

1 The United States versus Terrorism: From the Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya to the Surge and Drawdown of Forces in Afghanistan

Frédéric Gagnon and Ryan C. Hendrickson

Before You Begin

1. What is the traditionally accepted view of Congress's exercise of war powers during the Cold War and after September 11, 2001? How does that view compare to Congress's role leading up to President Bill Clinton's, President George W. Bush's, and President Barack Obama's military actions against terrorism?

2. In the days prior to military action in 1998, 2001, and 2009, how did the diplomatic challenges differ for Clinton, Bush, and Obama?

3. Is Congress's decision to endorse military action against those involved in the September 11 attacks a victory for Congress's war powers? If so, why?

4. Which advisers seem to have the most significant influence on Clinton's, Bush's, and Obama's decisions regarding terrorism, Afghanistan, and al Qaeda? Why?

5. Did President Clinton's military action in 1998 have a "diversionary" intent? What evidence supports such a view? What evidence challenges it?

Introduction: Striking Back at Terrorism

The public, the media, and most members of Congress sometimes are not privy to the process in which U.S. use of force decisions are made. Although Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama appear to have vastly different interests in policy matters, and certainly have divergent views of the appropriate role for the United States in international affairs, many similarities exist in the ways they made decisions as commander in chief. On August 20, 1998, when Clinton launched missile strikes against alleged facilities of Osama bin Laden in Sudan and Afghanistan, and on October 7, 2001, when Bush set in motion Operation Enduring Freedom

Timeline

The Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations' Strikes against Osama bin Laden

August 23, 1996	Osama bin Laden issues his first <i>fatwa</i> against the United States.
February 23, 1998	Bin Laden issues his second <i>fatwa</i> against the United States.
August 7, 1998	Bombs explode at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
August 14, 1998	Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet presents his agency's assessment that bin Laden and his al Qaeda network were behind the attacks on the embassies.
August 17, 1998	President Bill Clinton admits to the nation that he misled the public about having an extramarital relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky.
August 20, 1998	In a 2:00 a.m. telephone conversation with National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Clinton authorizes strikes against bin Laden. Missiles are launched on alleged al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan and Sudan.
Mid-September 1999	The Clinton administration initiates "the plan," consisting of broader covert operations intended to gather intelligence on bin Laden and disrupt al Qaeda.
October 12, 2000	Al Qaeda launches a suicide boat attack against the USS <i>Cole</i> while it is docked in Aden, Yemen. Seventeen Americans are killed.
September 11, 2001	Al Qaeda operatives hijack four commercial aircraft, flying two into the World Trade Center towers and crashing another into the Pentagon. The fourth aircraft crashes in a field in Pennsylvania. The death toll is 2,995.
September 14, 2001	The Senate passes S. J. Res. 23, authorizing George W. Bush to use all necessary and appropriate force against those associated with the September 11 strikes on the United States. The House of Representatives responds the following day by passing the resolution.

September 15–16, 2001	President Bush holds meetings with foreign policy principals at Camp David to discuss military operations in retaliation for the September 11 attacks.
October 6, 2001	Bush gives final approval for military action against Afghanistan.
October 7, 2001	The United States launches Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
December 7, 2001	The Taliban lose Kandahar, the last major city under its control.
August 2003	NATO takes control of security in Kabul, its first-ever operational commitment outside Europe.
October 2006	NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan, taking command in the east from a US-led coalition force.
April 2008	NATO leaders meeting in Bucharest say peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan is their top priority. They pledge a “firm and shared long-term commitment” there.
September 2008	President Bush sends an extra 4,500 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a “quiet surge.”
February 2009	President Barack Obama announces the dispatch of 17,000 extra U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
March 2009	President Obama unveils a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat what he calls an increasingly perilous situation.
December 2009	President Obama announces the dispatch of 30,000 extra U.S. troops in Afghanistan. He also declares that the United States will begin withdrawing its forces by 2011.
January—December 2010	As the surge plan is being implemented, President Obama escalates the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs)/drone missile strikes against remaining elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan.
June 2010	Gen. Stanley McChrystal is relieved of command of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Gen. David Petraeus replaces him.

(continued)

Timeline *(continued)*

The Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations' Strikes against Osama bin Laden

November 2010	The United States and its allies announce that all ISAF forces are intended to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
May 2, 2011	Osama bin Laden is found and killed in Pakistan by United States Navy SEALs.
June 2011	The American military presence reaches its apex in Afghanistan, with nearly 100,000 troops deployed.
May 2012	The Obama administration announces a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, which will keep approximately 15,000 to 20,000 U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after the 2014 conclusion of the ISAF mission.
July 2012	Afghanistan is named a "Major Non-NATO Ally."
November 2012	Obama wins a second presidential term. Afghanistan has largely moved out of the public and political discussion as the 2012 elections moved forward. ^a

^aFor a complete timeline, read BBC, "Timeline: Afghanistan," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1162108.stm>.

against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, nearly all the critical military decisions were made by the executive branch. In 2009 Obama's "strategic review" of Bush's Afghanistan policy and decision to expand the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan were also made primarily by the executive branch, with limited input from other actors. Congress also played a limited role in Obama's decision to reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan. Unlike many other foreign policy issues in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 environments, the center of action concerning terrorism is the White House.

Background: Terrorism and Presidential Powers

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, as well as other enumerated powers associated with the military. The president is given

the explicit authority to act as commander in chief. Most constitutional scholars agree, however, that the president is empowered to use force without congressional approval to “repel sudden attacks” against the United States.¹ In other instances, the president must obtain Congress’s approval prior to using force.

For much of U.S. history, Congress’s war powers have been respected by the commander in chief.² With the Cold War’s onset and the widely accepted belief that the Soviet Union and communism represented a threat to the United States, the president’s perception of his power as commander in chief became increasingly one of omnipotence. Since 1945 presidents have asserted broad military powers with few recognized limitations. Because members of Congress agreed that communism should be checked, and because it was politically safer to let a president assume full responsibility for U.S. military endeavors, Congress often deferred to executive branch unilateralism in actions by the president as commander in chief.³ This practice remained the norm until the 1973 passage of the War Powers Resolution, which was designed to reassert the authority that many felt Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had usurped from Congress during the Vietnam War.⁴ The resolution requires that the president “consult with Congress in every possible circumstance” prior to and after the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities (P.L. 93–148). Despite its intent, the War Powers Resolution has been a failure. All presidents since 1973 have maintained that it is unconstitutional—arguing that it illegally limits their power as commander in chief—and Congress has often failed to enforce it.⁵ The Clinton presidency is a good example of this dynamic. Clinton viewed his powers as commander in chief broadly, maintaining that congressional approval was not required for him to take military action.⁶ Clinton’s outlook is evidenced by U.S. military actions against Iraq, NATO air strikes in Bosnia and Kosovo, military deployments to Haiti and Somalia, and the use of force against bin Laden, all of which occurred without specific congressional approval.

