

Introduction

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Citizenship has become a fashionable concept and the literature on this subject is now enormous. It has always been central to liberal discourse but what is distinctive about the last ten years or so is the extent to which the concept of citizenship has been taken up by feminists, multi-culturalists, new social movement theorists and those generally critical of the liberal tradition.

During the 1960s and 1970s radicals on the left found the term too 'bourgeois' and, of course, the notion initially signalled one who had a propertied stake in the community. Citizenship was identified with legal and political rights and appeared to ignore the way in which those with wealth could exercise informal power over the property-less and the vulnerable. Yet the term should not be frozen in this way. Citizenship is a concept that is sensitive to historical change; the fact that it offers universal status – rights that everyone is entitled to exercise – makes it an important term to reconstruct and 'reclaim'. Although the liberal view of citizenship is a necessary condition for this process of reconstruction, it is certainly not sufficient, for the liberal view of citizenship still contains exclusionary clauses (even if these are now implicit) that favour certain kinds of people over others.

What is the justification for yet another book on citizenship? Crucial to the argument developed here is the question of the state. This work seeks to challenge the assumption – almost universally held – that citizenship involves the membership of a state. Citizens, it is argued, are French, British or German – and even where citizens are considered to be European or even global – the notion is still state-focused. I want to argue that the state is actually a barrier to the notion of citizenship, defined here as a set of entitlements which include *everyone*.

Rowan Williams, the new Archbishop of Canterbury, delivered a Dibleby lecture on 19 December 2002, which explored many of the themes tackled in this book. My differences with Williams are as instructive as the ground we share in common.

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Citizenship and the State

Williams argues – and this was the aspect of his lecture headlined in *the Times* (27 December 2002) – that ‘we are witnessing the end of the nation state’ (2002: 1). He rightly argues that we need to do some hard thinking about what these changes mean for being a citizen. These changes are, he argues, ‘irreversible’ (2002: 2). Williams’ contention is that the nation state is in decline – a position I would agree with – but he takes the view that the nation state is giving way to something he calls the ‘market state’. Although he is critical of the latter, I want to suggest that the state itself, in all its forms, is the problem.

Rousseau urges his reader to be aware of the poverty of language and be prepared to ‘wait’ (1968: 74) and I am conscious of using words in an unconventional way. My book stands or falls as an attempt to separate the concept of citizenship from that of the state. I define the state in a definition taken from Max Weber as being an institution that claims a monopoly of legitimate force for a particular territory. I seek to ‘deconstruct’ (i.e., criticize) the notion of the state in terms of Weber’s definition, by arguing that the state is a contradictory institution which claims a monopoly that it does not and cannot have. This is true both of its claim to have a monopoly of force and a monopoly of legitimacy.

The state can only claim a monopoly of force because it has competitors (terrorists, criminals, etc.) who use force against the state and society. Hence its monopoly of force is a fiction! The same is true of its claim to have a monopoly of legitimacy. It is because terrorists explicitly and criminals implicitly – not to mention those who are dissidents – challenge the legitimacy of the state that this monopoly is claimed. The state which *actually* had a monopoly of legitimate force would be linked to a society without terrorists or criminals, and hence would not need to exist. These are the implications of Weber’s own definition even though we readily concede that they are not implications which he himself acknowledged.

It is this critique of the state which challenges the standard view of citizenship as denoting membership of a state. For how can one be a citizen when laws are passed and functionaries exist, whose authority is underpinned by this claim to exercise a monopoly of legitimate force? Even when force is authorized, it still prevents the recipient of this force from exercising rights and duties that are crucial to citizenship and it means that those against whom such force is not directly exercised, live in its shadow. They know that the laws they obey can be ‘enforced’, so that the absence of fear which is central to citizenship cannot be proven to exist in a society that centres around the state.

It is the role of the state to impose solutions by force when faced with divisions and conflicts of interest which cannot be tackled through arbitration and negotiation. A person who is not free is not a citizen. It may be objected that the state does not simply use force, but claims – in the celebrated definition that is central to my argument – a monopoly of *legitimate* force.

