good qualities but may not in reality. In contemporary times, a demagogue “uses language that purports to support liberal democratic ideals (liberty, equality and objective reason) in ‘the service of undermining

these ideals” (Kakutani, 2016, p. 3). Stanley and Urowsky (2017) refer to Vladislav Surkov, the senior deputy for domestic political affairs in Russia and architect of “managed democracy,” who is known for “democratic rhetoric and undemocratic intent” (p. 72). Rather than speaking in explicit racial slurs, the demagogue uses words like “welfare” and “illegal immigrants” that are associated with stereotypes. A demagogue does not hesitate to lie, espouse conspiracy theories, and incite fear by appealing to the worst in potential supporters to gain power. You will read about Huey Long and Father Coughlin, demagogues, in Chapter 5. Hitler, Joseph McCarthy, Fidel Castro, Rodrigo Duterte, and many current dictators are demagogues. Distinguished journalists in prominent publications like the *Los Angeles Times*, *Time*, and *The New Yorker* named President Donald Trump as a demagogue. A *Time* magazine article published on June 20, 2016, when Trump was still a candidate, “What History Teaches Us About Demagogues Like the Donald,” noted the endurance of the demagogue or “rabble-rouser”:

Demagogues have been a problem for democracy for 25 centuries, at least since the populist Cleon persuaded his fellow Athenians to slaughter every man in the city of Mytilene as punishment for a failed revolt. Of that particular demagogue, Aristotle wrote: “He was the first who shouted on the public platform, who used abusive language, and who spoke with his cloak girt around him, while all the others used to speak in proper dress and manner.”

The words *propaganda* and *demagogue* have become common in today’s society, thus we emphasize the importance of understanding their meanings and recognizing evidence of their practices.

## OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

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The modern study of propaganda came about after World War I and, interestingly, led the way to the social scientific study of persuasion. At the same time, as Doob (1966) pointed out, the word *propaganda* became less used and was replaced by words such as *communication*, *information*, and *persuasion* because they imply no value judgment and tend to embrace the development of new communication technologies as well as the “intricate perplexities inherent in developing societies and international diplomacy” (p. vi). Today, as this book is being written in the midst of ongoing wars, the word *propaganda* is increasingly seen and heard.

The historical development of propaganda and the developing media and audiences are the subjects of Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 reviews the theories and research regarding persuasion and propaganda. Chapter 5 examines the use of propaganda in psychological warfare and the emerging fear of propaganda in mass society. The remainder of the book concentrates on modern propaganda methods of analysis (Chapter 6), case studies (Chapter 7), and a process model that depicts how propaganda works in modern society (Chapter 8).

## NOTES

1. This is a military training film on the characteristics, capabilities, weaknesses, and recognition of the World War II Mitsubishi-designed Japanese fighter aircraft A6M *Rei Shiki Kanjo Sento Ki*, nicknamed the Zero. The film was "dedicated to the flyers who are helping make the Zeros...zero." <https://archive.org/details/RecognitionoftheJapaneseZeroFighter>
2. *Jihad* is a loaded term when used in the Western English-speaking world, according to Maher Hathout, author of *Jihad vs. Terrorism*. He told Brian Handwerk of *National Geographic* magazine in 2003: "It's a range of activities all based on the Arabic meaning of the word 'exerted effort.' In the Koran it's projected as exerting effort to change oneself, and also in certain situations physically standing against oppressors if that's the only way."

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