U.S. Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya: Clinton Strikes Osama bin Laden

On August 7, 1998, 263 people, including 12 Americans, were killed in simultaneous truck bomb explosions at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Immediately after the bombings, experts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) rushed to East Africa to determine responsibility for the attacks. The evidence quickly pointed to Osama bin Laden, a name most Americans had never heard of but who was no stranger to the U.S. intelligence community. Bin Laden was born in 1957 into a wealthy, conservative family in Saudi Arabia with connections to the Al Saud, the Saudi royal family. In the 1980s, he left Saudi Arabia to go to Afghanistan and support the *mujahidin*, the fighters who were resisting the Soviet takeover and occupation of Afghanistan with critical military assistance from the United States. Toward the end of the Afghan war, bin Laden established an organization of radical Muslims that would become the foundation for al Qaeda, a network of supporters willing to advance their fundamentalist version of Islam using any means necessary. He then moved to Saudi Arabia and Sudan and was suspected of being involved in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in February 1993. The State Department added al Qaeda to its list of terrorist organizations in 1997. One of the first statements by bin Laden to generate international attention occurred on August 23, 1996, when he publicly issued a *fatwa*, or decree (usually by a recognized religious leader), calling for a *jihad* (struggle or holy war) against the United States to oppose its military presence in Saudi Arabia that began with the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 1998 bin Laden once again caught the eye of the world when on February 23 he issued a second *fatwa* in a fax to a London-based Arabic newsletter. In the communication, he made three central points: the United States should leave the Muslim holy land; the United States should end the “great devastation inflicted” upon the Iraqi people through its continuation of economic sanctions; and the United States was engaged in a religious and economic war against Muslims, while simultaneously serving Israel’s interests vis-à-vis the Muslim world. The truck bombings at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred less than six months later.

A week after the attacks, on August 14, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet presented his agency’s analysis—a “judgment about responsibility”—to President Clinton. According to the CIA, additional evidence suggested that bin Laden was planning another attack on Americans and that an important gathering of bin Laden associates would take place in Afghanistan on August 20, 1998. At the meeting with Tenet, Clinton gave tentative approval to a military response and authorized his senior military advisers to move forward with operational plans.⁷

The bombings and their aftermath occurred at a difficult time for Clinton. On August 17, he testified to the Office of the Independent Counsel and a grand jury, by videoconferencing, that he had had an extramarital relationship

with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Later that evening, in a national address, Clinton admitted that he had “misled” the American people about his relationship with Lewinsky.⁸ After his address, Clinton and his family left for a vacation, but planning continued for military strikes against bin Laden. On Wednesday, August 19, while on Martha’s Vineyard, Clinton discussed the strikes with Vice President Al Gore. Senior leaders in Congress were also notified of possible military action. Throughout the day, Clinton spoke on four occasions by phone with his national security adviser, Samuel “Sandy” Berger, who was in Washington. In a call around 2:00 a.m. Thursday, Clinton gave final approval for the strikes.

Beginning on August 20 around 1:30 p.m. EST, seventy-nine cruise missiles were launched at targets in Sudan and Afghanistan from ships stationed in the Arabian and Red Seas. The Sudanese targets included the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant, which the United States alleged was a chemical weapons factory. Six other sites were struck simultaneously in Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared that al-Shifa was chosen because bin Laden was heavily involved in Sudan’s military-industrial complex and had an interest in acquiring chemical weapons.⁹ In discussing the sites hit in Afghanistan, Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that one “base camp” that served as the headquarters for bin Laden’s organization was struck.

Approximately twenty-five minutes after the strikes, Clinton addressed the nation, providing four justifications for his actions. First, he announced that “convincing evidence” pointed to bin Laden’s responsibility for the attacks on the embassies. Second, the president pointed to bin Laden’s history of terrorist activities. Third, Clinton argued that “compelling information” suggested that bin Laden was planning another attack against the United States. Fourth, he said that bin Laden sought to acquire chemical weapons.¹⁰ In a second address to the nation later that evening, Clinton expanded on bin Laden’s previous declarations and activities and said that his senior military advisers had given him a “unanimous recommendation” to go forward with the strikes.¹¹ In mentioning the unanimous recommendation Clinton may have been anticipating the reaction from the public, 40 percent of whom believed that the Monica Lewinsky scandal may have influenced the decision to strike. Administration officials responded vehemently with denials that any link existed between the president’s domestic troubles and the strikes at bin Laden.¹² Though many Americans thought the “Lewinsky factor” may have entered into the decision to use force, 75 percent still supported the strikes.¹³

Consulting Congress

The night before the attacks, Berger phoned Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) and presented them with the evidence implicating bin Laden. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) also received a phone call before the strikes.¹⁴ Berger attempted to call House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO), who was traveling in France. Clinton also phoned these leaders, with the exception of Gephardt, as he flew back to Washington to deliver his second address to the nation.¹⁵ DCI Tenet notified, at minimum, Sen. Bob Kerrey (D-NE), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, in advance of the strikes, which Kerrey strongly supported.¹⁶ Other reports contend that Gingrich had been consulted and was privy to intelligence on bin Laden before Berger's first phone calls were made.¹⁷

In retrospect, it is clear that the most senior leaders in Congress of both parties knew of the impending strikes. White House spokesperson Michael McCurry purposely noted that all requirements of the War Powers Resolution were met, including its consultation mandate.¹⁸ In the aftermath of Clinton's strikes against bin Laden there were no complaints about violations of the War Powers Resolution or Congress's war-making powers. Congress gave broad support to the president on constitutional grounds.

Although these strikes were the last overt military effort to kill bin Laden before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Clinton administration did not give up the hunt for bin Laden. Before Clinton left office, he authorized five different intelligence operations aimed at disrupting al Qaeda's planning and preempting terrorist activities.¹⁹

The most comprehensive intelligence operation was known simply as "the plan" and went into effect around mid-September 1999. The plan sought to focus more attention on human intelligence gathering and expand the CIA's efforts to recruit well-qualified operatives who could be placed on the ground in Afghanistan to gather intelligence on bin Laden. Another critical element of the plan was to develop and use the Predator, an unmanned aerial vehicle with intelligence-gathering and military strike capabilities. On at least two occasions before September 11, and perhaps a third, the Predator sighted bin Laden.²⁰ Former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke maintains that on Clinton's orders, the United States had submarines in place with cruise missiles ready for use against bin Laden, but apparently not at times when "actionable intelligence" and military capability existed at the same time.²¹

From a policy-making perspective, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, or the 9/11 Commission, made one especially important finding regarding the Clinton administration's counterterrorism policies: Senior officials of the National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA "differ[ed] starkly" in their assessment of the administration's objectives in regard to bin Laden and therefore what types of actions they should be pursuing. NSC staffers, including Berger, maintained that the administration's policies were clear; authorization had been given to kill bin Laden. In contrast, CIA officials asserted that the administration had sought the capture of bin Laden and that only under certain conditions could he be killed.²² Although misunderstandings or differences existed among key agencies regarding the effort to get bin Laden, it is clear that the center of action for counterterrorism decisions and use of force was at the White House, with critical assistance provided by the CIA, and that military action was the preferred means of addressing these newfound terrorist challenges.

September 11: Authorization of Force and the War on Terrorism

President George W. Bush was made aware of the events that unfolded on September 11 while visiting with children at Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. Upon hearing that an aircraft had crashed into the Pentagon, Bush later said, he thought to himself, "We're at war. . . . Somebody is going to pay."²³ After the session with the children ended, Bush's Secret Service detail quickly escorted him to Air Force One. As it was not considered safe to fly the president back to Washington immediately, Bush was flown to Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska. From there, he spoke by phone with members of his National Security Council, including DCI Tenet, who reported that Osama bin Laden was behind the attacks.²⁴ By early evening, Bush was back at the White House, where deliberations began on how to address the crisis.