But this is not a convincing argument since legitimacy implies limits, whereas force, in my view, cannot be limited (however hard authorities might try). Legitimate force is thus a contradiction in terms, and the state, therefore, is an institution seeking to achieve the impossible. Williams argues that the state can no longer protect citizens, given the existence of intercontinental missile technology (2002: 2), but the state's mechanism for protecting 'its' subjects has always been contradictory and paradoxical.

This critique of the state is central to the argument of the book. It explains why we must develop a notion of democracy that goes beyond the state. Years ago I described the concept of the 'democratic state' as an oxymoron (1991: 342) since it is impossible that an institution that claims to have a monopoly of legitimate force can be compatible with the rule of the people. The distinction between nationality and nationalism rests upon this critique of the state, since my argument is that whereas nationalism is a state-centred or statist concept, nationality is not. People have one nationality or many nationalities because it is impossible to be an individual without the language and culture that is central to national belonging. Nationalism, conversely, privileges one nationality above others, and is tied to the fact that the state cannot seek to claim a monopoly of legitimacy in the abstract: it must provide cultural symbols that make its claim plausible and relevant.

States are not only contradictory, oppressive and nationalistic, but among the identities they privilege, is that of masculinity. Many feminists speak critically of the state, and argue for a woman-friendly polity. But women cannot be citizens in any meaningful sense as long as they live under the shadow of the state. In a patriarchal or male dominated society, women are the targets of violence. They are necessarily underrepresented in the state, and the public/private divide works against their participation in the political process. This divide, even as interpreted in the liberal tradition, assumes that women are not really suited to 'public' activity and should confine their activities to the 'private' or domestic sphere. The monopolistic identity of the state – the exaltation of the principle of 'oneness' – works against the interests of women.

Williams argues that the 'market state' is 'here to stay' (2002: 5), but not only is this overly pessimistic, but it points to a meaningless separate identity. The nation state itself has been a 'market state' as long as capitalism and the market have been around. These systems create divisions of interests that make interventions of the state necessary. Capitalism divides society into those who have independent resources, which they can use as capital, and those who have to work for others. Although these divisions are more complex than classical Marxism has assumed, inequality is crucial to the existence of the state since the challenge of the monopoly of the state comes from those who either have too much or too little. Capitalism is inconceivable without a state, even if other forms of exploitative society also necessitate states as well. As for the market, it

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masks the real power that people exercise and although markets can exist without capitalism, markets ultimately generate the kind of structural inequalities that create a need for the state.

Williams argues that the market state is accompanied by 'a disturbingly high percentage of younger people failing to vote' (2002: 5). The state has always been an elite institution, incompatible with meaningful and widespread participation. Apathy and inequality reinforce one another, so that those who are targets of the force of the state are drawn in part from that section of the population who do not participate in the making of laws. They are 'subjects' who must obey laws without formally authorizing them. Moreover, the notion of the state is incompatible with a meaningful concept of community, and however much communitarians applaud the latter, their arguments are often weakened by an uncritical view of the state.

This is the challenge faced by globalization. Williams' market state (which he takes from Bobbit) presupposes what I describe as 'pseudo-globalization'. By this I mean a 'globalization' which divides rather than unites, so that inequalities are deepened, and states remain necessary. The problem with Ohmae's market-fundamentalist version of globalization is that it rests firmly within a state-centric framework. He sees the nation state giving way to the regional state, and his acknowledgement that market forces aggravate rather than reduce inequalities, means that the state and statism remain central to his notion of globalization. Such is the tyranny of the state concept that some see the United Nations as a world state, and regard global (or even European) citizenship as only intelligible in terms of the state.

States generate particular ways of thinking, which I call 'state-centric' or 'statist' in character. Thus the notion of emancipation is either applauded or (more recently) attacked, since it is assumed that it has to be tied to the absolutism of the state. It is true that the classical liberal concept of the 'rational state' saw emancipation as a state of affairs in which individuals obeyed lawful acts of force which they had prescribed for themselves. But this problematic situation – captured memorably in Rousseau's notion of a legitimate state forcing people to be free – arises from the state, not from the concept of emancipation. Postmodernists are often tempted to blame the concept of emancipation for the absolutism and historical insensitivity that derives from the state. A statist mentality is not simply one that admires the state: it may involve (as with classical Marxism and anarchism) critiques of the state but these are critiques which ensure that divisions continue and states remain in business. Naïve optimism is not really preferable to naïve pessimism: both express philosophical attitudes tied to a fatalist acceptance of the state.

