Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences
Four Volume Set
Edited by:
June 2005 | 1 648 pages | SAGE Publications Ltd
This is a comprehensive and authoritative reference collection in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences. The source materials selected are drawn from debates within the natural sciences as well as social scientific practice.
This four volume set covers the traditional literature on the philosophy of the social sciences, and the contemporary philosophical and methodological debates developing at the heart of the disciplinary and interdisciplinary groups in the social sciences. It addresses the needs of researchers and academics who are grappling with the relationship between questions of knowledge construction and the problems of social scientific method.
VOLUME ONE
SECTION ONE
LANGUAGE, EXPLANATION AND REALITY
A J Ayer
The Elimination of Metaphysics and The a priori
B Russell
How a priori Knowledge Is Possible
I Berlin
Verification
C G Hemple
The Function of General Laws in History
I Berlin
Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements
I Berlin
Logical Translation
SECTION TWO
POPPERIAN INTERVENTIONS AND THE PROBLEMS OF POSITIVISM
K Popper
Fundamental Problems and A Theory of Method
K Popper
Science, Conjectures and Refutations
K Popper
Conjectural Knowledge
W O Quine
Two Dogmas of Empiricism
A Giddens
Positivism and Its Critics
SECTION THREE
CONCEPT FORMATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
E Nagel
Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences
C G Hempel
Typological Methods in the Social Sciences
A Schutz
Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences
VOLUME TWO
SECTION ONE
ACKNOWLEDGING IMAGINATION AND COMPLEXITY IN THE SOCIAL WORLD
M Weber
Ideal Types and Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy
A Schutz
Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action
F A Hayek
Scientism
F Machlup
Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?
SECTION TWO
INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
C Taylor
Interpretation and the Sciences of Man
H Garfinkel
Routine and Everyday Activities and Common-Sense Knowledge of Social Structures
W Outhwaite
Naturalisms and Anti-Naturalisms
R Rorty
Science and Solidarity
M J Smith
Empiricism, Idealism and Realism
VOLUME THREE
SECTION ONE
PARADIGMS ETC
T Kuhn
Normal Science and The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions
A Musgrave
Kuhn's Second Thoughts
M Mulkay and G N Gilbert
Putting Philosophy to Work
H Collins
The TEA Set
W O Hagstrom
Science as Gift-Giving
B Latour and S Woolgar
The Cycle of Credibility
D Bloor
The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge
P T Manicas and A Rosenberg
Naturalism, Epistemological Individualism and The Strong Programme
M Gibbons
Mode 1 and Mode 2 Knowledge production
SECTION TWO
... AND WHAT SCIENTISTS SHOULD DO!
I Lakatos
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
K Popper
Normal Science and Its Dangers
P Feyerabend
On the Critique of Scientific Reason
L Laudan
For Method
SECTION THREE
PARADIGMS AND RESEARCH PROGRAMMES IN SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
M Blaug
Kuhn versus Lakatos, or Paradigms versus Research Programmes in the History of Economics
R E Backhouse
The Lakatosian Legacy in Economic Methodology
M Landau
Objectivity, Neutrality and Paradigms in Political Science
VOLUME FOUR
SECTION ONE
NEW DEBATES AND SITUATED KNOWLEDGES
R Harre and M Krausz
The Debate between Relativists and Absolutists
A Giddens
Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and the Production of Culture
R Bhaskar
Societies
A Sayer
Problems of Explanation and the Aims of Social Science
S Harding
From the Woman Question in Science to the Science Question in Feminism
V Olesen
Feminisms and Models of Qualitative Research
S Harding
Is Science Multicultural? Challenges, Resources, Opportunities, Uncertainties
SECTION TWO
APPLICATIONS
D N McCloskey
The Rhetoric of Economics
Z Bauman
Is There a Postmodern Sociology?
U Maki
Two Philosophies of the Rhetoric of Economics
T Lawson
A Realist Perspective on Contemporary Economic Theory
A Sayer
Geohistorical Explanation and Problems of Narrative
M J Smith
Prospects for a Post-Disciplinary Social Science