The constitutional dynamics and the authority of the president to respond to the September 11 attacks with military action were considerably different from Clinton's strikes against Afghanistan in 1998. Because the United States was directly attacked on its soil, most constitutional experts would concur that the Constitution allowed Bush, as commander in chief, to respond with force in defense of the nation. In addition, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter permits all member states to act in self-defense if attacked.²⁵ The Bush administration, however, quickly turned to Congress for formal authorization for the

use of force. The public was strongly in favor of a military response, and by approaching Congress the administration could avoid raising constitutional questions about the legitimacy of its forthcoming military actions. At the same time, legitimate constitutional questions existed in terms of whom the United States would be at war with. Part of the difficulty of this issue is that the enemy is not easily defined, identified, or targeted.

When Bush administration officials first met with congressional leaders and their senior staff members on September 12, congressional staffers were initially struck by the sweeping nature of the administration's force authorization proposal. Its request included the authority to "deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States" and essentially unrestricted financial resources for military responses, which would infringe on Congress's constitutional authority to appropriate money.²⁶ Key legislators, such as Senate Majority Leader Daschle and Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), thought it was Congress's duty to avoid giving the president "a blank check to go anywhere, anytime, against anyone."²⁷ During deliberations over the language of the resolution, administration officials agreed to eliminate *pre-empt* and replace it with *prevent*.²⁸ The request for unlimited spending powers was deleted.²⁹ As of late evening on September 13, final agreement on the resolution language had not been reached.³⁰

On the morning of September 14, Daschle and Senate Minority Leader Lott met with their respective caucuses. Later that morning, the Senate approved, 98–0, S. J. Res. 23 (P.L. 107–40), granting the president sweeping powers to initiate military action. The key provision of the resolution concerning force authorization stated

[t]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such organizations or persons.

The process by which this resolution was crafted and eventually voted on is uncharacteristic in that it was not passed from a formal committee of the House or Senate, and there was no public debate on the constitutional merits of the resolution. The White House consulted with Congress and revised its original proposal based on congressional input, but all in private sessions. A day after the Senate approved the resolution the House did so as well, in a

420–1 vote. Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) was the only member of Congress who voted against the measure, maintaining that it provided a “blank check” to the president and granted him “overly broad powers.”³¹

In most cases, senators and representatives commented on the resolution after the vote. A number of senior Democratic senators heralded the resolution as a victory for the principle of checks and balances. There is no doubt that Congress forced some important changes in the resolution’s language, exercised and demanded its constitutional prerogatives on appropriations, and even inserted a reference to the War Powers Resolution. Congress also limited the administration’s military response to only those “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the September 11 attacks. These “congressional demands” were noted by Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Joseph Biden (D-DE), among others.³² Regardless, the resolution language remained quite broad and granted considerable discretion to the president to determine who is responsible for the attacks and how an organization or individuals may be related to the events of September 11. It was easy to interpret the resolution in a number of equally legitimate ways. The process was constitutional, with the White House seeking congressional authority to act and the House and Senate voting to grant such authority. At the same time, however, some observers maintain that Congress abdicated much of its war power through the resolution’s broad and ambiguous language and by granting the president excessive discretion as commander in chief.³³

These interactions appear to be the last instance prior to the decision to use force against Afghanistan and al Qaeda when Congress played a substantive role. It is difficult to find any meaningful congressional input between the House vote on September 15 and the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, where a member of Congress had a role in determining whom to go to war against or when to respond militarily.

Whom to Strike

When administration officials first met with the president to discuss the September 11 attacks and devise a response, there was a great deal of confusion and difference of opinion over what should be done.³⁴ The first weekend following the attacks, Bush convened the principals at Camp David to begin planning for a broad war on terrorism. On the first day of the meetings, Saturday, September 15, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz pressed for making Iraq a target of the planned military response. Secretary of State Colin Powell made the case that bin Laden

should be the sole focus of the response, in part because he believed that international support existed for attacking bin Laden but not Iraq. General Shelton was surprised that Iraq was even in consideration and also favored a military response only against bin Laden. Tenet and Vice President Dick Cheney focused their attention on bin Laden. Andrew Card, White House chief of staff, also voiced the opinion that al Qaeda should be the target of the response.³⁵ During these discussions, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice acted as the president's central coordinator at planning sessions. She absorbed information and views and then consulted privately with Bush on the options.³⁶

Bush made the decision on September 15 to focus the administration's response on al Qaeda only. After Bush returned to the White House on Monday, September 17, he told his senior principals that Iraq would not be a target for a military response at that time. Former administration officials confirm that it was Bush's view that it was not the appropriate time to strike Iraq, although Bush felt that Iraq was somehow complicit in the September 11 attacks.³⁷ With Iraq no longer a target, and apparently with heavy input from George Tenet, the Taliban and al Qaeda were increasingly viewed as one entity, ending any lingering debate over whom to strike. The Taliban had come to power in 1996 and governed Afghanistan under an extreme interpretation of the *sharia*, or Islamic law.³⁸ It provided sanctuary for bin Laden in 1996, when he was expelled from Sudan, and protected him after the 1998 strikes on the U.S. embassies in East Africa. The Taliban also gave him communications equipment and security guards. In exchange, bin Laden helped the Taliban train its military and expand its political control over Afghanistan, and he also provided financial assistance to Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban.³⁹

On September 17, Bush instructed Colin Powell to issue an ultimatum to the Taliban: either turn over bin Laden or face severe consequences from the United States. On Sunday, September 23, the CIA assessed that Mullah Omar would side with bin Laden and refuse to give up the al Qaeda leader. That, indeed, was what happened.⁴⁰

When to Attack

After they decided whom to attack, the question plaguing the Bush administration, and especially President Bush, was when to initiate the strikes. In the first days after September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld offered that it would take at least sixty days to get the military in place and ready for a major offensive. Gen. Tommy Franks, head of Central Command, concurred but more conservatively estimated that it could take several months.⁴¹ President Bush wanted to

be aggressive in time and strategy and avoid any comparison with President Clinton's military strikes. He felt that Clinton's strikes amounted to little more than "pounding sand" with cruise missiles.

Bush was attracted to one of the strategies presented by General Shelton. The plan Bush preferred entailed the launch of cruise missiles, air raids on Taliban and al Qaeda defenses, and the use of Special Operations Forces, and thus the insertion of "boots on the ground," all working in concert to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban. In addition, the CIA was to enlist the support of anti-Taliban groups in the northern and southern regions of Afghanistan to attack the Taliban with the assistance of Special Operations Forces and CIA operatives.