Coercion and Force: State and Government

But is it possible to envisage life beyond the state? Deeply rooted in our psyche (with 5,000 years of theory and practice to mould and reinforce it)

is the notion that the state is part of civilization, and that without the state, we will have chaos and destruction.

In fact humanity has lived for most of its life without a state. While the domestic societies of 'early' peoples cannot constitute a model to which we should return, they are of great interest to political theory in demonstrating that humans can order their lives without a state. Crucial to my argument is the distinction between force, on the one hand, and coercion and constraint, on the other. This distinction enables us to challenge the proposition that order is impossible without the state.

What early stateless societies demonstrate, as does international society – which is also stateless in character – is that order can only be established through sanctions which are social rather than statist in character. Stateless societies maintain order through non-statist sanctions, economic and moral pressures, ostracism, etc., even if some of the sanctions employed in early stateless domestic societies are archaic and no longer meaningful in character. What these sanctions demonstrate is the need to distinguish between coercion (and constraint) on the one hand, and force on the other. It is interesting that Mill refers to a 'moral coercion', which he sees as distinct from the force of the state, and even notes the punitive character of what he calls 'natural penalties' – spontaneous social pressures that arise simply because we interact with one another (Mill, 1974).

Of course, coercion has a 'negative' ring in our liberal culture, and one can preserve some of this negativity by making a distinction between coercion, on the one hand, and constraint, on the other. Coercion can be characterized as a deliberate intervention intended to inflict harm on a recipient through pressures that fall short of force, whereas constraints arise unintentionally and have a much less formal character. They may indeed simply constitute natural and social structures, which cause people to do things they otherwise would not do.

The point about both coercion and constraint is that they are unavoidable. They arise simply because we live in a society and they are inherent in relationships. Both are a condition of freedom, even though the more people can regulate their lives through constraint rather than coercion (other things being equal), the better. It is particularly important to distinguish between coercion and force, since force disables agency in a way that coercion does not. Even when extreme coercion is used and force is threatened, it is not coercion that is the problem, but the credibility of the force threatened. A two year old who 'threatens' you with a plastic water pistol is very different from a hardened criminal who produces a sawn-off shotgun! Coercion is unpleasant, but it leaves a person's capacity to exercise choice intact in a way which force does not.

I argue for a concept of force that is broad but is basically physicalist in character. What makes abuse an act of force is that it creates physical harm for the recipient, whereas an adverse moral judgement, for example, need not. Obviously, it can be difficult to distinguish extreme coercion from force, but in my view, it is a crucial distinction to make, since the use

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of coercion allows for a rule- and law-governed society and the employment of sanctions. Force, on the other hand, actually undermines order since it suppresses agency and creates a desire for revenge, making it ineffective in the long term as a sanction.

Is force never justifiable? I make a distinction between what is justifiable in the short term and what is legitimate. Force is never legitimate since, as argued above, legitimacy implies limits whereas force always goes to extremes. Force, however, can be justified when (and only when) it is used to create a breathing space enabling non-statist sanctions to operate. I do not make any distinction between force and violence (as some writers do) on the grounds that the distinction is not a practical one as the hapless recipients of force can readily testify. By problematizing force, it becomes necessary to identify the conditions in which force arises, and when it can be avoided. My position is rooted in the argument that force can be avoided where common interests exist between parties to a dispute. This does not mean that common interests presuppose an absence of conflict but rather that conflict arises (and is inevitable) simply because people are different from one another, but this kind of conflict can be resolved through compromise, negotiation and arbitration.

Where common interests do not exist, force comes into play, and the use of force is not only a defeat for negotiation, but it can only suppress or manage conflicts of interest – it can never resolve them. The position adopted here is not a pacifist one – that force should always be avoided – but it sees force as undesirable, dangerous and only to be justified on the grounds that a present act of force makes a future one unnecessary. Force can be justified if it is the only way to enact policies that cement common interests.