As the military plans moved forward, the need for diplomatic allies in the Middle East quickly became clear. To insert Special Operations Forces and to attack from the south, the United States needed access to military bases in the Persian Gulf. Oman, one of the best U.S. allies in the region, had assisted the Clinton administration with the use of its bases in the 1998 air strikes on Iraq. Although Oman did not immediately rush to assist the Bush administration, it ultimately agreed to lend its support, as did Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. To Secretary Powell's surprise, Pakistani president Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who had had friendly relations with the Taliban, agreed almost immediately to Bush's multiple diplomatic, intelligence, and military requests.⁴²

The biggest operational and diplomatic obstacle was securing staging areas for combat and search and rescue operations north of Afghanistan. To obtain permission to operate from military bases in some of the former Soviet republics, the administration requested the assistance of Russian President Vladimir Putin in making diplomatic overtures in the region. Putin, who exercised considerable diplomatic influence with nearly all of the former republics, agreed on the condition that U.S. actions were only temporary and did not represent a long-term military presence in the region.⁴³

This Central Asian element was the final piece of the puzzle needed before a military response could be initiated. Uzbekistan—whose president, Islam Karimov, did not have good relations with President Putin—was a preferred site. In responding to the U.S. request, Karimov initially demanded NATO membership, a \$50 million loan, and what amounted to a full-fledged security guarantee from the United States. Although the United States did not grant Karimov's every wish, the Uzbeks signed on to assist the United States on October 3. The military launched its first strikes on the Taliban on October 7.

The Taliban regime was brought down 102 days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, and American support for conduct of the war remained near 90 percent for the duration of the fighting in 2001.⁴⁴

After the Initial Strikes

During the initial military strikes on the Taliban and al Qaeda in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, war planning directed by the White House, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the commanding officer for the United States Central Command, Gen. Tommy Franks, had already begun for a possible invasion of Iraq.⁴⁵ These actions have led to the argument that U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan suffered from a lack of attention from the rest of the Bush administration, as its central foreign policy ambition and challenge focused first on removing Saddam Hussein from Iraq and then on containing the civil war that ensued in Iraq.⁴⁶ Whether this critique is accurate or not, for the remainder of Bush's presidency the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan grew steadily, reaching approximately 32,000 troops by December 2008.⁴⁷ During these years, much of the Bush administration's strategic approach to Afghanistan focused on utilizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to build support for the new Afghan government and on lobbying the NATO allies to conduct more aggressive combat operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda.

In the aftermath of the Taliban's immediate defeat in 2001, the United States turned to the United Nations Security Council to negotiate the presence of an international peacekeeping force in Kabul. UN Security Council Resolution 1386 permitted the presence of UN peacekeepers in Kabul, and created an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that sought to provide security for the interim national government. Simultaneously, while this and other diplomatic initiatives unfolded, U.S. military efforts persisted as well. One of the largest military strikes against the Taliban occurred in March 2002 in Operation Anaconda, where U.S. forces struck the Taliban in the Shahi-Kot Valley. At the time, the strikes inflicted considerable damage on Taliban forces, but by some accounts forced the Taliban into the mountainous regions of western Pakistan for refuge.⁴⁸ This migration was significant in that it gave the Taliban a new sanctuary to regroup outside of Afghanistan in a region of Pakistan outside of governmental control. This location caused tactical and diplomatic challenges for the military operation.

NATO's formal role in Afghanistan came at the urging of primarily Canada, Germany, and the United States, who sought a continuity of command for

ISAF through NATO rather than the national leadership transitions that came under UN auspices.⁴⁹ On August 11, 2003, NATO agreed to take over ISAF. Over the next three years, the peacekeeping mission expanded to include thirteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were small groups of civilians and military personnel who spread out across northern and western sections of Afghanistan. The PRTs were deployed to help in the reconstruction of schools and roads, and more generally sought to provide support for economic growth and the national government, which eventually included approximately 10,000 troops from the NATO allies.⁵⁰

Over the course of 2001 to 2006, the U.S. military presence grew gradually as well, as military efforts continued to focus on finding and killing members of the Taliban and al Qaeda. These efforts, though, were dwarfed by the war in Iraq that began on March 20, 2003, which generally consumed the Bush administration for the rest of its tenure. During these same years, Congress was similarly focused on Iraq and otherwise not closely tracking military events in Afghanistan, which is best characterized by the few congressional hearings devoted to Afghanistan and the limited oversight devoted to NATO operations by members of Congress.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the Bush administration continued to work through NATO to wage this war. On July 31, 2006, after intense U.S. lobbying, NATO agreed to oversee the entirety of the Afghan military operation, which now included NATO participation in combat operations along with the PRTs. In agreeing to this revised and more extensive presence in Afghanistan, four NATO members—Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States—agreed to wage combat operations in the south. While this new policy indicated that NATO was capable of adapting to new security threats, the change also highlighted the profound differences in how each ally viewed its role in Afghanistan. Some of the allies, notably Germany and Italy, contributed hundreds of peacekeepers to more peaceful regions of Afghanistan in the north and west. These allies, along with other NATO partners, also placed “national caveats” for the kind of military engagement that their countries would permit. Such restrictions included strict prohibitions on the use of force, restriction on aircraft flights during the night, limited patrols that could only be conducted in armed personnel vehicles, and distance limitations on how far patrols could travel from their military bases.⁵²

These caveats, and the ensuing casualties that occurred with British, Canadian, and Dutch military forces, produced new and serious diplomatic tensions within NATO. Those states who were experiencing casualties often challenged those allies deployed in safer regions to take on combat operations.⁵³

Frustration was also evident in the Bush administration, which was well displayed when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggested that some of the current allies did not have the necessary military skills and professionalism to engage in counterinsurgency operations, which later resulted in diplomatic protests from the Netherlands and a subsequent apology from the United States.⁵⁴ Although NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer consistently noted that Afghanistan was NATO's number one priority, the NATO allies continued to adopt very different military approaches for the remainder of the Bush administration, which led to ongoing diplomatic fissures within the alliance.

Despite the ongoing U.S. military operations and NATO's increased military and peacekeeping presence, by the end of the Bush administration most analysts, including U.S. intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense, concluded that the Taliban had successfully regrouped and was capable of waging increasingly advanced military attacks on US and NATO forces.⁵⁵ In 2008 the United States suffered 155 casualties in the conflict, the highest number of deaths in one year since the war began. Sen. Barack Obama's (D-IL) presidential campaign often noted that Bush's efforts in Iraq had moved the United States away from what Senator Obama viewed as the real source of global terrorism, which was centered in Afghanistan.

Obama's AfPak Strategy and Troop Surges and Drawdown

When Barack Obama won the 2008 U.S. presidential election, the United States had been fighting terrorism in Afghanistan for more than seven years. The new president did not wait long before starting to implement the changes he had promised during the presidential campaign. As Obama argued during the campaign: "Now is the time for a responsible redeployment of our combat troops that . . . refocuses on Afghanistan."⁵⁶ According to Obama, the war in Iraq had distracted the United States from the more important fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Obama believed the United States had to change its strategy in Afghanistan in order to win the war against those he labeled "violent extremists."

Obama softened George W. Bush's tone and has been less inclined to use terms such as *evil*, *brutal*, or *murderers* to define al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, the policies he adopted in the first months of his presidency illustrate his determination to use military force as he deems necessary. In February Obama declared that he would send an additional 17,000 American troops to Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 2009.⁵⁷ The president also announced a new "comprehensive" strategy on March 27, 2009, addressing what his

administration believed are the major factors that have caused security in Afghanistan to deteriorate since 2006.⁵⁸ The strategy—dubbed the “AfPak” strategy—started with what the White House called a “clear, concise, attainable goal”: “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens.”⁵⁹ Moreover, it treated Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries but one challenge. According to Obama, it was imperative to focus more intensely on Pakistan than in the past, and to increase “U.S. and international support, both economic and military, linked to Pakistani performance against terror.”⁶⁰ For example, in terms of military cooperation, the Obama presidency has coincided with greater U.S. assistance to the Pakistani army in its push against militants in South Waziristan by providing surveillance video and intelligence gleaned from CIA-operated unmanned aircraft.⁶¹ While it was the first time Islamabad had ever accepted such help from the United States, some have criticized Obama’s decision to put Pakistan on the same level as Afghanistan in the war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. For instance, former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf argued that Pakistan is different from its neighbor, which has no government and is completely destabilized.⁶² But United States Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke—who is believed to be the one who coined the term *AfPak*—provided a different interpretation in March 2009, arguing that the terrorists who attacked New York were in Pakistan, not in Afghanistan.⁶³

Obama’s AfPak strategy was detailed in a White Paper published by the White House in March 2009. The paper was the product of an overarching sixty-day inter-agency review of the situation in Afghanistan, chaired by South Asian expert Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by Richard Holbrooke and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy.⁶⁴ The paper stated that Obama’s objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan were the following: (1) disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks; (2) promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support; (3) develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance; (4) assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan; and (5) involve the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.⁶⁵

When one looks at how the decisions to reshape U.S. strategy in Afghanistan have been made by the Obama administration, one can see two striking similarities between the Democratic president and his two predecessors. On one hand, just like Clinton and Bush, Obama made the White House the center of action concerning the fight against terrorism. Indeed, during the first year of the Obama presidency, the key players of the debate on Afghanistan were the president himself, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, United States Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, commanders of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan David McKiernan (until June 2009) and Stanley A. McChrystal (from June 2009 to June 2010), Vice President Joseph Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen, Commander of the U.S. Central Command David Petraeus, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, and White House National Security Adviser James Jones.⁶⁶ On the other hand, just like the members of the Clinton and Bush administrations, Obama's advisers have not always agreed on U.S. strategy to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. In White House sessions, military leaders and civilian officials have clashed over questions of strategy and troop levels, especially in October and November 2009, after the U.S. troops experienced one of their deadliest months in Afghanistan. The rift between Obama and some of his advisers became obvious when General McChrystal, after a four-hour September meeting with Mullen and Petraeus, asked for 40,000 more troops to better protect the Afghan people and train security forces, and pressured the president in public to reject Vice President Biden's proposals to switch to a strategy more reliant on drone missile strikes and special forces operations against al Qaeda.⁶⁷ Biden, who has been Obama's "in-house pessimist" or "bull in the china shop" on Afghanistan from the moment the president took office, said he did not favor abandoning Afghanistan; he recommended leaving the U.S. force roughly at what it was in February 2009 (a total of 68,000 troops).⁶⁸ According to Biden, al Qaeda had, at the time, reconstituted in Pakistan, and the United States had to concentrate its efforts and resources there. In marketing his strategy, the vice president pointed out that Washington was, during that period, spending approximately \$30 in Afghanistan for every \$1 it spent in Pakistan.⁶⁹

While some members of the Obama administration, such as Rahm Emanuel and James Jones, were believed to share Biden's pessimism about Afghanistan, others expressed doubts about the vice president's plan and aligned themselves with General McChrystal. Indeed, while Jones said a troop buildup would not be welcome, and while Emanuel told Obama early in 2009 that the war in

Afghanistan could threaten his presidency, Hillary Clinton and her close ally Richard Holbrooke stated that they would back McChrystal's request.⁷⁰ Robert Gates appeared more skeptical of further troop increases at first, especially because he thought it could fuel resentment the way the Soviet occupation did in the 1980s. However, he finally backed McChrystal's plan after the general convinced him that the goal of U.S. forces was to protect civilians in major Afghan cities from Taliban attacks, not to dominate Afghanistan like the Soviet Union tried to do during the invasion.⁷¹

In December 2009, after nine formal war meetings and three months of intense debate within his administration, the president finally announced that he would deploy 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan within six months to break the Taliban's momentum. The main mission of these new troops was to kill insurgents, protect population centers in the south and east of Afghanistan, and speed up training of Afghan security forces in order to hand over control of the mission to Afghan authorities.⁷² In a move that illustrated Obama's willingness to address the critics of those who dubbed the war "Obama's Vietnam," the president also stated that the troop surge did not mean an open-ended commitment. Indeed, Obama declared that his goal was to end the war successfully and quickly, and that after eighteen months, U.S. troops would begin to come home.⁷³

Two days after Obama announced his policy, Sens. John Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), who held the positions of chairman and ranking minority member in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proved that members of Congress did not want to remain silent or passive in the debate on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kerry and Lugar held public hearings during which Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, and Michael Mullen were invited to give more details about Obama's AfPak strategy.⁷⁴ These hearings were not the first ones Kerry and Lugar had held since Obama took office. For instance, in May 2009 Kerry set up a debate on Afghanistan within the committee and expressed concerns about the deteriorating security situation in most of the country.⁷⁵ Kerry, who was believed to share Biden's pessimism on surging the troops in Afghanistan, also played a fundamental role in the passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 in October 2009. The key provisions of this law, dubbed the "Kerry-Lugar bill," were to provide Pakistan \$1.5 billion in annual economic assistance for five years, renewable for another five.⁷⁶ One key goal of the bill was to counter widespread anti-American sentiment in Pakistan by helping Pakistan's civilian government deliver essential services to its population.⁷⁷

In addition to Kerry and Lugar, Sens. Carl Levin (D-MI) and John McCain (R-AZ), who held the positions of chairman and ranking minority member in the Senate Armed Forces Committee, also organized multiple hearings on Obama's policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For instance, on February 26, 2009, the committee held a hearing on "Strategic Options for the Way Ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan," during which Senator McCain shared Obama's position that the United States needed a troop surge in Afghanistan and a regional strategy to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban.⁷⁸ On December 2, 2009, Levin and McCain also invited Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, and Michael Mullen to discuss Obama's strategy with the full committee. During this meeting, McCain criticized Obama for his decision to set an arbitrary date to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan.⁷⁹

In the House, chairmen of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Rep. Sylvestre Reyes, D-TX) and of the Committees on International Affairs (Rep. Howard L. Berman, D-CA) and on Armed Services (Rep. Ike Skelton, D-MO) were some of the most dynamic congressional actors in the debate on AfPak. For instance, the three took part in an October 2009 White House meeting to discuss General McChrystal's troop surge proposal. Although Berman said he would consider other options before backing McChrystal, Reyes and Skelton advised Obama to follow his recommendation. Skelton even sent a six-page letter to Obama in which he implored the president to "give the general what he needs."⁸⁰ Other House Democrats, such as Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) and Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), also expressed concerns about Obama's decision to escalate the war.⁸¹ However, the debate between the White House and Congress on the war in Afghanistan revealed that members of Congress had little control over Obama's decision beyond approving the money to pay for it.