The force/coercion (and constraint) distinction translates into a distinction between state and government. Government, in my view, involves resolving conflicts of interest through sanctions that are inherent in social relationships and fall short of force. Williams makes it impossible to look beyond the state when he follows the common pattern of using government and state as synonyms (2002: 1). In stateless societies, governments exist without the state, but in state-centred societies, the distinction is more difficult to make, but it still exists – logically if not empirically. This is not only true in terms of domestic state-centred societies; in international society, the participants are often states whose behaviour is a complex mixture of the statist and what I call the governmental. While I write, the conflict in Iraq is being waged in a way that is depressingly statist in character, although talk of a future reconstruction involves (some) reference to governmental measures as well. It is also true that, in some instances, British troops have been trained to blend the governmental with the statist to a much greater extent than American troops, who appear to regard the Iraqis as enemies to be killed, and not human beings to be empowered.

States can act governmentally, as in situations in which they seek to resolve conflicts through negotiation and compromise. When they do,

they are, strictly speaking, dissolving away statism, and changing themselves into something else. Indeed, the disappearance of the state can only occur in this way. This is why I regard citizenship as a governmental and not a statist concept, since people can only become citizens when their agency is acknowledged and they are not subject to force.

The distinction between force and coercion (and constraint), and state and government, is central to a critique which makes it possible to look beyond the state in both autopian and realist way. It also means that a democratic society is not one without laws, rules and discipline: rather it is a society governed by coercion and constraint, and not force. Democracy is certainly governmental and political, in that it seeks to resolve conflicts of interest in ways that preserve the agency (and thus capacity for self-government) of parties to a dispute. Citizenship and democracy are contradicted by the use of force. The use of force is incompatible with the idea of self-government (which I see as central to the concept of democracy), even if this force is deemed legitimate because it has been explicitly authorized. I am critical of Held's model of a cosmopolitan democracy because he argues that a cosmopolitan democracy needs to be sanctioned by force. Of course, cosmopolitan institutions may need to use force in the short term, but this indicates that they still have some distance to go before they can be described as democratic.

If democratic nationalism is a contradiction in terms, a democratic nationality is not. Such a nationality respects and learns from others who are different – both those in their midst and those who live in other countries. What aspects of a national culture are unacceptable? Aspects that harm others and are intolerant of difference. In a democracy, these harmful practices can only be dealt with through non-statist sanctions. In societies yet to be democratic, force may have to be used in situations where social pressures aren't powerful enough to prevent harmful practices.

The tension between force and coercion is well exemplified in terms of the struggle for women's equality. Clearly men (or partners) who are so brutalized that they cannot respond to mere coercion, may have to be suppressed through force, but thoughtful women recognize that, for example, the use of force against rapists must be linked to policies that address the hatred and insecurity of the rapist. Codes of practice that empower women and advance their interests can only really be implemented through coercion and constraint: to rely upon force (though it may be provisionally necessary) can easily become counter-productive.

It is tempting, but wrong, to argue that the very distinction between public and private should be abandoned. The public equates with the political. An issue becomes public when it involves the existence of conflict, which needs to be resolved. Although the distinction is a complex one, what is private refers to a sphere in which conflict is imperceptible or embryonic, so that political mechanisms are not called into play. This 'sphere' is not static since an arena of privacy may become public in character when conflict breaks out. It is important to remember that conflicts can

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not only be tackled without the use of force, but many conflicts of interest can be resolved by what Mill refers to as natural penalties – spontaneous social pressures that do not even require moral judgements or focused sanctions to be effective. The public/private divide is better characterized as a public/private difference, given the fact that divisions imply conflicts of interest that generate force.

The formal exclusion of women from citizenship was historically premised on the assumption that only those who could fight for their country could be citizens. It is true that women can now enter the armed forces in some societies, and although this is a necessary step in dissolving away naturalistic prejudices, the use of violence remains a statist and patriarchal practice, incompatible with emancipation and citizenship.