By November 2010, Obama had made another important decision at NATO's Lisbon Summit meeting, where the United States and its allies announced that all ISAF forces would be withdrawn by the end of 2014, as NATO forces would work to expeditiously train Afghanistan National Security Forces so that they could lead the way in providing security for the country. This announcement tamped down some of the concerns over the 2011 timeline that Obama had proposed previously. By June 2011, the American military presence reached its apex, with nearly 100,000 troops deployed.⁸²

As the surge plan was being implemented, President Obama escalated the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)/drone missile strikes against remaining elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan, which illustrated a significant

policy change compared to that of President Bush. During the entire Bush presidency, a total of 45 drone strikes occurred. Analysts from the New America Foundation, however, calculated that the Obama administration carried out 54 drone missile strikes in 2009, 122 strikes in 2010, and 72 additional strikes in 2011.⁸³ The use of drones continued, albeit at a slower pace in 2012, though a major increase in missile strikes occurred against al Qaeda targets in Yemen in the same year.⁸⁴ Thus, though Barack Obama campaigned aggressively in 2008 against George W. Bush's leadership as commander in chief, Obama himself demonstrated repeatedly his willingness to use force—through a number of means—to address remaining elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

From the announcement of the second surge plan in 2009, it was difficult to find many in Washington or the public who could find much good to say about the progress of the military mission. Apart from commanding General David Petraeus, who replaced General Stanley McChrystal after McChrystal's unprofessional interview and conduct was published in *Rolling Stone* magazine in the summer of 2010, few others spoke favorably about the mission. By October 2010, 60 percent of Americans viewed the war as a "lost cause."⁸⁵ By 2012, only 27 percent of Americans favored the war in Afghanistan, with 66 percent against.⁸⁶

Liberal congressional Democrats, often led by Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), offered resolutions in 2010 and 2011 aimed at ending America's military presence in Afghanistan. Kucinich's efforts generated a vocal but small following.⁸⁷ A number of congressional Republicans also remained opposed to the imposition of a time table for an eventual troop withdrawal. What seemed to unify both Democrats and Republicans was the ongoing concern about corruption within the Afghan government, as well as an interest in limiting financial expenditures for the war.⁸⁸ The killing of Osama bin Laden served as a catalyst for such calls. Congressman Steve Cohen (D-TN) noted the "killing of Osama Bin Laden was the biggest deficit reduction action this country has known, if we take advantage of that action," though members of Congress were still hesitant to impose serious financial limitations on Obama's funding requests for the war.⁸⁹

In May 2012, the Obama administration announced a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, which will keep approximately 15,000 to 20,000 U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after the 2014 conclusion of the ISAF mission.⁹⁰ In addition, Afghanistan was named a "Major Non-NATO Ally" in July 2012. Though this status has nothing to do with NATO or collective security, the agreement does permit an expedited trade relationship for sharing of sensitive defense technology, training, and weapons development between the two countries.⁹¹ Yet even with these new agreements, conditions on the ground

remained grim. Most notably, the number of killings of ISAF military trainers by Afghanistan National Security Forces (the so-called “green on blue” attacks) increased significantly in 2012.⁹²

Despite such high levels of dissatisfaction with the war expressed in Washington, across the nation, and even within the military, by many accounts the Afghanistan war largely moved out of the public and political discussion as the 2012 elections progressed. Candidates rarely raised the Afghanistan issue during the congressional elections or even during the presidential contest. Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s address at the Republican national convention did not even devote one sentence to Afghanistan.⁹³ Military historian Andrew Bacevich maintains that Americans have increasingly become accustomed to the use of U.S. military force abroad, and in this respect, have lost some sense of policy discernment of America’s military presence abroad today.⁹⁴ Though perhaps Americans are comfortable with and support the new Strategic Partnership Agreement, it seems more likely that Bacevich’s ideas have some merit, and that American politicians see few political incentives in aggressively challenging the ongoing and foreseeably unending military presence in Afghanistan.

Conclusion: Presidential Leadership in the War on Terrorism

In the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations’ military actions against al Qaeda, the White House has been the heart of the policy-making process, with limited formal input from others. This finding contrasts sharply with most other cases in this book—and in general with U.S. foreign policy making in the post-Cold War era—in which multiple bureaucratic officials, individual members of Congress, and individuals outside of government often play critical roles. Although Congress has considerable formal leverage through the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution to demand a substantive role for itself in matters concerning the decision to go to war, it is largely the president who controls the policy-making process regarding such a decision. Bush and Clinton, to different degrees, consulted with Congress, but in their formal communications with Capitol Hill, they asserted essentially unlimited powers as commander in chief, as had all presidents during the Cold War. Obama was less inclined to assert unlimited powers as commander in chief, and he consulted with key members of Congress during his policy review on Afghanistan. However, it seems fair to argue that Congress had little direct leverage over Obama. Formally, members of Congress could rely on the power

of the purse and refuse to finance Obama's surge plan; instead, most members of Congress supported President Obama, with only a handful of liberal Democrats openly challenging either of Obama's troop surges.

The national security advisers of Clinton and Bush played key roles prior to the use of force. Sandy Berger and Condoleezza Rice, respectively, acted as primary confidants, consulting privately with the commander in chief. It appears that the national security adviser was the most trusted principal among all senior-level foreign policy decision makers in both administrations. Obama's national security adviser also played an important role during the debate on Afghanistan. However, it seems fair to say that other political actors at least matched James Jones's influence, especially Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who toward the end of the White House debate about the troop surge was instrumental in shaping a plan that would bridge the differences between Hillary Clinton, Joseph Biden, and others.

The public widely supported the military actions of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Although many people suspected that Clinton's strikes on al Qaeda may have been a "diversionary military action" related to the Lewinsky scandal, his approval ratings remained high in the days following the strikes.⁹⁵ President Bush's political approval ratings soared soon after the September 11 tragedy and remained exceptionally high during the war in Afghanistan. As for Obama, the unveiling of his new military strategy revealed that Americans were not overly confident about the war. The killing of Osama bin Laden (which is examined in more detail in chapter 2) was popular among the American people, but a September 2012 poll showed that only a quarter of them still supported the military effort in Afghanistan.⁹⁶

As of January 2013, the White House nonetheless continued to allege that the war was necessary. For instance, Washington stressed that the remaining leadership of the Afghan Taliban was still based around the city of Quetta, in the Balochistan province of Pakistan.⁹⁷ Among these leaders, Mullah Omar has been effective in reorganizing remnants of the Taliban.⁹⁸ In November 2009, Omar issued a message in which he rejected peace negotiations while Western forces remain in Afghanistan.⁹⁹ The U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani governments have pursued various peace initiatives with the Taliban since, including the December 2012 release of members of the movement from Pakistani prisons.¹⁰⁰ However, Omar's refusal to negotiate a settlement with Kabul reminded Washington that the war in Afghanistan could last longer than Obama would want it to. It could also continue after ISAF forces are withdrawn from the country in 2014.

Key Actors

Samuel “Sandy” Berger National security adviser; principal adviser to President Clinton leading up to strikes in 1998 against Osama bin Laden and his network in Sudan and Afghanistan.

Joseph Biden Vice president; President Obama’s “in-house pessimist” and most outspoken critic about an expansive troop-surge policy in Afghanistan.

Osama bin Laden Leader of al Qaeda; which was responsible for the bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the September 11 attacks.

George W. Bush President; principal decision maker for initiating Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al Qaeda in 2001 in Afghanistan.

Richard A. Clarke Counterterrorism coordinator for Presidents Clinton and Bush.

Bill Clinton President; principal decision maker for strikes against bin Laden in 1998.

Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of state; advocate for a troop surge in Afghanistan during the first months of the Obama presidency.

Rahm Emanuel White House chief of staff; expressed opposition to an expansive troop surge in Afghanistan during the first months of the Obama presidency.