Capitalism demonstrates, as Marx's analysis testifies, a distinction between coercion, which compels people to work for an employer and force, which is state-centred. Although Marx makes it clear that the coercion involved in the labour contract is unacceptable, he also indicates that coercion and constraint (a realm of 'necessity') is unavoidable in any society. Making the relationships, which markets obscure, transparent still involves coercion since, to echo Mill, there cannot be too much government helping people to help themselves. Regulations, which prevent harm to others or to oneself, are essential to the governing process. Williams speaks of the market state deregulating in order to 'clear a space for individuals or groups to do their own regulating' (2002: 3), but deregulation is only justifiable when it reduces harm.

The argument for a basic income could not be brought about without a good deal of moral pressure – both upon those who see themselves as having to pay disproportionately for such a measure and those who would benefit from it. The attack on the welfare state has (somewhat demagogically) focused on the paternalistic and authoritarian character of much welfare provision and it has to be said that the welfare state has often and in part provided charity for the vulnerable rather than rights for all. The welfare state is an amalgam of what I would call the statist and the governmental; empowering people but often through a leadership that is elitist and divisive.

The use of quotas to increase participation from those who have been excluded must be handled carefully and sensitively so that these quotas do not perpetuate a zero-sum mentality, which takes the view that in order to include, one must exclude. There is also a problem of voting, although, as the recent protests against the war on Iraq have shown, participation in politics can take other forms. The argument that I advance for compulsory voting is an argument which assumes that formal political processes themselves become more meaningful and although in the short term compulsory voting may require a small measure of statism, in general it seems to me that the implementation of such a measure would require social pressures of a governmental kind.

Globalization involves the restructuring of the international order as a process that must surely be governmental in character – with the exception

of rogue states who will not respond to non-statist sanctions. Global governance or government should be conceived in two ways. First, as a gradual process in which regulatory activities formerly exercised by states, are taken over by global bodies, and second as a process in which global activities do not suddenly vanquish states, but gradually make them redundant. It is crucial that we do not pose the issue in terms of a modernist divide between global government *or* the state, for that assumes that one monopolistic institution replaces another. The point is that states will remain as long as conflicts of interest exist which cannot be settled through negotiation – and that, alas, will be for a long time!

Coercion, constraint and government bring about progress and change as education and socialization alters, but force – like the state – is a static concept and practice which must be phased out as the struggle for emancipation develops. It is a central problem with anarchism that it fails to distinguish coherently between force, coercion and constraint, and between state and government, and hence is utopian without being realist. Marxism's contribution to the realization of an inclusive citizenship is weakened by the fact that the act of revolution can only polarize so that common interests become difficult, if not impossible, to cement.

To realistically envisage a citizenship beyond the state, it is crucial to challenge the collapse of force and coercion (and constraint) and that of state and government which is promoted in the liberal tradition. Few liberals today would regard the state of nature as a meaningful concept, and yet they analyse freedom and force as though it were possible for individuals to exist without relationships.

A Relational Approach

Why can't some be citizens while others are subject to force? Underpinning my argument is what I call a 'relational' approach, which means that we only identify ourselves through others, and when these others are deprived of their freedom, we have no freedom either. Although force particularly harms those who are targeted, the perpetrators of force also lose their autonomy, so that unless everyone is a citizen, no-one is a citizen.

Williams argues that the 'button pushing model' of the market state is 'not the ideal of democratic life but a parody of it' (2002: 7). The 'market state', as Williams describes it, promotes an atomism which denies that individuals must be seen in relationships to one another. The idea that societies calling themselves democratic may be oppressive wrongly assumes that a majority can be free at the expense of minorities. This rests upon a non-relational view of individuals. It takes the view that some can be free while others are dominated.

The critique of patriarchy advanced here is relational in that it argues that men cannot be free while women are subordinated. It is true that in a

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patriarchal society, men enjoy privileges which make them 'victors', but patriarchy oppresses *everyone* (albeit in different ways). Men have begun to realise that patriarchy not only strips them of involvement in child rearing, but subjects them in particular to the violence of war. Engels admirably captured the relevance of the relational approach to the national question when he argued that no nation can be free that oppresses another, and it is clear that colonialism doesn't merely brutalize and degrade its victims, it also limits the so-called beneficiaries as well.