Robert Gates Secretary of defense; helped President Obama shape a troop-surge plan that would bridge the differences between Hillary Clinton, Joseph Biden, and others.

Richard Holbrooke United States Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan; coined the term *AfPak* during the first months of the Obama presidency.

James Jones White House national security adviser; expressed opposition to an expansive troop surge in Afghanistan during the first months of the Obama presidency.

Stanley A. McChrystal Commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan; most aggressive advocate for a troop surge in Afghanistan during the first months of the Obama presidency; relieved of his command due to unprofessional military conduct.

Barack Obama President; principal decision maker for increasing the war effort against the Taliban and al Qaeda after January 2009; in November 2010, announced that all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

David Petraeus Commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan; replaced Stanley A. McChrystal in the summer of 2010; spoke favorably about the mission in Afghanistan even when it was getting less popular in U.S. public opinion and in Washington.

Condoleezza Rice National security adviser; principal adviser to Bush in the lead-up to attacking the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001.

Hugh “Henry” Shelton Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Clinton and Bush; provided Bush with options for striking the Taliban and al Qaeda after the September 11 attacks.

George Tenet Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Clinton and Bush; exercised great influence in determining whom to strike after the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Paul Wolfowitz Deputy secretary of defense; most aggressive advocate for military strikes on Iraq immediately after September 11.

Notes

1. Charles A. Lofgren, “War-Making under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,” *Yale Law Journal* 81 (1972): 672–702.
2. Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, *To Chain the Dog of War* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989).
3. Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002).
4. Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 190–193.
5. Michael J. Glennon, “Too Far Apart: The War Powers Resolution,” *University of Miami Law Review* 50 (1995): 17–31; Edward Keynes, “The War Powers Resolution: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone,” *University of Toledo Law Review* 23 (1992): 343–362.
6. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars*, 104.
7. “Press Briefing with National Security Advisor Berger on U.S. Strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan,” August 20, 1998, www.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980820.html.
8. Bill Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Testimony before the Independent Counsel’s Grand Jury,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 28, 1998, 1638, www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html; James Bennet, “Testing of a President: The Overview,” *New York Times*, August 18, 1998, A1.
9. Defense LINK News, “DoD News Briefing,” August 20, 1998, www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1727.
10. Bill Clinton, “Remarks on Departure for Washington, DC, from Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 28, 1998, 1642.
11. Bill Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Military Action against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 28, 1998, 1643.

12. For example, see Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's statements, "Interview on NBC-TV *Today Show* with Katie Couric," August 21, 1998, <http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/1998/august/sd4824.htm>.

13. For polling data, see Marck Z. Barabak, "The Times Poll," *Los Angeles Times*, August 23, 1998, A1; Bruce Westbrook, "War or a 'Wag'?" *Houston Chronicle*, August 25, 1998, 1; Marcella Bombardieri, "Wagging Dog? Fine, Some Say," *Boston Globe*, August 22, 1998, A8.

14. Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Briefing by Mike McCurry," August 20, 1998, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48262; see also Chuck McCutcheon, "Lawmakers Back Missile Strikes Despite a Bit of GOP Skepticism," *CQ Weekly*, August 22, 1998, 2289.

15. McCutcheon, "Lawmakers Back Missile Strikes."

16. "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Eighth Hearing," March 24, 2004, govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-24.htm.

17. Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Briefing by McCurry in Gaggle"; see also McCutcheon, "Lawmakers Back Missile Strikes," 2289.

18. See Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Briefing by McCurry in Gaggle."

19. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).

20. Tenet maintains that it is likely that two sightings occurred, but Richard A. Clark, former counterterrorism coordinator, maintains that there were three occasions. "Testimony of Richard A. Clarke before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," March 24, 2004, govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-24.htm#clarke.

21. *Ibid.*

22. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "Intelligence Policy," staff statement no. 7, March 24, 2004, govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-24.htm#statement7.

23. Quoted in Woodward, *Bush at War*, 17. For more information about Bush's reaction to the September 11 attacks, read the chapter "Day of Fire" of his memoir: George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 126–151.

24. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 26–27.

25. One forceful advocate of this view is Robert F. Turner, "The War on Terrorism and the Modern Relevance of the Congressional Power to 'Declare' War," *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 25, no. 2 (2002): 519–537.

26. Quoted in David Abramowitz, "The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force against International Terrorism," *Harvard International Law Journal* 43, no. 1 (2002): 73.

27. Tom Daschle (with Michael D'Orso), *Like No Other Time: The Two Years That Changed America* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003), 124.

28. Abramowitz, "The President, the Congress, and Use of Force," 73.

29. *Congressional Record*, September 14, 2001, S9424.

30. Dave Boyer, "Some Lawmakers Call for War on Terror," *Washington Times*, September 14, 2001, A13.

31. Barbara Lee, "Why I Opposed the Resolution to Authorize Force," *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 23, 2001.

32. *Congressional Record*, September 14, 2001, S9416, S9417, S9423.

33. Nancy Kassop, "The War Power and Its Limits," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (2003): 513–514.
34. An excellent account about the White House deliberation is provided in Woodward, *Bush at War*. See also Ron Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2004); and Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004).
35. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 83–91.
36. *Ibid.*, 158; David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner's, 2001), 404–409.
37. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 99. Woodward's account squares with the recollection of former Treasury secretary Paul O'Neill. See Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty*, 184–187.
38. Shawn Howard, "The Afghan Connection: Islamic Extremism in Central Asia," *National Security Studies Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (2000): 28–29.
39. James S. Robbins, "Bin Laden's War," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Under the New Security Environment*, ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Duskin, 2004), 396; George Tenet, "Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," March 24, 2004, 6–7, www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/tenet_statement.pdf.
40. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 99, 121.
41. *Ibid.*, 32, 43. For more details about Tommy Franks's role in the planning of the war, see Gen. Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 255–262.
42. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 115–117, 59.
43. *Ibid.*, 117–118.
44. RAND Corporation, "Operation Enduring Freedom: An Assessment," Research Brief, 2005, 1, www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2005/RAND_RB9148.pdf. See also Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, "Most Americans Back U.S. Tactics; Poll Finds Little Worry over Rights," *Washington Post*, November 29, 2001, A1.
45. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 19–23; Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 32–34.
46. Sean Kay, "From COIN to Containment," *ForeignPolicy.com*, September 1, 2009, afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/01/from_coin_to_containment.
47. Kirk Semple, "U.S. Plans a Shift to Focus Troops on Kabul Region," *New York Times*, December 7, 2008, A1.
48. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "A Nation Challenged: Strategy: Afghans' Retreat Forced Americans to Lead a Battle," *New York Times*, March 10, 2002, 1.
49. Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 304; Sean M. Maloney, "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force," *Canadian Military Journal* 4 (Summer 2003): 4–7.
50. Michael J. McEnerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* 35 (Winter 2005–2006): 32–46; Sean M. Maloney, "Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment," *Parameters* 35 (Autumn 2005): 21–32.

51. Ryan C. Hendrickson, "LOTAN et George W. Bush: Perspectives du Congrès Américain sur la Transformation de l'Alliance," *Études Internationales* 38, no. 4 (2007): 475–499.
52. Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," *Congressional Research Service*, August 25, 2009, 10–11.
53. Mike Blanchfield, "U.K. Minister Blasts Dion's Stance on Afghanistan: NATO Needs to 'Get Real,'" *National Post*, December 12, 2006, A6; Bruce Campion-Smith, "Lack of NATO Help Slammed," *Toronto Star*, November 16, 2006, A06.
54. Judy Dempsey, "Defense Secretary, Facing Criticism, Hails NATO's Forces in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, January 18, 2008, A10.
55. Mark Massetti and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Study Is Said to Warn of Crisis in Afghanistan," *New York Times on the Web*, October 9, 2008; Mark Mazzetti, "Military Death Toll Rises in Afghanistan as Taliban Regain Strength," *New York Times*, July 2, 2008, A6.
56. Barack Obama, "Obama's Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan," *New York Times*, July 25, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html?pagewanted=print.
57. Helene Cooper, "Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops," *New York Times*, February 17, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/washington/18web-troops.html?_r=0.
58. Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, October 6, 2009, 26.
59. The White House, "What's New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," March 27, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan.
60. Ibid.
61. "U.S. Drones Aiding Pakistani Military Offensive," Fox News, October 23, 2009, www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/23/drones-aiding-pakistani-military-offensive.
62. Spiegel interview with Pervez Musharraf, "Obama 'Is Aiming at the Right Things,'" *Spiegel Online*, June 7, 2009, www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-pervez-musharraf-obama-is-aiming-at-the-right-things-a-628960.html.
63. Pascale Mallet, "Les États-Unis Énoncent Leurs Priorités en Afghanistan," *La Presse*, March 21, 2009, www.cyberpresse.ca/international/moyen-orient/200903/21/01-838918-les-etats-unis-enoncent-leurs-priorites-en-afghanistan.php.
64. Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 26.
65. The White House, "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan," March 27, 2009, 1, www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
66. "Key Players in the U.S. Debate on Afghanistan Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, October 17, 2009, www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-players17-2009oct17,0,3331018.story.
67. Alex Spillius, "White House Angry at General Stanley McChrystal Speech in Afghanistan," *The Daily Telegraph*, October 5, 2009, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/6259582/White-House-angry-at-General-Stanley-McChrystal-speech-on-Afghanistan.html.
68. Peter Baker, "Biden No Longer a Lone Voice on Afghanistan," *New York Times*, October 13, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/world/14biden.html; Peter Baker,

"How Obama Came to Plan for 'Surge' in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, December 6, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html?_r=2&scp=5&sq=afghan%20surge&st=cse.

69. B. Stoddard, "Biden's Moment," *The Hill*, October 28, 2009, www.thehill.com/opinion/columnists/ab-stoddard/65273-bidens-moment.

70. *Los Angeles Times*, "Key Players in the U.S. Debate on Afghanistan Policy."

71. "Q. and A. on Obama's Afghan Plan," *New York Times*, December 7, 2009, thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/q-and-a-on-obamas-afghan-plan.

72. "Obama's War," *The Economist*, December 2, 2009, www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15004081&source=features_box1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Helene Cooper, and Brian Knowlton, "Obama Team Defends Policy on Afghanistan," *New York Times*, December 2, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/world/asia/03policy.html?_r=1&hp.

73. Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *The White House*, December 1, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

74. See U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead," December 3, 2009, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56845/pdf/CHRG-111shrg56845.pdf.

75. John Kerry, "Chairman Kerry Opening Statement at Hearing On Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy," U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 21, 2009, www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement090521a.pdf.

76. U.S. Public Law 111-73, "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009," October 15, 2009, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ73/pdf/PLAW-111publ73.pdf.

77. Omar Waraich, "How a U.S. Aid Package to Pakistan Could Threaten Zardari," *Time Magazine*, October 8, 2009, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1929306,00.html.

78. See U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Hearing to Receive Testimony on Strategic Options for the Way Ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan," February 26, 2009, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg53725/html/CHRG-111shrg53725.htm.

79. John McCain, "Statement of Senator McCain," *Hearing to Receive Testimony on Afghanistan*, U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee, December 2, 2009.

80. S. A. Miller, "Key Democrats Align with Military on Afghan Buildup," *Washington Times*, October 9, 2009, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/09/key-democrats-align-with-military-on-buildup/?feat=article_top10_shared.

81. Karen DeYoung, "Lawmakers Scrutinize New Afghan Strategy," *Washington Post*, December 3, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/02/AR2009120201013.html.

82. Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, September 21, 2012.

83. New America Foundation, "The Year of the Drone," accessed December 19, 2012, counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones.

84. The Long War Journal, "Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes in Yemen, 2002-2012," accessed December 19, 2012, www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php.

85. Frank Oliveri and Emily Cadei, "Mission Uncertain," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* (October 18, 2010): 2382–3.
86. Emily Cadei, "Campaigns Quiet on Afghanistan," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* (May 21, 2012): 1022.
87. Eugene Mulero, "Kucinich Troop Withdrawal Effort Goes Down to Defeat in House," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* (March 21, 2011): 635; Eugene Mulero, "House Resolution Calling for Afghanistan Withdrawal Draws Heated Debate but Fails by Large Margin," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* (March 15, 2010): 636.
88. Emily Cadei and Frank Oliveri, "Capitol Hill's Own Afghanistan War," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* (January 10, 2011): 100.
89. Quoted in Alexander C. Hart, "House Rejects War Funding Limitations," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* (July 11, 2011): 1496.
90. White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement," May 1, 2012, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/fact-sheet-us-afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement.
91. U.S. State Department, "Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Afghanistan: Fact Sheet," July 7, 2012, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194662.htm.
92. Alissa J. Rubin, "Audacious Raid on NATO Base Shows Taliban's Reach," *New York Times*, September 16, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/world/asia/green-on-blue-attacks-in-afghanistan-continue.html?pagewanted=all.
93. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "Two Campaigns Skirt Talk of Tough Choices in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, October 21, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/us/politics/candidates-skirt-talk-of-hard-afghanistan-choices.html?pagewanted=all.
94. Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Limits to Power: The End of American Exceptionalism* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2009).
95. For an argument expressing doubt about the diversionary theory for these strikes, see Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Clinton's Military Strikes in 1998: Diversionary Uses of Force?" *Armed Forces and Society* 28 (2002): 309–332.
96. Peter Bergen, "Abandon Afghanistan? A Dumb Idea," CNN, January 10, 2013, www.cnn.com/2013/01/10/opinion/bergen-afghanistan-troop-levels/index.html.
97. Augustine Anthony & Haris Anwar, "Bombs Kill 118 People in Pakistan as Sectarian Attacks Surge," *Bloomberg*, January 11, 2013, www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-11/bombings-kill-114-people-in-pakistan-as-sectarian-attacks-spiral.html.
98. Hassan M. Fattah, "Bin Laden Re-emerges, Warning U.S. while Offering 'Truce,'" *New York Times*, January 19, 2006. See also Amir Shah, Associated Press, "Taliban Leader Said to Be Reorganizing Group," *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, September 22, 2003, 6A.
99. "Mullah Omar Gets on Message with Speech Aimed at West," *The Nation*, November 26, 2009, www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/26-Nov-2009/Mullah-Omar-gets-on-message-with-speech-aimed-at-West.
100. Haris Anwar, "Pakistan Frees Former Taliban Officials to Promote Afghan Peace," *Bloomberg*, December 31, 2012, www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-01/pakistan-frees-former-taliban-officials-to-promote-afghan-peace.html.