There is, it seems to me, a tension in Marx's critique of capitalism between a relational view of class around the concept of alienation and the zero-sum logic of a class war. Central, however, to the argument in *Capital*, is the concept of abstraction. Abstraction involves a denial of relationships – an atomistic approach – and abstraction, for Marx, means not 'unreality' but rather mystification. Commodities are perfectly real, but what makes them mystifying (and hence abstract) is the abstract labour embodied in them. This conceals the underlying relations of production which have made them what they are, so that (in the famous phrase) relations between people appear as relations between things.

Appearances are part of reality, but to understand reality more profoundly, Marx argues that a process of concentration needs to be grasped. I assume the process of 'concentration' to involve the highlighting of the social relationships that abstraction conceals, and the problem with Marx is that this 'dialectic of abstraction and concentration' (as I rather grandly call it) is not carried far enough. People do not simply concentrate their interests in economic terms. These classes also take a gender, national, religious form, etc., so that class expresses itself in a specific and culturally particularistic way. The way people experience oppression is crucial to the kind of change they struggle for. It is vital that we make relationships transparent, for the notion of the 'individual' can conceal, as feminists have pointed out, a dominant male identity, and the notion of a 'woman' may only represent females who are rich and well educated.

In fact, it is through regulation that capitalism is transformed and the equality and inclusiveness essential to citizenship, obtained. This is why it is helpful to stress the need for 'post-market' as opposed to 'anti-market' measures. The former seek to realise the dynamism and diversity that the market theoretically extols, but which, through its penchant for abstraction, it actually undermines.

Nothing demonstrates the erosions of the logic of capitalism by new liberal reformism more dramatically than the New Right reaction to this reformism that took place in the 1980s. It is crucial to emphasize that the neo-liberalism of the New Right is not only shorn of the egalitarian character of the classical liberal tradition, but freedom is seen as the anti-relational capacities of an elite. What makes the notion of a 'right to be unequal' problematic, is the fact that a right implies an egalitarian relationship (of some kind) between individuals – precisely the point that the

New Right deny. Rights arose historically as part of liberal or modernist discourse, and a society which grants people abstract 'rights' is clearly preferable to a society that grants no rights at all. But the point still remains, that rights need be grasped in a concrete fashion i.e., in a way that is not abstracted from correlative duties or obligations. Rights can only be exercised by individuals, but once we see individuals in relational terms, it is clear that individuals can only identify themselves through collectivities or groups. Groups or collectivities exist in plural and multiple terms so that rights not only involve an individual having many identities, but no right can exist that harms the individual or his or her associates. A right that does not empower is not a right: the atomistic notion of a 'right' to exploit or be violent has to be rejected.

The literature on globalization warns us of the dangers of assuming that we can study movements and countries in isolation from one other. If the inhabitants of wealthy countries find that the number of refugees and asylum seekers have dramatically increased over the last few years, then they will be compelled to reflect on the global consequences of the North/South divide. Unless we see globalization as a process that extending social justice to all, we should not be surprised at the numbers of people who move out of poorer countries in search of a 'better' life.

The so-called realists who, following World War II, describe democracy as a system in which people choose those who rule over them, rested their case for a non-participatory democracy upon the logic of atomism and abstraction. The minority of active decision makers was seen as quite unrelated to the irrational and 'primitive' mass of the population whose temperament and skills left them unsuited to political involvement. Macpherson's argument for greater participation in *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* adopts a relational argument in his search for what he calls loopholes within a vicious circle in which apathy and inequality reinforce each other. His argument is that people cannot be effective consumers when the environment deteriorates and job insecurity and inflation set in, so that the formerly apathetic feel compelled to participate. Each increasingly finds that they must relate to others through conscious political participation as the condition of the 'atomistic consumer' becomes increasingly untenable.

The case for compulsory voting that I make is linked to compulsory community service: both can only help to instil in the individual a sense of social responsibility and indebtedness to others. What disrupts the relational approach of many communitarians and republicans is their failure to see that the use of force is incompatible with the mutuality of relationships.

A relational view of the individual underpins the case for a citizenship that excludes no-one. It is essential to isolate those who are staunchly opposed to extending citizenship whether on misogynist, racist or nationalist grounds or because they are so privileged that they cannot identify with others. A critique from within makes it as difficult as possible for the intransigent to gain adherents. As the hapless inhabitants of a Hobbesian

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state of nature, all who live in state- and market-dominated societies have a vested interest in living in a world in which differences can be celebrated and conflicts of interest resolved through negotiation rather than by force. The well-being of each depends upon the well-being of all.

What undermines the capacity of anarchism and Marxism to assist in moving towards an inclusive citizenship is the way in which both ultimately undermine a relational position. Anarchism treats individuals abstractly, and substitutes a liberal spontaneity for the coercive and constraining discipline of a relationship. Marxism, for its part, is saddled with notions of class war, revolution and dictatorship, which weaken a relational attitude towards contending parties in a dispute.

It is important that we evaluate all differences positively. Although it is likely that the struggle for an inclusive citizenship will be pursued by those who are the victims rather than the beneficiaries of the market and state, people with education and status are (or can be), less subject to prejudice based upon ignorance; 'outsiders' are more likely to see the need for integrating in an open-minded way rather than being bludgeoned into assimilating to dominant norms. The need for self-government affects *everyone*, for even the well-to-do are vulnerable to problems in the social and natural environment.

Momentum Concepts

Crucial for the arguments in this book is the idea of the *momentum concept*. Momentum concepts are those which are infinitely progressive and egalitarian: they have no stopping point and cannot be 'realized'. Static concepts, by way of contrast, are repressively hierarchical and divisive. The latter must be discarded whereas the former have an historical dynamic which means they must be built upon and continuously transcended. The state, patriarchy and violence are examples of static concepts; freedom, autonomy, individuality, citizenship and emancipation are examples of momentum concepts. Tocqueville famously formulated democracy as a momentum concept – a concept that has no stopping point. However, his account is marred by static and 'foundational' features, whereas momentum concepts, as I formulate them, seek to avoid this inconsistency by being infinite in their egalitarian scope. It is crucial to avoid the kind of inversion of modernity that leads some into a scepticism and relativism that simply echoes a Humean empiricism (which is after all still modernist in character).

Curiously, conservatives have sensed that democracy is a 'momentum concept' and have opposed it historically for this reason. But if democracy is a momentum concept, this is not true of liberalism, which is a creed linking individual freedom to the ownership of private property. The classical liberal theory of natural rights is a device for justifying (and authorizing) the need for a state, however many conservatives may protest at

the subversive implications of liberal abstractions of the individual, freedom and equality.

In his critique of the market state, Williams argues his relational case in terms of a relation to the eternal, to God (2002: 8). The concept of God needs, however, to be seen as a momentum concept – a God who is always becoming more God – rather than as a static ideal that contrasts tragically with a fallen world. This would mean arguing that God is not dead, but needs to be reconstructed conceptually as being not a person, a supernatural creator, a spiritual force or an object of worship but is simply a philosophical principle of infinity – of infinite matter in motion. The notion of ‘reconstruction’ is tied to the idea of a momentum concept since in criticizing old ideas, we need to consciously (where they have an egalitarian and relational potential) reconstruct them.

In what way is citizenship a momentum concept? In three ways. First, the struggle for citizenship can be developed even by those who seek only limited steps forward and are oblivious of a more wide – ranging agenda. Second, citizenship involves a process of change that is both revolutionary and evolutionary – it is important that we do not privilege one over the other – and third, citizenship is an on-going struggle with no stopping point. It is not that the ends of an inclusive citizenship are not important: it is rather that achieving one, enables us to move to the next, ad infinitum. So-called ‘thick’ citizenship (a citizenship which gives people real power over their lives) is desirable, but ‘thin’ citizenship (in terms of formal legal and political entitlements) is better than no citizenship at all. The right to self-rule is important and central to citizenship: but it becomes absurd and paradoxical when placed in the context of the state.

This is why the case for an inclusive citizenship makes it essential that we look beyond the state, and I have tried to outline in this introduction the notions of coercion and constraint; government and relationships; abstraction and momentum which make it possible to present a utopianism that is thoroughly realistic at the same time.

